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The Panj River represents the border between Afghanistan (left) and Tajikistan (right). Since 
2002, four bridges connecting the remote provinces of Badakhshan and Gorno-Badakhshan, 
along with border posts and cross-border markets have been built to promote cross-border 














Cross-Border markets sponsored by international donor organisations provide traders and 
customers with the opportunity to earn an income and purchase products that are cheaper or 
unavailable in their own country. Unfortunately, the markets are oftentimes closed, officially 
due to the insecure situation in Afghanistan. Photograph taken by Dörre at the cross-border 
market between Ishkoshim (Tajikistan) and Sultan Ishkashim (Afghanistan), May 2015  
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Andrei Dörre & Stefan Schütte 
Preface  
Empirical research and fieldwork practice conducted by students have formed a central part 
of the master degree programme provided at the Centre for Development Studies of the 
Institute of Geographical Sciences at Freie Universitaet Berlin. In an attempt to bridge the 
gap between theoretical concepts and actual experiences during fieldwork in real-life 
settings, these projects limited in scope and time aim to provide opportunities for deep 
learning, for intercultural encounter and for reflecting about the explanatory value of 
development concepts as taught in the classroom.  
The fieldwork practice was carried out in the remote high mountain region of the Western 
Pamirs in the year 2018 in close collaboration with the University of Central Asia (UCA) on 
its campus in the City of Khorog as the administrative centre of the Gorno-Badakhshan 




















Fig. 1: The Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast of Tajikistan.                                                          
Source: Dörre 2020 (draft) based on Jarvis et al. 2008  
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The overall thematic umbrella was selected from the field of regional and urban 
development; twelve individual research projects were conceived in partnership with faculty 
members from the University of Central Asia and subsequently further refined and jointly 
developed by teams of students from Freie Universitaet Berlin and the University of Central 
Asia in Khorog.  
The particular study area was selected for didactic and practical reasons. In the Western 
Pamirs, manifold social, economic and ecological challenges and constraints meet in a 
confined space. In combination they provide complex and difficult conditions for different 
facets of societal development. The twelve student teams focused on certain aspects and 
implemented their individual projects in independent fieldwork. The thematic focus of the 
case studies investigating specific problems moved within the three subject areas “economic 
relations and economic development”, “social and ecological challenges” and “social 
services” in Khorog and beyond. Specifically, the studies dealt with questions of 
international trade relations, marketing strategies for food, agricultural practice and 
production, migration, development cooperation, natural hazards, education, provision and 
consumption of electrical energy, everyday mobility, tourism and waste disposal. Fieldwork 
in and around Khorog was carried out in July 2018. This volume comprises six selected studies 
that provide an impressive picture of the challenges the region is facing, but above all of 
the human agency of local people and their creative and proactive ways of dealing with 

















Fig. 2: Khorog City.                                                                                                                       
Source: Dörre 2020 (draft) based on Jarvis et al. 2008 
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The first paper by Safarmamadova, Siemering and Yang deals with the impact of growing 
trade between Tajikistan and China on urban development in Khorog. The provincial centre 
(Fig. 2) is located at the crossroads between the border post at Kulma Pass and the Tajik 
capital of Dushanbe. The paper looks at how this trade touches down in Khorog as a transit 
point, how the urban economy is affected by growing trade relations, and how its daily 
practice is organised and observable.  
The second paper written by Caleta, Okhirnazarova and Wilß deals with the urban food 
system of Khorog by highlighting wheat’s position and central function as the most important 
staple food. The organisation of the wheat trade and the articulation and structure of wheat 
value chains are investigated. The strive for safeguarding a constant supply is another central 
aspect of the argument put forward in the paper.  
Khorog as a place with a thriving fast food sector is the starting point for the paper by Hasse, 
Nasratshoeva and Rupp. By using the framework of glocalization, it looks at how global fast 
food chains form an inspiration for local entrepreneurs and how they adopt globalised 
branding images and adapt those strategies to local taste and culture. By studying 
fashionable and hip eating places, the authors provide a glimpse into marketing strategies, 
global fashion, and politics of culinary taste in Khorog.  
The paper by Jumakhonov, Kessler and Laube looks at the ubiquitous phenomenon of labour 
migration in Tajikistan from the viewpoint of those who stay behind. Based on in-depth case 
studies the focus is on the multiple ways in which long-term migration strategies affect 
gender roles and responsibilities at the household level in Khorog.  
The University of Central Asia as a driver for local and regional development is the focus of 
the paper by Azum, Belling and Rahmatshoev. It looks at the economic, material and social 
processes stimulated by the construction of the Khorog Campus of the UCA that was finalised 
and started operations in 2017. Their findings are based on interviews with various staff 
members on the campus and its affiliated schools in the city; furthermore, they talked to 
displaced villagers who lived on the land allocated for the construction the University of 
Central Asia. This academic institution is perceived as an important vehicle for setting in 
motion a variety of largely beneficial development processes in the Western Pamirs.  
The final paper by Bredigkeit, Imomyorbekov and Vipavc looks at the role that national and 
international organisations play for facilitating social and economic development. Based on 
a register of the diverse practical development work carried out in the region the authors 
conclude that the privatisation of state responsibilities is captured by the wide range of 
activities that are carried out by a large number of non-governmental organisations and 
especially the Aga Khan Development Network.  
The successful implementation of this student project was significantly dependent on the 
invaluable help and contributions provided by many individuals affiliated with the University 
of Central Asia. Chiefly, both Munira Amidkhonova and Myrza Karimov facilitated 
communication and were instrumental in providing logistic support for empirical fieldwork. 
The support of Saidzulolsho Shozodaev as chief of administration at the UCA Khorog Campus 
was critical, as was the help of Murodbek Laljebaev and other UCA faculty to provide critical 
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commentary to improve the design of individual research projects and to serve as interview 
partners in their field of expertise.  
The student project in Khorog was generously supported by both the ‘PROMOS-Programme 
for the mobility of undergraduate and postgraduate students’ jointly funded by the German 
Federal Ministry of Education and Research and the Freie Universitaet Berlin whose 
Department of Earth Sciences increased the budget with an additional grant. We are very 
grateful to all supporters.  
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Khursheda Safarmamadova, Sarah Siemering & Ye Yang  
Manifestations of the Tajik-Chinese Trade: Khorog at the Periphery of a 
Fast-growing Trade Relationship  
Abstract 
The Tajik-Chinese trade has flourished ever since the opening of Tajikistan and China’s only border 
crossing point at Kulma in 2004. Nowadays, China is not only one of Tajikistan’s leading trading 
partners, but also its biggest direct investor. This paper is based on fieldwork in and around the Tajik 
city of Khorog, capital of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO), and Tajikistan’s capital, 
Dushanbe. It follows products as they travel across the border from major production sites in China 
to the main markets of Dushanbe and local markets of Khorog. Its research aim is to examine how the 
Tajik-Chinese trade impacts the local realities in Khorog. Therefore, the study considers three main 
strands related to the trade: The transport of goods, administration of the trade and effects on 
Khorog’s local economy. In trying to identify change effected by the formation of a Tajik -Chinese 
trade relationship, this paper focuses on the question of how the trade manifests itself in Khorog. The 
research results highlight ambivalent, fragmented effects of the Tajik-Chinese trade. The Tajik-
Chinese trade does not affect noticeable growth for different actors on different levels across-the-
board due to the marginalisation of Khorog’s local market. Still, the consequences of the border 
opening have penetrated the market of the study area as well as the lives of the local people visibly. 
Introduction 
Today, China’s influence on Tajikistan is omnipresent in the country, due to the formation 
of a flourishing trade relationship over the past two decades. This raises the question of how 
this relationship was developed from being non-existent at the time the Soviet Union 
collapsed to China becoming one of Tajikistan’s leading trading partners. To begin with, 
Tajikistan is highly disadvantaged on the world market based on its geographical location 
and subsequent constraints alone (Coulibaly 2012: 2). It is a mountainous and landlocked 
country in Central Asia that has only limited access to other markets. Shaped by high 
mountains, framed by Kyrgyzstan in the North, Uzbekistan in the West and Afghanistan in 
the South, Tajikistan is separated from China by high mountain ranges. These constraints 
add to Tajikistan’s “poor logistics and business environment” (Coulibaly 2012: 6) and already 
fragile economy. The geographical conditions in Tajikistan favour either trading with former 
Soviet partners or its powerful neighbours in the region, particularly China. Still, Tajikistan’s 
regional trade ties are weak and its transport links remain upgradable. Together, these 
conditions make Tajikistan vulnerable to external shocks (Asadov 2012: 6-7). Infrastructural 
improvements are the prerequisite for economic growth in Tajikistan. Thus, the country is 
“seeking to improve its transport corridors and multimodal logistics services that could 
significantly enhance its regional competitiveness” (Asadov 2012; 6), and China is its most 
important partner in doing so. 
Against this background, the paper focuses on aspects of regional economic development in 
Khorog, Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) in the Western Pamirs. The GBAO 
constitutes 45 percent of Tajikistan’s area, although it is “sparsely populated” (Kreutzmann 
2016) with only about 214,000 inhabitants. 30,000 inhabitants live in Khorog, which 
“functions as the administrative and economic hub of the Pamirs” (Kreutzmann 2016). In 
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regard to the increased Chinese influence on Tajikistan as a whole and Gorno-Badakhshan in 
particular, the research interest of this paper is to examine how the Tajik-Chinese trade 
manifests itself in Khorog. In doing so, three main dimensions of the Tajik-Chinese trade 
relationship will be explored in the following chapters: (i) the logistics of the China trade in 
terms of transport of goods, (ii) its administration and (iii) its impact on Khorog’s local 
economy. The paper aims to identify how products travel across the border and how actors 
along the transport route operate; how the trade is regulated and what effects the opening 
of the border had on the city’s local market. 
Thinking about relations between the core and periphery provided analytical inspiration for 
in this paper. In aiming to explain the uneven development between regions or between 
urban and rural areas the core-periphery model works on different scales, from towns and 
cities to regions and global relations. In the context of this paper, periphery refers to a 
region that is relatively marginal economically. Both the economy and its development lag 
behind the standards of the core region. Due to limitation in resources and infrastructure, 
the periphery is significantly less competitive than the core region (Borgatti and Everett 
2000). Here, Khorog and Gorno-Badakhshan are regarded as periphery on a national scale, 
compared to Dushanbe and its surroundings.  
Research methods 
Research for this paper was carried out mainly in and around the city of Khorog, as well as 
in Tajikistan’s capital, Dushanbe. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with a wide 
variety of participants involved in the China trade. In Khorog, interviews were conducted 
with the ‘Department of Investment and State Property Management in GBAO,’ the 
‘Department of Economic Development and Trade’ and the ‘Regional Customs Office,’ 
business owners, entrepreneurs and sellers at the local bazaar. Additionally, interviews were 
conducted with inspectors, customs officers and truck drivers at a terminal in the nearby 
village of Tang and sellers at the ‘Korvon’ market in Dushanbe. The interviews were 
complemented by findings gathered through participatory research at the terminal in Tang 
and at Khorog’s local bazaar, together with a customer survey and a survey of business 
people at the local bazaar. Due to the limitations of this study, the conclusions are tentative 
and require further in-depth research to fully assess the complex and growing structure of 
Tajik-Chinese trade and its far-reaching impacts on the local population. 
Contextualisation 
The following part will briefly introduce aspects of the historical, political and economic 
context that are relevant for understanding international trade between China and 
Tajikistan. 
Remnants of Tajikistan’s Soviet past 
The region of Central Asia is generally defined as the following five independent states that 
were former Soviet Republics: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and 
Tajikistan. Central Asia has “long been a zone of conflict and competition” (Pannell 2011: 
105) as regards local groups and external actors alike, going back to the ‘Great Game’ 
between Russia and Great Britain in the 19th century. Historically, Tajikistan’s economy has 
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been shaped most notably by being part of the integrated Soviet economy (Coulibaly  2012: 
2). Since its independence in 1991, there have been little changes in Tajikistan’s domestic 
production and export structure and remnants of the Soviet era persist to this day. The 
dissolution of the Soviet Union led to “instability and uncertainty both in central and 
provincial political institutions” (Parham 2016: 359) in Tajikistan, a consequence of the 
“shift from a planned to a market-led economy and the withdrawal of subsidies from 
Moscow” (Kanji 2002: 138). Following its independence, Tajikistan was shaped by the 
devastating effects of a civil war in the 1990s (1992-1997). During the Soviet era and until 
the late 1990s, there were hardly any relations between Tajikistan (or the Tajik Soviet 
Socialist Republic, respectively) and China. After the peace agreement in 1997, Tajik-
Chinese relations developed gradually within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation (SCO) (Olimova 2008: 63).  
The Tajik-Chinese relationship within large international frameworks 
China’s interest in Central Asia is “both diplomatic and economic in character” (Pannell 
2011: 110) and regulated to different policy initiatives. The SCO, apart from being an 
important Eurasian political and economic union, mainly focuses on security issues. The 
organisation was initially referred to as the ‘Shanghai Five,’ consisting of China, Russia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and was founded in 1996 as a “loose regional security 
alliance” (Pannell 2011: 114) in light of growing Islamic extremism. Since 2001, the 
organisation’s scope has widened with additional members (Uzbekistan, India, Pakistan) and 
becoming a relevant counterweight to European and US influence. Generally, China’s 
economic advancement of Central Asia is oriented towards security. 
China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI) has been a main emphasis of Chinese foreign policy 
since its launch in 2013. Developing economic corridors in Central as well as South Asia 
through “a series of transport nodes that are strategically placed” (Dave and Kobayashi 2018: 
268) and connectivity with Europe are the initiative’s aims. Furthermore, the initiative’s 
“developmental thrust […] and ‘win-win’ promise is very appealing to […] Tajikistan” (Dave 
and Kobayashi 2018: 271) as it promises to better integrate Tajikistan into the dynamics of 
regional trade in Central Asia. Overall, the SCO, BRI as well as continually growing economic 
and commercial relations with Central Asia, made China gain “increasing economic and 
political influence and extend the arc of security westward into Central Asia” (Dave and 
Kobayashi 2018: 268). 
Major Chinese investments in Tajikistan 
So far, “Tajikistan has benefitted the most from Chinese investments in road infrastructure” 
(Peyrouse 2011: 1) compared to all other Central Asian countries. Hence Tajikistan welcomes 
the Chinese development efforts in Central Asia and the rapid expansion of Tajik-Chinese 
relations, based on the mutual interest in the realisation of major infrastructure projects 
like the construction of a transport corridor connecting China and Tajikistan. However, for 
China this means that “Tajikistan is both a market for its exports, a gateway to Southwest 
Asia, as well as a prospective buffer zone to provide safety to Chinese borders” (Olimova 
2008: 65). China is the largest foreign investor in Tajikistan with investments in vegetable 
and cotton growing and, since arable land is limited, major investments in the hydropower 
sector (including the construction of the world’s tallest dam in Rogun), power engineering, 
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cement and manufacturing goods (Dave and Kobayashi 2018: 272). Various joint projects and 
regular business meetings testify to the “growth of private Chinese business in Tajikistan” 
(Olimov and Olimov 2010: 13). 
The border 
The Tajik-Chinese border spans 430 kilometres and a border limitation treaty between 
Tajikistan and China was signed in 2002. On the Tajik side of the border lies the GBAO, one 
of the poorest regions in Tajikistan and “one of the most remote parts of the former Soviet 
Union, isolated to some degree from the rest of Tajikistan by the Pamir mountains” (Kanji 
2002: 138). Similarly, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) on the Chinese side of 
the border occupies a special position within the country as well (Pannell 2011: 106). It was 
only in the 1990s that China initiated the “Xibu da kaifa” (Develop the West), a strategy to 
develop its Western part that lagged behind the rest, mainly involving infrastructural 
measures and economic growth (Pannell 2011: 115) with Xinjiang leading the way. At 4363 
metres a.s.l. on a mountainous plateau, the Kulma Pass is currently the only border post 
between Tajikistan and China. The Kulma Pass is approximately 95 kilometres east of 
Murghab in Tajikistan and 14 kilometres west of Karasu, the border crossing point on the 
Chinese side. It was opened in 2004 and, even though the GBAO and the XUAR had no previous 
trade relationship, being the only border post, it quickly became a key location in the Tajik-
Chinese cross-border trade. A direct 700-kilometre-long transport corridor through Kulma 
emerged, connecting Khorog, the capital of the GBAO, with the Chinese city of Kashgar 
(Kaminski and Mitra 2012: 31; Olimova 2008: 64). Since Kulma is the only border crossing 
point, this route not only connects the GBAO and the XUAR, but also ultimately links Khorog 
to Tajikistan’s capital, Dushanbe. Historically, the GBAO has been dependent on external 
relations. Similar patterns can be observed today while Tajikistan is influenced significantly 
by its neighbour in the East. 
Transport of goods in the trade 
Transport of goods between China and Tajikistan: Increasing and challenging  
The Pamir highway is a crucial west-east artery in Tajikistan’s transport system, which 
connects Dushanbe, Khorog and Murghab. It is the longest transport route in Tajikistan and 
also the only direct connection between Tajikistan and China (Olimshoev 2014). Since the 
Tajik-Chinese border was opened, the route via Kulma Pass has become one of the most 
important roads in the bilateral trade of the two countries (Kaminski and Mitra 2012: 31). 
Alternatively, it is possible to cross the border of China and Kyrgyzstan at Irkeshtam and 
then through Kyrgyzstan’s Alai Valley and Tajikistan’s Rasht Valley and continue to Dushanbe 
(Laruelle and Peyrouse 2012: 60). The advantages are that this route is shorter and is in 
better condition. However, there are high taxes to be paid to the Kyrgyz state ever since 
Kyrgyzstan joined the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in 2015 and shares a common external 
tariff policy with its fellow member states Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia (Khitakhunov, 
Mukhamediyev and Pomfret 2017: 61). Therefore, most of the transport between China and 
Tajikistan is processed via the direct route. Figure 1 shows the two major transport routes 
connecting Kashgar and Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan. Since the opening of the border, 
the amount of goods shipped increased from 833 tons in 2004 to 389,600 tons in 2014. Over 
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the last decade, the Karasu point of entry has cleared 1.4 million tons of goods in total, 

















Fig. 1: Map of the major transport routes connecting China-Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan.                    
Source: Dörre 2020 based on Jarvis et al. 2008; Siemering & Yang 2018 (draft)  
 
Following the goods: the process of the transport of Chinese goods to Tajikistan 
A significant trade imbalance between Tajikistan and China can be observed. The main flows 
of the trade consist of cheap Chinese products which are sold to Tajikistan in large amounts. 
Conversely, there is only a small number of products that are sold from Tajikistan to China.  
In the process of the transport from China to Tajikistan the main stops along the way on the 
Chinese side include Urumqi, the largest wholesale market for Central Asia, and Kashgar, a 
centre of transport, stocking and distribution as well as the second largest market in 
Xinjiang. 
These places in Xinjiang are the main distribution centres of goods in Tajikistan and an 
increasing number of Tajik traders (especially wholesalers from Dushanbe) travel directly to 
the places of production in China to get cheap goods. On the Tajik side, the main stations 
are Murghab, a rest stop which is also the nearest city to the Kulma Pass, Khorog City with 










Fig. 2: The cargo transport process in the Tajik-Chinese trade.1                                                  
Source: Siemering & Yang 2018 (draft)  
 
It usually takes five to ten days to ship the goods from Urumqi to Khorog and ten to fifteen 
days to Dushanbe. There are many uncertainties in the transport such as weather conditions 
(especially during winter), waiting time at the border crossing, the need for informal 
payments along the way and the waiting time to repair trucks due to the poor road condition. 
On account of most of the truck drivers, they mostly drive directly to Dushanbe instead of 
Khorog, indicating that the role of Khorog and Tang is somewhat peripheral compared to 
Dushanbe. The role of the terminal in Tang changed substantially since the border was 
opened. Between 2004 and 2014, Tang was the only terminal in Tajikistan and all customs 
clearances of foreign trucks en route to Tajikistan were processed here. Since 2014, new 
terminals were established in Dushanbe. Additionally, another terminal was recently built 
near Murghab.2  
Between 2008 and 2010, road transport accounted for more than 75 percent of all freight 
turnover in Tajikistan. About 80 percent of vehicles in Tajikistan are bought from China by 
Tajik transport firms employing local truck drivers (Olimshoev 2014). Additionally, there is 
an increase of privately-owned trucks. In the early period of the opening of the Kulma-Karasu 
pass, Chinese transport firms and truck drivers were more numerous than Tajik agents. 
However, with the growing development of the trade, some Tajik truck drivers and traders 
gradually accumulated a certain amount of capital, began buying Chinese trucks in Kashgar 
and started their own transport businesses (mainly shipping cargo from Kashgar to 
Dushanbe). Since Tajik drivers are paid only a third compared to those from China (Tajik 
drivers earn about US$ 500 for one-way transport from Kashgar to Dushanbe), they had a 
price advantage, gradually replacing Chinese drivers in the transport business. Today, 
Chinese transport firms and drivers mainly ship goods from China to other countries in the 
region such as Kyrgyzstan and Pakistan. Among the small transport firms existing in 
 
1
 The time period between two places indicates the average travel time for the truck only while the total 
time also includes the waiting time during checks, the drivers’ breaks and unforeseen circumstances, 
such as the time for the repair of a truck. According to the interviewees, the transport f rom Kashgar to 
Khorog takes three to five days. The transport from Urumqi to Dushanbe (the most common route in the 
trade) takes ten to fifteen days. Differences are mainly due to the weather, i.e. it takes much longer for 
the transport during winter time.  
2
 Since this study was conducted, the terminal near Murghab began operation and took on the business 
of  the terminal in Tang, which was closed down subsequently.  
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Tajikistan, there are not only Tajik entrepreneurs but also Chinese, especially from Xinjiang. 
Moreover, there are several hundred Tajik small-scale entrepreneurs owning only one truck 
(Olimshoev 2014). 
Wholesalers in Khorog and Dushanbe ship goods to Tajikistan differently. The traders in 
Khorog organise the transport of their goods mainly by themselves. They contact different 
truck drivers and/or firms at least twice in the transport process. Besides, they need to pay 
for each stage of the transport individually: the cost of transport from Urumqi to Kashgar 
ranges from US$ 3,000 to US$ 4,000 per vehicle (usually carried out by Chinese truckers). 
The transport from Kashgar to Khorog costs about US$ 3,000 to US$ 3,800 per vehicle (carried 
out by Tajik truck drivers). However, the transport fees for trucks and drivers account for 
only a fraction of the transport costs. The owners of the goods need to make other payments 
too, including informal payments at police checkpoints (paid by the driver), service fees for 
the Chinese agency that prepares the required documents and also for the services of the 
warehouse in Kashgar.  
In contrast to importers in Khorog, those in Dushanbe outsource the transport to transport 
firms. They give an order to a firm and then wait for their goods to be shipped to Dushanbe. 
The cost is based on the weight or volume, and it ranges from US$ 1/kg to US$ 1.3/kg or  
US$ 220/m3 to US$ 260/m3. Once the trucks arrive at their destination, the customs 
clearance must be done in one of the terminals in Tajikistan, usually the terminal nearby. 
The owners of the goods must pay for the customs clearance before they receive their goods. 
Furthermore, the price of customs clearance has increased annually and it is about US$ 7,000 
to US$ 9,000 for each vehicle in 2018 in Khorog. In principle, the cost of one-way transport 
from China to Khorog is cheaper than to Dushanbe. However, because of large amounts being 
shipped from China to Dushanbe, it is much easier for Dushanbe traders to share a truck with 
several other traders. 
The mobility of traders 
There are generally two options for the Tajik traders travelling to China to purchase goods, 
either by car or plane. Since Dushanbe, being the country’s capital, is home to an 
international airport, Dushanbe traders prefer to go by plane. For Khorog's traders, it is 
typical to drive to the border and then call a Chinese taxi to Kashgar, since Tajik private 
cars are not allowed to enter China. Alternatively, they can go to China by plane from 
Dushanbe, but because Khorog is halfway between the border and Dushanbe, directly driving 
to China is the cheapest (US$ 100 for a round trip compared with US$ 500 for a round trip by 
plane) and easiest way for Khorog traders. Between 2012 and 2016, Tajik traders could only 
go to China by plane, since the border was open to trucks exclusivily.  
Poor infrastructure 
Tajikistan’s logistics performance is one of the poorest in  the world due to the weak traffic 
infrastructure and challenging geographical conditions resulting in an overall poor transport 
accessibility (Asadov 2012: 19; Coulibaly 2012: 2). Even though some construction projects 
were implemented to improve the road condition, for example roadwork between Murghab 
and Kulma as well as two tunnels in the Dushanbe-Kulyab district which reduced the travel 
time from Dushanbe to Khorog, the condition of the road as a whole is still poor (Olimshoev 
 12 
2014). According to truck drivers, the average speed on the Pamir highway is only 20 km/h. 
There are almost no service facilities along the way from Kulma to Dushanbe aside from 
some rest stops in Murghab, Khorog and Tang. Especially a repair shop on the route is in 
urgent need.  
Border crossing 
The Tajik-Chinese border at Kulma-Karasu is covered with snow for several months during 
winter. In the past, the border was closed during winter time (from November to May), but 
now it is open even in winter. However, only 300 trucks per month cross the border in winter, 
200 vehicles less than in summer. The transport costs are also higher in winter due to 
increased travel time and petrol consumption.  
Aside from the constraints caused by the weather and geographical conditions, the 
administrative issues on the border are a significant problem in the transportation process. 
On the Chinese side, it takes a long time for the truckers to wait for the Chinese customs to 
perform the checks of goods and documents. Their hours of operation are from 11 am to 12 
pm and 2 pm to 5.30 pm. Hence, only 20-30 vehicles can go through the Karasu border each 
day, which leads to long waiting times of one to three days. On the Tajik side, the border 
officials work more efficiently. Truck drivers can usually pass the border quickly when they 
make an informal payment of US$ 100-200.  
Trade imbalance leads to high empty load rate 
So far, the Tajik-Chinese trade is mainly one-sided with Chinese exports to Tajikistan. 
“Thousands of trucks leave Tajikistan empty” (Coulibaly 2012: 17). By the end of 2008, their 
number had already reached more than 21,000 (ibid.). This waste of transport resources is 
already a significant problem in the cross-border trade. It is primarily due to a Chinese 
regulation ensuring that the private traders are not allowed to bring goods to China. During 
interviews, traders in Khorog expressed their hopes that they will be allowed to sell Tajik 
goods like honey and herbs to China in the future. Making use of the empty trucks would be 
an accessible means to bring at least some products from Central Asia to external markets. 
The administrative level of the Tajik-Chinese trade 
Agreements at the basis of the bilateral trade relationship 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, international organisations and stakeholders 
encouraged Central Asian countries to “join initiatives fostering regional cooperation” 
(Asadov 2012: 14) to counter the region’s most pressing challenges regarding the lack of 
regulation and infrastructure. In response, Tajikistan was among the countries that joined 
initiatives such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the United Nations Special 
Programme for the Economies of Central Asia (SPECA) or the Central Asia Regional Economic 
Cooperation (CAREC) Programme. Altogether, “most cooperative agreements within these 
initiatives have had little impact in harmonizing trade and transport policies of member 
states” (Asadov 2012: 14).  
In 2007, the Republic of Tajikistan and the People’s Republic of China signed the so-called 
Treaty on Good-Neighbourliness, Friendship, and Cooperation, which will be in effect for 25 
years. It emphasises fostering development on each side and includes bilateral cooperation 
in political, military, economic and commercial areas with strengthening of trade being one 
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of the focal points (Olimova 2008, 63; Olimov and Olimova 2010: 12). The signing of such 
agreements accelerated the develoment of Tajik-Chinese relations as they serve as 
frameworks of joint ventures like the implementation of infrastructure projects. According 
to a representative of the Department of Investment and State Property Management in the 
GBAO more than 200 agreements between China and Tajikistan exist at the present time and 
counting. Besides, the framework of Tajik-Chinese relations is often discussed at meetings, 
such as the annual Pamir Invest Forum in Khorog, an annual meeting in Kulma, where Tajik 
and Chinese representatives discuss trade issues, as well as quarterly regional meetings of 
customs officers from China and Tajikistan.  
Hierarchies of the trade organisation 
On the national level, Tajikistan’s Ministry of Trade is the supreme authority and has the 
responsibility of overseeing the Tajik-Chinese trade, whereas the Department of Economic 
Development and Trade in Khorog oversees all trade-related branches in the region of the 
GBAO. The department in central Khorog monitors seven provinces, amongst others Khorog 
itself, analyses current trends, predicts future developments and gives reports to the 
government’s Ministry of Trade. Administrative authorities emphas ised that the Tajik-
Chinese trade relationship grants many freedoms and few limits. Overall, Tajikistan was said 
to have an ‘open-door policy’ regarding investments. For instance, one interview partner 
engaged in administration explained that the city of Khorog is expanding and thus anyone, 
privately or commercially, is invited to invest. Especially Chinese investments in the region 
have been embraced by administration officials. Actors on the administrative level 
commonly describe the opening of the Tajik-Chinese border in Kulma in 2004 as a catalyst 
for progress in Tajikistan and agree on the positive influence on the part of China that has 
been promoting the Tajik economy. Khorog’s customs officers stress that customs played a 
major role in rebuilding Tajikistan after the civil war. Nowadays the trade relationship 
enables Tajikistan to import goods that the country is unable to produce itself from China 
at a low price. The consensus is that China helps to promote progress in Khorog both directly 
through investments and indirectly by providing the materials needed for construction as 
well as products that increase the local quality of life.  
Establishing trade with China did not only have an impact on the local population, but also 
on the GBAO’s ruling class. Tajikistan has a pro-Chinese business lobby, for example ‘Milal-
Inter,’ an association of Pamiri businessmen with “lobbying strategies at the institutional 
level,” who have joined “the provincial administrative organs of Gorno -Badakhshan” 
(Peyrouse 2011: 4) and also have an office in Kashgar. Likewise, it is widely known in the 
local population that some “members of the presidential family, directly involved in the 
most profitable sectors of the national economy, have Chinese-linked interests” (Peyrouse 
2011: 4) as is exemplified by the management of the terminals and customs clearance posts 
for trucks that travel between Kulma and Dushanbe. Except for the privately-owned terminal 




 The terminal in Tang has since been replaced by a terminal in Murghab, which is also owned by ‘Faroz,’ 
meaning that all Tajik terminals are now in the hands of ‘Faroz.’  
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Crossing the border 
As a rule, all trucks that cross the Tajik-Chinese border are registered in Kulma. Border 
officials do customs and documents checks to register the truck, driver and cargo. The 
documents that are needed depend on the cargo carried by the truck. According to the 
interviewed customs officials, Tajik and Chinese trucks are treated equally at customs and 
document checks are executed according to international standards. As long as they obey 
the rules, they are allowed to cross the border. Border issues are discussed on a regional 
level by the governments of the GBAO and the XUAR in keeping with the bilateral 
agreements. Customs officials frequently address their dissatisfaction with the Tajik border 
post, which does not meet international standards yet and whose “poor infrastructure and 
obsolete equipment […] are glaringly at odds with the sh iny buildings and expensive 
equipment found on the Chinese side” (Parham 2016: 361).  
Trucks that enter Tajikistan via Kulma correspondingly enter the autonomous region and 
special military zone of Gorno-Badakhshan. Hence, “all access to, and movement with in, 
the territory is granted only to persons who possess a special propusk (permit) issued by the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs in Dushanbe” (Parham 2016: 361). This internal permit is needed 
for multiple checks and registrations of the trucks entering the GBAO to ensure lawfulness. 
Nevertheless, it is known among truck drivers and traders that carrying this permit can be 
avoided “depending on the connections a driver and/or his employer in China possess within 
Tajikistan” (Parham 2016: 361).  
According to bilateral agreements of China and Tajikistan, 16 documents are needed to cross 
the border on the Tajik side. On the Chinese side twelve documents are required, ten 
correspond with the Tajik side (UNESCAP 2017: 173-188). Due to the complicated procedure 
of preparing these documents, almost all traders commission Chinese agencies that handle 
the required formalities and charge about 5,000 Tajik Somoni (currently about US$ 520). As 
a matter of fact, in the majority of cases truck drivers do not need to show all the documents 
that are required. Besides, the Chinese visa poses a problem for the Tajik traders and 
truckers. In the past travellers were issued visas of three up to six months, but it was changed 
to a one-month visa for business people and 15 days (with two border crossings granted) for 
truck drivers. Visas cost US$ 25 and people have to travel to Dushanbe and back to obtain 
the visa, which causes additional costs. 
The customs clearance process 
The Tajik customs law allows customs clearances to take place anywhere in Tajikistan, thus 
they often take place wherever the traders prefer, for instance at storage locations. In the 
GBAO customs clearances are primarily done in Khorog or around Tang, a small village, 
approximately 30 kilometres east of Khorog. All terminals can also serve as customs offices. 
For example, the terminal in Tang is affiliated with the customs office in downtown Khorog. 
Tang serves different purposes, both as a stop where the truck drivers can take a rest, and 
where food and accommodation is offered, and as a checkpoint where documents are 
checked, trucks are registered and weighed and cargo can be transshipped. In case the trucks 
are overweight, a fine of at least US$ 1,000 per ton overweight is due. Sometimes the cargo 
is examined at Tang’s terminal as well. For that, the Tajik and Chinese seals on the back 
door of the truck’s container are broken and some packages are cut open as samples. Many 
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people can be involved in the signing of documents and transshipment of cargo, including 
inspectors, customs officers, intermediaries, company owners, warehouse owners and day 
labourers. Previously the customs clearance and registration of the trucks was done by hand, 
but nowadays it is supposed to be electronic to comply with international standards, make 
the process quicker and allow traders to face less challenges. “It only takes fifteen minutes 
to do the customs clearance,” one interviewee reports. Yet, in reality it is still frequently 
done by hand due to the varying places the customs clearance takes place at. 
The “customs payments are made directly to customs officers, increasing informal payments 
and corruption; no bank or guarantee system is in use” (Coulibaly and Thomsen 2016: 19) as 
was confirmed by numerous interviewees who expressed frustration at the lack of 
administrative oversight and high degree of corruption. Traders complained about the high 
tax they pay for imported goods from China. They confirmed that there is currently no formal 
customs proceeding and reported that they pay for the customs clearance in cash at the 
local Customs Office. Additionally, one interviewee described that “the customs clearance 
fees change constantly and often increase quickly.” Over the past years, the price of customs 
clearance has increased, now averaging about US$ 7,000, depending on the cargo. 
Reportedly, some traders have to pay more than others. 
Informal payments 
Informal payments are a common problem in long-distance transport across Central Asia. 
Since the payments are still made in cash, informal payments are difficult to avoid. Peyrouse 
argues that: “[...] nearly the entire Central Asia trading system is based on corruption 
schemes” (Peyrouse 2011: 4). Along the way from the Kulma Pass to Khorog and Dushanbe, 
several checkpoints and terminals can be found which may require to pay informal fees 
ranging from a few dollars up to US$ 200. When a truck is overloaded, informal fees to get 
the permission to pass the border and terminals arise. The trucks are usually stopped at 
checkpoints on the borders of provinces, and their documents are checked there. There are 
eight checkpoints between Dushanbe and Khorog alone (Olimshoev 2014). The informal 
payments in the transport process are paid by the importer who purchased the goods. 
Coulibaly (2012) regards the low wages of the customs officers and the lack of transparency 
as causes of the widespread corruption. 
Challenges on the administrative level 
Although increased collaboration between Tajikistan and China is planned in the fu ture, 
several challenges impede the Tajik-Chinese trade at present. Inflation in Tajikistan has 
evidently hampered economic growth and has resulted in an unfavourable currency exchange 
rate for Tajikistan’s weak currency. As one customs officer explains: “Petrol used to be 
cheaper, now it is much more expensive. Factors like these influence the trade and its 
profitability.” Moreover, inefficiencies at the border post and the “weak control of 
corruption resulting in informal taxation that adds to the cost of doing business” (Coulibaly 
2012: 9) pose challenges on the administrative level of the Tajik-Chinese trade relationship. 
In regard to how the formation of the Tajik-Chinese trade relationship acts as a means of 
development in Khorog, it becomes apparent that informality, a lack of transparency and 
administrative barriers such as the GBAO’s special status as an autonomous region still hinder 
Khorog’s development opportunities. An increase in trade was not accompanied by an 
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increase in the monitoring of trade or a decrease in corruption. Ultimately, the Tajik regime 
represents two contradictory interests. On the one hand it wants to prove itself as member 
of international organisations such as the SCO in ensuring border security, however as seen 
in the lack of implementation of these agreements and the pursuit of private interests, it 
simultaneously hopes to “benefit from new regional economic patterns, both legal and 
illegal” (Peyrouse 2011: 6). 
Effects of the Tajik-Chinese trade on Khorog’s local economy 
Tajikistan’s domestic production cannot compete with the Chinese economy, since it has a 
“constrained production capacity and constrained accessibility to market” (Coulibaly 2012: 
9). Additionally, the Pamirs are a particularly “remote and resource-poor region” 
(Kreutzmann 2016). The trade with China was established soon after the opening of the 
Kulma border crossing in 2004 and China has “strengthened its economic presence in 
Tajikistan” (Olimova 2008: 63) ever since, with Chinese goods now being ubiquitous on 
Khorog’s local market.  
The manifestation of the China trade in Khorog 
Mainly two types of traders in Khorog are involved in trade. Firstly, large-scale traders who 
buy goods directly from China and, secondly, small-scale retailers who obtain their products 
from wholesale markets in Dushanbe. After the opening of the Tajik-Chinese border, the 
number of Khorog-based traders who travelled to China themselves in order to buy large 
numbers of goods for the local market was considerably higher. At present, only few large-
scale traders in Khorog import their goods directly from China, while most are small-scale 
traders, who purchase them from the capital instead. In the beginning, this business was 
very profitable for them due to significantly lower customs clearance fees and a currency 
exchange rate that was much more favourable than today. However, in recent years an 
increasing number of large-scale traders in Khorog have given up their businesses. Aside from 
the rising cost of customs clearances, the main reasons are the drop in the exchange value 
of the Tajik Somoni against the Chinese Yuan which reduces the purchasing power of local 
traders and trade-related actors in Dushanbe who have built up many structural and 
organisational advantages over Khorog-based traders.  
Most Chinese goods are purchased from Xinjiang. “For our needs, Xinjiang is the most 
important region. Urumqi and Kashgar have all the goods we need”, one interviewee at the 
regional customs office reported. At present, the most imported commodities from China 
are construction materials, textiles, shoes, toys and various everyday products like dishes 
and kitchen appliances. The majority of non-Chinese products are imported from Russia, 
Iran, and Turkey. Women’s clothing in particular is mainly imported from Turkey, because 
of different clothing styles and sizing in China and Tajikistan.  
Large-scale traders in Khorog 
Generally, the large-scale traders of Khorog still doing business with China today started 
doing so immediately after the border crossing at Kulma opened. Currently they own more 
than two stores each, some servicing special demands such as textiles, while others have a 
more diversified scope of business. Compared to smaller retailers who have a booth at the 
bazaar, the large-scale traders of Khorog look back on 15 years of experience in cross-border 
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trade. During this time, they were able to gradually accumulate capital, which now helps 
them to occupy a unique position. The cost of purchasing a full truck load of goods from 
China is about US$ 65,700 in total, consisting of US$ 50,000 for goods (for a load of 50 m3), 
US$ 7,000 for transport (from Urumqi to Khorog), customs clearance fees of at least                      
US$ 7,000 and other services amounting to US$ 1,700. Compared with the GDP per capita of 
Tajikistan which came to US$ 1,015.50 in 2017, a single full truck load already constitutes a 
massive investment. In other words, trade of this size is impossible for small-scale business 
people. 
Large-scale traders usually have long-term cooperative partnerships with distributors and 
emphasise the importance of having trustworthy business partners in China as well as in 
Khorog. Coordination with other traders who sell the same products and knowing basic 
Chinese to communicate efficiently is common. Over the past years, Tajik traders and 
Chinese sellers have drawn on using WeChat, a communication app widely used in China. For 
instance, the Chinese contact persons will send Khorog-based traders’ pictures or videos of 
the products, whereupon they place an order and to send the money to China. This way 
some of Khorog’s traders “have their own transit service unit, thus providing a full logistic 
service of transporting and distributing goods” (Coulibaly 2012: 16) from Urumqi and Kashgar 
to Khorog.  
Even though the procedure of purchasing goods from China has become easier for Khorog’s 
traders, the profits have declined substantially compared to the early years of the cross-
border trade. A businesswoman said: “Now we can only get 30 percent profit from the goods 
that we sell, but it used to be 50 percent – 60 percent. Therefore, many traders here in 
Khorog closed their businesses. Nowadays it is easier for the traders to buy Chinese goods 
from Dushanbe instead of China.” Dushanbe’s dominance in the trade is another reason for 
the closing of many direct trade businesses in Khorog. 
Purchasing goods from Dushanbe 
For small-scale traders in Khorog the advantage of buying Chinese goods from Dushanbe is 
that they can also be purchased in smaller quantities and without paying for the customs 
clearance. In this case, local traders only have to pay for the transport from Dushanbe to 
Khorog, which is more suitable for small-scale traders with little capital. Small-scale traders 
often share trucks. The main advantage of Dushanbe-based traders are their capital 
resources which enable them to buy Chinese goods in large quantities with quantity discounts 
on a regular basis.  
Most Khorog-based traders get their products from one of “four large  wholesale markets” 
(Coulibaly 2012: 16) in Dushanbe that form a distribution and re-export system that allows 
products to enter the market. Korvon market in Dushanbe is the largest market in Tajikistan. 
Most traders in Dushanbe go directly to China to get their goods – some even go to the original 
places of production in China’s coastal provinces. Each time they purchase goods worth 
about US$ 15,000-20,000 in total. Usually they go to China 4-5 times a year. The Tajik traders 
at Korvon Market mentioned the devaluation of Tajikistan’s currency as being a major 
problem in the trade, too. Yet, traders in Dushanbe never mentioned that customs clearance 
fees are an obstacle to their business, which is in strong contrast with the statements of 
traders in Khorog. 
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Impact of the trade on the daily life in Khorog 
The emergence of Chinese goods had several positive impacts on people ’s lives in Khorog, 
since the trade provides both employment opportunities and access to products that were 
hardly accessible before. Besides, the main benefit of Chinese products is the same for 
customers and sellers alike, namely that they are affordable. Simultaneously, customers are 
unsatisfied with the poor quality of the products, citing easy and cheap access and lack of 
alternatives as the main reasons for purchasing them. The Chinese goods that are sold in 
Tajikistan, particularly at bazaars, are generally regarded as of the worst quality. Customers 
as well as administrative officials are aware of better-quality products from China, but 
criticised that Khorog’s traders solely purchase low-quality and low-cost Chinese products 
due to the low incomes of locals. As a Chinese businessman at Korvon market explained 
“most of the products at Korvon market are from small ‘underground’ factories, where there 
are no quality inspections and safety tests. Hence the price is very low.” Low-quality and 
low-cost Chinese products have hence become inevitable on the local market. However, 
based on past developments, customers as well as administrative officials, hope for a local 
income growth in the future accompanied by the arrival of better-quality products. It is 
worth noting that the trade with low-quality, short-lived Chinese products is hardly 
sustainable on an ecological level, though this is not an issue that is widely received as 
problematic among Khorog’s local population. Despite the poor quality of the products, most 
locals believe that the cheap goods from China have greatly improved their quality of life 
since the opening of the Tajik-Chinese border. One of the most popular Chinese imports in 
Khorog are minibusses, inofficially called ‘Tangen.’ The import of these minibusses enabled 
Khorog to develop a public transportation system that has significantly improved the local 
population’s mobility and constitutes an important source of income. 
In brief, the consensus among business people is that the trade with China helps in promoting 
Khorog’s economy. A shop owner stated: “We do not have the ability to produce these 
products in Tajikistan and a few years ago, they were not available in Tajikistan at all. So 
overall, the situation has definitely improved.” Consequently, the availability of new 
products as well as their affordability is regarded as a result of a positive impact on behalf 
of the Chinese. Likewise, Khorog’s traders claim their business experiences with China to 
mostly be positive.  
Khorog’s marginalisation in the Tajik-Chinese trade 
Most of the goods that are shipped from China to Dushanbe are owned by several large 
companies in Dushanbe, including ‘Faroz,’ that buy large amounts of Chinese goods, thus 
forming a market monopoly and leaving smaller, local vendors with little to no alternative 
aside from purchasing products from them. “The monopoly is in the hands of the presidential 
family. It makes it very affordable to buy from Dushanbe, but we ultimately have to buy 
from them,” one seller at the bazaar explained. Due to the large amounts they order, these 
companies can obtain products at a very low purchase price in China and the price of Chinese 
products from Dushanbe is not much different from the price of a small number of goods 
purchased directly from China. Moreover, more traders in Khorog have business contacts in 
Dushanbe than in China, which makes ordering and shipping the products easier. According 
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to regional government officials in Khorog, they pursue the goal to reduce the disadvantages 
local traders face in competition with traders in Dushanbe in the future. 
To local traders, the rising cost of customs clearances and the clear monopoly of Dushanbe 
pose considerable challenges. They are attributed to “government regulations and 
interventions that weaken the business climate” (Coulibaly 2012: 9). Further barriers to the 
trade, such as inflation and a currency exchange rate that is not as profitable as it used to 
be after the border opening, are also due to the government’s mismanagement. 
Furthermore, business people in Khorog point to a high degree of corruption and informal 
payments along the transport route. Correspondingly Parham speaks of a “perceived 
negligence by the forces of border control” and “structures of a powerful state are 
experienced by the locals as having departed” (Parham 2016: 363, 365). 
Khorog’s market, though of regional importance for the GBAO, does not play a major role 
on a national scale (Peyrouse 2011: 4). In the future, Pamiri traders hope to fulfil an 
intermediary function on a bigger scale than the local market. By both investing in the transit 
role of the GBAO and strengthening the regional role of Khorog’s market in the face of 
Dushanbe’s monopoly through facilitating direct trade relations between Khorog and China, 
Tajikistan can make use of the market’s “non-negligible commercial opportunities to the 
local populations” (Peyrouse 2011: 4) and use Khorog’s distance from major markets to their 
advantage. For example, the advancement of small-scale trade relations to Afghanistan 
would create a “commercial niche” (Peyrouse 2011: 4) for the local population and is obvious 
regarding Khorog’s location in proximity to the Tajik-Afghan border. Nevertheless, in order 
for Khorog to compete, the GBAO has to improve its transit infrastructure by fixing 
infrastructural deficits. At the moment, growth through transit business is significantly 
hindered by “unreliable connectivity service raising the cost of trading and limiting access 
to markets and technology” (Coulibaly 2012: 9).  
Conclusion 
In recent years, affordable Chinese products have not only flooded the markets of Tajikistan, 
but also the markets of Central Asia in general. Although the quality of these products is 
poor, they have influenced the quality of life of Khorog’s local population significantly. The 
Chinese presence in Tajikistan is observable and it is rarely more obvious than when driving 
along the Pamir highway in the early morning as it is crowded with trucks transporting 
Chinese goods. Not only does the cross-border trade bring income and employment 
opportunities to direct participants, but also to people indirectly involved in the trade, like 
bazaar sellers and service personnel (Kaminski and Mitra 2012: 7-8). However, in regard to 
how the formation of the Tajik-Chinese trade relationship acts as a means of development 
in Khorog, it becomes apparent that opportunities are not equally accessible. Poor people 
in a marginalised region such as the GBAO cannot afford the investment of a booth at the 
local bazaar, the cost of visas or travelling in order to establish business contacts. Hence the 
poor can at best find opportunities to participate in the trade indirectly in low-paying jobs 
as service personnel. Additionally, the participation in the trade has many more obstacles, 
not only due to ‘hard obstacles’ like connectivity and lack of capital resources. Also ‘soft 
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obstacles’ caused by non-transparent governance, administrative barriers and the 
dependence on informal networks play an important role.  
In the cross-border trade between China and Tajikistan, Khorog is caught between China’s 
main distribution centres and Dushanbe, and is largely bypassed by the continuous flow of 
goods from China to Tajikistan. The bazaar and trade economy is crucial in reducing poverty 
and alleviating unemployment. Nonetheless, as the capital of one of the poorest, least 
populated and most peripheral regions in Tajikistan, the development of the GBAO in general 
and Khorog’s development in particular were ruled out both by political power and market 
development leading to gradual marginalisation in the Tajik-Chinese trade, turning it into a 
secondary market of Dushanbe. Moreover, geographical factors cause the poor accessibility 
of the GBAO to the national market, and cultural factors (such as different religions and 
ethnicities), cause political neglect, which results in less economic opportunities. Thus, 
Khorog’s marginalisation in the Tajik-Chinese trade is the result of the combined influence 
of market mechanisms and national development strategies aiming at the development of 
selected growth poles. As the country prioritises the strengthening of central cities, these 
policies contribute to further marginalisation of already marginal areas. Apart from general 
policies and structural developments, the cross-border trade between Tajikistan and China 
is also impacted by small-scale regulations on the mobility of personnel and goods as well as 
customs clearance tariffs. These administrative issues accelerate the marginalisation of 
Khorog. Ultimately, these factors result in a current trading system that is volatile and not 
sustainable. 
Since development strategies in Tajikistan are heavily based on Chinese investment, it is 
worth looking at their implications for regional development in the GBAO. China mainly 
focuses on investing in infrastructure projects in Tajikistan. Regarding Tajikistan’s potential 
as a transit country and potential growth through the transit business, it is confronted with 
fierce regional competition by the transport corridors of its neighbouring countries (Asadov 
2012: 6). Under the framework of BRI and SCO, agreements have been made to strengthen 
trade and investment between Tajikistan and China. However, many projects have shown 
that both countries adopt similar policies of strengthening central cities and therefore focus 
their attention on the connection between Dushanbe and Urumqi. A future development 
potential for Khorog may be its proximity to Afghanistan. Considering the reconstruction of 
a bridge between Tajikistan and Afghanistan and the opening of a border market, Khorog is 
likely to become a re-export market, exporting Chinese goods to Afghanistan. Peyrouse 
argues that Khorog’s market plays “a more regional role” by offering “non-negligible 
commercial opportunities to the local populations [...]. Small commercial niches are thereby 
created, with Pamiri traders aiming to become intermediaries in China-Afghanistan trade” 
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A truck with imported goods from China masters a difficult passage of the road connecting the 
















Between Murghab and Khorog, the China-Tajik trade uses the Pamir Highway, which connects 
Khorog City with the city of Osh in Kyrgyzstan. This picture shows a section of the Pamir 
Highway east of Khorog in the Gunt Valley. Here the road runs through small parcels of irrigated 
land. Photograph taken by Dörre, July 2014  
 23 
Elena Caleta, Risolat Okhirnazarova & Louis Wilß  
The Urban Wheat System of Khorog  
Abstract  
This paper seeks to reveal how the supply of the most important staple food – wheat – is organised in 
Khorog, the capital of Gorno-Badakhshan. During July 2018, a case study was carried out, approaching 
this issue through the theoretical lens of (urban) food systems. By applying an adapted version of the 
approach, the high degree of interconnectedness between the sub-systems of Khorog’s urban wheat 
system are highlighted, and the way external factors have implications for the supply of wheat in 
Khorog and its surroundings are revealed. 
Introduction and context 
Tajikistan is a mountainous, landlocked country with limited options for agrarian production. 
Only 5.3 percent of Tajikistan’s land area is eligible for agriculture (The World Bank 2010). 
With about eight million inhabitants, Tajikistan is a country with one of the lowest amounts 
of arable land per person worldwide and with the lowest ratio in Central Asia (approximately 
0.1 ha) (Akramov 2013: 128). Due to population growth and land decline, this problem even 
intensified over the last two decades (ibid.), leading to an impossibility of subsistence 
agriculture in most cases (Robinson & Guenther 2007: 360). The problem of food shortages 
is omnipresent in Tajikistan, but it is even more distinct in remote parts of the country 
(Abassian 2005: 40). In the Tajik Pamirs, satisfying food demands “is an ongoing struggle” 
(Doerre & Goibnazarov 2018: 104).  
The research area of this case study, Gorno-Badakhshan, is one of the poorest and most 
isolated parts of the most impoverished country in Central Asia (Robinson & Guenther 2007: 
373). Arable land areas and natural resources are not sufficient to meet the needs of its 
population (Middleton 2013: 1). Nonetheless, low agrarian productivity in Tajikistan and 
especially in the GBAO is not only determined by geographical constraints. During the Soviet 
era, the GBAO was benefited with a heavily subsidised system of food deliveries. This was 
mainly because of the high strategic importance of the Pamirs during the ‘Great Game’, but 
also in Soviet times, when the region served as an important border area as well as a 
demonstration site of Soviet modernisation policy (Kraudzun 2016: 162-163). The measures 
of heavily subsidising should prevent the important border area from a depopulation 
(Middleton 2016: 254). After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of 
Tajikistan in 1991, this form of support suddenly ceased to exist. With the outbreak of the 
civil war in Tajikistan in 1992, the situation exacerbated dramatically. Although the land 
productivity of Tajikistan almost tripled between 1997 and 2010, it is still significantly lower 
than in the early 1990s (Akramov 2013: 136). Despite this improvement, the Pamirs will not 
be able to achieve self-sufficiency very soon and are therefore still heavily dependent on 
food imports.  
The case study on urban wheat systems took place in Khorog, the administrative capital and 
only major urban area of Gorno-Badakhshan, where wheat is the most important resource 
for calorie intake. In whole Tajikistan, wheat accounts for more than half of the daily calorie 
and protein intake, usually in the form of bread (Akramov 2013: 131; FAO 2015). The 2015 
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published cookbook ‘With our own Hands’ (Van Oudenhoven & Haider 2015) may serve 
further impressions of the strong cultural rootedness of bread in the Pamirs.  
In urbanised Khorog, off-farm activities and remittances are a major source of income 
(Robinson & Guenther 2007: 366), embedding the population in a cash economy. Hence, the 
population is mainly dependent on the availability of wheat on the market as well as on 
cash-based income to meet their daily demands. Facing current price hikes, access to wheat 
presents an essential and steady challenge. 
Because of these constraints, the research interest lies in an examination of the highly 
complex wheat procurement in Khorog, which is – given the enormous contribution for the 
nutrition of Tajikistan’s inhabitants – vital for its population. 
The analysis is basend on data gathered during 17 interviews with different actors of Khorog’s 
urban wheat systems, and by means of field observations. Among the respondents were 
different wheat traders, bakery owners and bread sellers at the roadside, a truck driver, an 
employee of the Mountain Society Development Support Programme (MSDSP) of the Aga Khan 
Development Networt (AKDN) responsible for Nature and Resource Management, an 
employee of the World Food Programme (WFP), a Research Fellow at the University of 
Central Asia (Khorog campus), employees of the governmental grain mill in Boghev Village, 
the Head of the Department of Economic Development and Antimonopoly Policy of the 
Province Administration of the GBAO as well as employees from the Department of Food 
Distribution. 
The examination of the structures of wheat supply in Khorog has been approached through 
the theoretical lens of ‘Food Systems’. The food system approach has been introduced by 
Terry Cannon in 1991. The British geographer David Smith enhanced this approach, focusing 
on urban food systems and linking “production and consumption networks at local, regional 
and global levels [...].” (cited in Bohle & Adhikari 2002: 402). 
Applying an adapted form of the approach, this paper seeks to reveal how the supply of the 
most important staple food in Khorog is organised in such a remote (and yet urbanised) and 
import-dependent city, and how the population of Khorog is able to gain access to it. 
Theoretical framework: Urban wheat system of Khorog 
According to Cannon,  
“a food system includes four sub-systems: Production, Exchange, Distribution, and Consumption 
(P, E, D, C). These are not neatly distinct categories [...], but to some extent there is a 
progression from P through E and D to the final satisfaction (or not) of nutritional needs at C.” 
(Cannon 2002: 354). 
Cannon’s framework was used in a slightly modified version to structure Khorog’s urban 
wheat system into four main sections: Imports, Distribution, Processing and Purchase & 
Consumption. 
This adaptation (Fig. 1) is related to the finding that local wheat production does not play a 
major role in Khorog and is therefore located outside of the inner circle in the figure. Imports 
are of major importance due to the remoteness of Khorog and its insufficient local wheat 
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production. Distribution of wheat is influenced by infrastructural conditions. Further 
processing is an important localised step, regulated both privately and governmentally. 
Purchase and Consumption emphasises the local food culture and purchasing behaviour. By 
connecting these categories further aspects emerge, which in Terry Cannon’s Framework 
mainly would belong to the category of ‘Exchange’.  
Considering the socio-economic 
situation, the physical constraints 
and the recent history of Khorog 
and the GBAO, the application of 
the urban food system approach 
can be valuable in different ways.  
At first, it helps to see Khorog’s 
food system in a global context and 
emphasise its linkages to the 
international political-economic 
system. As David Smith states, the 
world’s population is tending to 
renounce from subsistence 
agricultural systems and is 
continually interwoven into a 
“globalization of food systems” 
Smith (1998: 208).  
Secondly, “[u]rban food systems 
are usually complex entities 














Fig. 1: Research framework.                                            
Source: Caleta & Wilß 2018 (draft)  
distribution and retailing, together with the various exchange and transfer mechanisms that 
link these activities” (ibid: 212). Thus, each sub-system is influenced by many factors and 
processes regarding economic, social, spatial, physical-material and infrastructural aspects.  
The case study in Khorog 
There exist two different regulation systems in terms of providing wheat for Khorog’s 
population, driven by private as well as government actors. The insights into the 
governmental regulation system were mainly made possible through interviews with the 
Head of the Department of Economic Development and Antimonopoly Policy of the Province 
Administration of the GBAO in Khorog as well as with governmental employees of a 
department responsible for the distribution of food within the GBAO. A significant part of 
the urban wheat system in Khorog is centrally organised by Government authorities who 
established a controlled price regime for wheat and wheat flour. 
The dependency on imports and the implications for exchange 
Agricultural production and capacities of Gorno-Badakhshan are not sufficient to feed the 
local population, leading to a dependency on wheat imports even though the production of 
wheat is still an important component of the subsistence-oriented agricultural practices of 
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individual households in Gorno-Badakhshan. Therefore, the vast majority of wheat supply in 
Khorog is imported from Kazakhstan. 
Kazakhstan is the largest wheat exporter for Central Asian countries and is therefore often 
considered as the ‘bread basket’ of Central Asia. In 2016, Kazakhstan accounted for               
100 percent of officially imported wheat in Tajikistan (OEC 2019). Considering the fact that 
more than 50 percent of per capita calorie intake in Tajikistan comes from cereals (Akramov 
2013: 131; FAO 2015), wheat imports from Kazakhstan are essential for the Tajik population. 
The situation in Khorog seems even more intensified.  
Among all of the surveyed wheat vendors, only one of the sellers – a small farm shop next to 
the office of MSDSP – offers regionally grown wheat flour in smaller amounts. This wheat 
flour is usually mixed with pea flour. This local wheat flour production takes place through 
farming in the Bartang Valley (Roshan District) and the lower Wakhan (Ishkashim District) as 
well as both the Shugnan and Roshtqal’a Districts according to the interviewed expert from 
the MSDSP. Reportedly, only very few farmers can produce a surplus to bring their remaining 
wheat on the market. The mentioned farmer shop receives the locally grown wheat from 
farmers from Roshtqal’a and sells it in small amounts. One kilogram of the locally produced 
wheat was sold for six Tajik Somoni (TS) during the time of fieldwork. The Research Fellow 
of the UCA emphasised that there is not much farming activity in the urban area of Khorog 
owing to less land availability, so virtually everyone depends on the market to provide wheat 
flour. When asked about the almost non-existence of locally produced wheat in the surveyed  
wheat shops, the expert from the 
MSDSP asserted that most of the locally 
produced wheat is used to supplement 
own requirements. Hence, locally 
produced wheat (and wheat flour) can 
be mainly considered as a niche 
product in Khorog, which finds 
especially use for festive occasions or 
special diets (e.g. diabetes) but not for 
covering the daily calorie intake.  
Five major wheat sellers (including 
several employees of the government-
run processing mill) could be identified 
in Khorog and its surrounding areas. 
Among these wheat sellers two are run 












Fig. 2: State-run wheat flour shop at the main market. 
Photograph taken by Caleta, July 2018 
are privately owned shops. The available wheat flour is distinguished between white flour 
(all purpose flour), brown flour (wholemeal flour) and superfine flour and is usually sold in 
50 kg sacks (Fig. 2; Fig. 3). This classification could also be observed at the private shops. 
However, differences in prices were striking. The governmental seller in the main market 
offered white flour processed in Boghev Village, Suchon Municipality, nearby Khorog for           
150 TS/50 kg and brown flour for 120 TS/50 kg. Also, smaller amounts of wheat flour directly 
imported from Kazakhstan was available and sold for 175-180 TS/50 kg. The prices in private  
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shops were signigicantly higher. The price for white 
flour processed in Sughd Province in Northwestern 
Tajikistan was around 165-175 TS/50 kg and the 
price for brown flour from the same region was sold 
between 145-147 TS/50 kg. Nevertheless, it is 
notable that locally produced wheat sold in the 
farmer’s shop is significantly more expensive 
compared to imported wheat. However, this 
observation may also be based on the fact that the 
sale of local wheat takes place in much lower 
quantities (1 kg vs. 50 kg). 
The dependency on imports has a series of economic 
effects crucial for the price mechanisms of wheat in 
Khorog. In 2015, wheat prices reached record levels 
in Tajikistan with 26 percent higher than the 












Fig. 3: Wheat flour offered for sale in 
Khorog: white (left) and brown (right). 
Photograph taken by Wilß, July 2018 
Because of the remoteness of Khorog to market centres as well as the relatively low turnover 
in comparison to markets such as Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan, wheat prices in Khorog 
are always relatively higher than on the national level. It was notable that most of the 
respondents were aware of a connection between local wheat prices and currency and fuel 
price fluctuations. In a market report published by the WFP in cooperation with UKAid, the 
price hikes in Tajikistan are explained with a global increase of fuel prices, increases in 
Russian export taxes and a ban on their wheat exports which led to higher competition for 
wheat in Kazakhstan and increases in transit fees in Uzbekistan (WFP and UKAid 2011: 4). 
Additionally, a decrease in remittances played a critical role in terms of price mechanisms. 
Due to reduced remittances, the Tajik currency depreciated by 27 percent against the          
US Dollar between 2014 and 2015 (FEWS NET 2015: 5). This is strongly related to a point 
articulated by Karimova and Najibulloev who emphasise the connection between Tajikistan’s 
dependency on imports and the resulting pressure on its hard currency reserves, leading to 
a higher inflation rate in the consumer sector (Karimova and Najibulloev 2017: 4). This 
development is especially affecting those who have no own food sources. In urban Khorog 
where there is little food production, dwellers are highly vulnerable to wheat price 
fluctuations. The strong dependence on imports, therefore, can be seen as a vicious cycle, 
reinforcing price hikes in Tajikistan. 
The distribution and transport of wheat  
One of the main challenges for the whole GBAO is the remoteness of the region, combined 
with the highly vulnerable infrastructure. The GBAO is connected with Western Tajikistan 
by a single road, which runs over a ca. 2,000 m high pass (Herbers 2001: 368; Photograph on 
page 22) and is highly vulnerable due to landslides and avalanches (ASIA-Plus 2017 quoted 
by Doerre & Goibnazarov 2018).  
Wheat distribution basically relates to the delivery from the place of production to the site 
of consumption. Applied to this case study it was examined how wheat is distributed 
physically from Kazakhstan to the markets and ultimately to the households in Khorog. Given 
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the highly distinct remoteness and difficult accessibility of Khorog, the examination of the 
trading routes is an important step for understanding Khorog’s urban wheat system and how 
it is embedded transnationally. The labelling of the packaging served as a first indicator of 








Fig. 4: Different packagings of 50 kg wheat flour bags. The pictures A and B show white wheat 
flour imported from the Sughd Province. The pictures C and E display sacks of white wheat flour 
from Kazakhstan, and picture D shows a bag of white wheat flour from the Boghev Mill.    
Photograph A taken by Wilß, July 2018; Photographs B, C, D and E taken by Caleta, July 2018 
 
Wheat sellers were subsequently asked about the origins and processing stations of their 
wheat supply and about the means of its transportation. Additionally, an administrative staff 
member of the government department responsible for food distribution provided detailed 
information on wheat-trading routes. 
Wheat import and wheat flour processing are organised slightly different in the cases of 
private and governmental trade. Privately imported wheat is mainly processed in the Sughd 
Province of Northwestern Tajikistan and then transported as flour into the Pamirs. Most of 
the wheat imported by the government is processed in a flour mill in Boghev Village, which 
is located close to Khorog in the Gunt Valley. This mill processes and stores wheat and 
delivers large amounts of wheat flour to designated shops. It plays a pivotal role in the urban 
wheat system of Khorog. 
The complex interlinkages between the sub-systems of Khorog’s urban wheat system are 
clearly recognisable in the case of flour distribution. When wheat or already processed wheat 
flour is imported from Kazakhstan, it needs to be transported through Uzbekistan, giving rise 
to logistical challenges. Railway tariffs and import taxes are important factors influencing 
the trading routes of wheat. As observed by McKee, a change in transportation routes took 
place after railway tariffs in Uzbekistan were increased to US$ 0.18 per ton per kilometre. 
While the imported wheat and wheat flour was formerly carried via the rail route through 
Uzbekistan to Dushanbe, today most of the wheat passes through Sughd Province in 
northwest Tajikistan by rail. There are a number of mills in the Sughd Province where the 
imported wheat grain is processed to wheat flour and subsquently further distributed by 
trucks. This rather recent development is also connected with the improvement of the 
Khujand-Dushanbe highway, which connects Tajikistan’s milling centre with the capital of 
 29 
the country (McKee 2014: 12-14). This road is now adequate during winter, thereby saving 
on transportation costs when avoiding the transit through Uzbekistan (Abassian 2005: 10). 
Government-owned trucks transporting wheat flour from the Sughd Province have special 
licence, which facilitates a speedy delivery of wheat. A large part of the imported produce 
is however processed in the Boghev Mill, from where the Khorog market is supplied four to 
five times a week with 100 bags of flour (5 tonnes). A further 30 tonnes are regularly 
delivered to other districts of the GBAO. 
Conversely, in privately organised businesses, wheat flour prices vary because of shifting 
prices in transportation, fuel, truck driver payments, and the US Dollar exchange rate. 
Private trucks can carry 250 wheat flour sacks (12.5 t), resulting in higher fuel consumption 
and transport costs (Table 1). Reportedly, truck drivers receive also higher payments in the 
private wheat trade. 
Table 1: Wheat flour prices in Khorog per 50 kg packages in TS in 2018 
Category Main market 
(governmental) 
Private businesses 
July 2018: white flour   150 165-175 
July 2018: brown flour   120 147 
December 2018: white flour 165 195 
December 2018: brown flour 130 170 
 
The logistics of wheat distribution provides important insights into Khorog’s urban wheat 
system, as external economic and political factors such as railway tariffs or changes in tax 
regimes as well as 
physical-material factors 
such as infrastructure 
conditions shape the 
urban wheat system of 
Khorog. The map (Fig. 5) 
depicting major trading 
routes in the wheat 
business is primarily based 
on the statements of the 
interview partners as well 
as on the existing road 
system (Chabot & Tondel 










Fig. 5: Trading routes of wheat and locations of flour mills and 
the main grain storages in Tajikistan.                                                 




Processing wheat in the Boghev Mill  
Processing wheat is also crucial for the Khorog wheat system and the recently opened state-
run mill in Boghev as an important government intervention into the wheat (supply) market 
for the region is a case in point (Fig. 6).  
The mill in Boghev serves as a main 
processing and distribution place for the 
governmentally imported wheat in the 
region. It was officially opened in 2015 
by Tajikistan’s president Emomali 
Rahmon himself. The mill in Boghev is 
the first, and, so far, only state-run flour 
mill in Gorno-Badakhshan (Asia-Plus 
2015).  
All wheat which is processed in this mill 
is imported from Kazakhstan. The state-
run mill has the capacity to process up 
to 60 tons of wheat flour per day. The 
wheat flour is subsequently delivered to 
governmental wheat shops by state-run 
trucks as well as directly sold from the 












Fig. 6: Grain elevators in the mill in Boghev, which 
was established in 2015.                                           
Photograph taken by Wilß, July 2018  
In addition to serving as a processing and distribution place, the mill in Boghev also functions 
as storage, not only for already processed wheat flour but also for imported raw wheat 
grains. The function as wheat storage unit has major implications for the region of the GBAO. 
In winter or in the event of unexpected events or disasters such as mudslides and floods, the 
only road connecting the GBAO with Western Tajikistan happens to be impassable. This often 
leads to a temporary interruption of wheat deliveries, threatening the region’s wheat 
system. To address this problem, the mill in Boghev serves to supply the region during an 
emergency and to mitigate wheat shortages. 
Hence, the mill in Boghev has an important strategic impact for the GBAO and especially for 
Khorog and its surroundings. The mill employs 30 staff members and significantly contributes 
to the tax revenues of the region even though it only supplies certified shops.  
The situation in terms of processing is different for privately imported wheat  where 
processing takes place in the Sughd Province. In recent years, this region has become the 
most important processing centre because of the locational advantage, milling 80 percent 
of the imported wheat and 25 percent of the domestically grown wheat (McKee 2014: 13-
14).  
Tajikistan is aiming to reduce the imports of flour and simultaneously increase the import of 
raw wheat grain for further processing domestically (Aliyeva in Azernews 2018). A 
presidential decree dating back to November 2008 reduced the value-added tax (VAT) on 
imported wheat from 18 percent to ten percent while keeping the duties on imported wheat 
flour at 18 percent. Since 2009, a trend is visible towards increased wheat imports and 
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stagnant flour imports (McKee 2014: 11; Randall 2015: 13). The government recently 
launched further projects to decrease the dependence on Kazakh imports. The rise of the 
Sughd Province as the milling centre of Tajikistan as well as the recent construction of the 
mill in Boghev are relatively new developments, representing infrastructural investments 
adding value in the wheat chain inside Tajikistan against the background of a strong import-
dependency from Kazakhstan. 
A short calculation emphasises the important role of the Boghev mill. Reportedly, the mill 
provides wheat shops on the main market in Khorog with 100 packages (50 kg each) of flour 
on average four times a week. Extrapolated to one year, this means that the governmental 
shop in the main market receives about 1,040 tons of wheat flour from the mill 
(approximately 208 deliveries a year á 5 tons). Estimates by government officials count an 
average annual consumption of 135 kg wheat flour per capita in Khorog. Given the fact that 
Khorog has approximately 30,000 inhabitants (Kreutzmann 2016), the annual consumption of 
wheat (flour) in Khorog is about 4,050 tons. This would mean that the mill alone could supply 
more than one quarter (25.7 percent) of local demand, underlinging its relevance for local 
wheat security. 
Purchase and consumption 
Purchasing and consumption form an essential element of the urban wheat system, where 
inhabitants rely on cash to access food items: “It is this dominance of the cash economy over 
access to such a basic need that links urban food systems to poverty and vulnerability” (Smith 
1998: 212). 
While Gorno-Badakhshan is one of the poorest regions in Tajikistan, the prices for wheat in 
Khorog were always registered as the highest in Tajikistan, mostly due to its distance from 
the national milling centre in the Sughd Province and associated transport costs (Abassian 
2005: 36). In December 2018, the prices for privately imported wheat amounted to 195 TS 
(white flour processed in the Sughd Province) and 170 TS (brown flour processed in the Sughd 
Province). Prices in governmental shops amounted to around 165 TS (white flour processed 
in Boghev) and 130 TS (brown flour processed in Boghev). Compared to the price survey in 
July 2018, prices in private wheat shops rose by more than 15 percent; in state-run shops by 
about ten percent. 
The asymmetry of relatively high prices and low-income opportunities for an urban majority 
is mitigated by a strong inflow of remittances into Khorog (Middleton 2013: 1). Urban food 
availability and access are embedded into market indicators (WFP 2016), leading to 
vulnerability to market price fluctuations for basic staple foods. “For mountain communities, 
access to markets is critical both for household consumption and trading activities” (Dame 
and Nüsser 2011: 187). Against the background that Khorog is characterised by unfavourable 
trading conditions in relation to national milling centres, government efforts to keep wheat 
prices stable serve as important policy measures. Constructing the mill in Boghev can be 
seen as an important step in achieving the desired price stability. 
Interviews showed that the customers purchase wheat mostly at the end of the month, which 
indicates that purchasing behaviour depends on the payment of salaries and pension, but 
also on the flow of remittances. Peak days for wheat purchase are Mondays and Saturdays. 
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The state-run wheat shop at the main market sells 20 to 50 wheat flour packages per day. 
More generally, the purchasing behaviour of urban inhabitants is notable because of their 
preparedness for seasonality and disasters. Whenever possible, households tend to buy 
additional wheat for storage. This aspect is confirmed by our household survey conducted in 
Pashor Village nearby Khorog.  
However, some restrictions apply. Whereas the private and more expensive wheat businesses 
operate without limitations, government shops may only sell a certain amount of wheat flour 
per customer.  
To dig deeper into purchasing behaviours a small case study was carried out in Pashor Village 
at the urban fringes of Khorog. About half of the resident 100 households were asked about 
their wheat buying behavior. Most get their wheat from private shops nearby, relying on 
owned or hired cars to transport the 50 kg packages to their houses. Local wheat sellers have 
an agreement with private lorry drivers, who are delivering the wheat flour from central 
storage facilities in Dushanbe. All wheat in Pashor is from the processing mills in the Sughd 
Province, where the quality is reportedly better. However, given the absence of 
governmental shops in the locality cheaper alternatives are more difficult to access. 
Nevertheless, there are also households (24 percent) who are using the locally processed and 
cheaper wheat from the mill in Boghev available at the main market in Khorog. 
The urban wheat system of Khorog – result of a long-term learning process?  
Khorog’s urban wheat system is made up of both state and private actors that operate in a 
cooperative manner. Government measures aimed at minimising the risk of food shortages 
and preventing the threat of famine satisfy the population, especially the urban and rural 
poor, by facilitating access to subsidised wheat flour. 
In a region extremely sensitive to food supply, the governmental wheat system regulation 
with all its subparts, the strong presence of governmentally organised sellers and their 
reportedly high sales indicate that there is a demand and need for cheaper wheat flour in 
Khorog. This indicates that a learning process in relation to the procurement of wheat but 
also in the purchasing behaviour has taken place and prevails. The governmental wheat 
regulation system provides comparatively cheap and accessible food. In difficult times, for 
example during winter when the main road from Dushanbe to Khorog is often impassable, 
the governmental procured wheat may be able to mitigate wheat shortages or price 
fluctuations. When privately organised wheat vendors struggle because of price and currency 
fluctuations, the governmentally procured wheat can be a temporary opportunity to 
overcome obstacles such as high prices for wheat or even shortages. Governmental 
interventions in the urban wheat market of Khorog are visible and may increase further due 
to the alleged trend of increased processing of wheat flour in Boghev. Still, when they can 
afford most customers prefer the privately sold wheat with its better quality. Table 2 





Table 2: A brief comparison of the wheat supply systems in Khorog 
Governmentally regulated wheat market Privately owned and organised businesses 
Cheaper produce and relatively stable price More expensive produce and volatile prices 
Limited amounts for selling                                     
(legal regulation remains unclear) 
No limitations in selling amounts                             
(bulk buys possible)  
Salaries independent from sold amounts Salary depends on the sold amounts  
Governmentally negotiated transportation duties More uncertainties due to transportation costs 
 
The study showed the high degree of interconnectedness between import dependency, 
distribution, processing and purchase and consumption of wheat in Khorog. External 
economic and/or political factors such as railway tariffs or changes in taxes but also physical-
material factors just as infrastructure conditions have significant implications for the supply 
of wheat. Khorog’s urban wheat system is integrated into the global wheat market, primarily 
through its dependence on Kazakh wheat as well as on remittances. The entanglement of 
the urban wheat system with fuel prices, international currency exchange rates as well as 
tax regimes in the import business has become clear. To mitigate the worsening terms of 
trade, the Tajik government aims to buffer price fluctuations and wheat scarcity through 
market interventions in order to guarantee constant access to wheat for affordable prices. 
As such, given Khorog’s special importance as urban and administrative centre of Gorno-
Badakhshan, the strategic interventions aim at sustainable food security in the region and 
represent upgrading initiatives in the international wheat chain. Working in tandem with the 
profit-oriented wheat businesses that supply better but more expensive quality, the urban 
wheat system in Khorog caters to different needs but ultimately ensures constant acces to 
Tajikistans basic staple food.  
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Festive atmosphere during a folklore fair in the City Park (Chor Bagh Park) of Khorog. 

















The central minibus station at the bazaar of Khorog. Photograph taken by Dörre, July 2016  
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Glocalization of Fast Food in Khorog  
Abstract  
This article explores the recent development of fast food restaurants in the administrative and 
economic centre of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast of Tajikistan, the city of Khorog. It 
examines the strategy of glocalization, used by local entrepreneurs to open fast food restaurants in 
the city and adapt menus to the local condition. Thereby, the availability of kitchen appliances and 
necessary ingredients, the created atmospheres and images of restaurants, and restaurant staff’s 
culinary knowledge were analyzed. We argue for an understanding that the concept of fast food was 
transferred to Khorog from Russia, but is nevertheless associated with its American origin. 
Introduction 
Eastern Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) occupies almost half of 
the country’s area and is characterised by the high mountains of the Pamirs. Inhabited by 
approximately 214,000 people, its biggest city and administrative and economic centre 
Khorog is home to about 30,000 people (Kreutzmann 2016). In recent years, the urban centre 
of the GBAO has witnessed great changes, including its gastronomic scenery. Not only the 
overall numbers of restaurants and cafes in the city are increasing, there are also more and 
more international influences palpable on its culinary landscape. After the Indian restaurant-
chain Delhi Darbar was the first non-Tajik restaurant to open in Khorog in 2007, more 
enterprises serving foreign food and drinks have been finding their way into the city. 
Especially the number of restaurants which advertise and serve American-style fast food is 
notable. This paper focuses on the question of how this development of a changing culinary 
scenery towards more Americanised fast food occured in the remote and high-altitude city 
of Khorog. 
The development of restaurants and cafes offering Americanised fast food is comparatively 
new to Central Asia. Until 2015, no American fast food chain had opened a branch in either 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan or Tajikistan. The first fast food 
restaurant chain to enter the Central Asian market was the California-based restaurant 
franchise company McDonald’s, which opened its first restaurant in the Kazakh capital 
Astana in 2016, about four months after the coffeehouse chain Starbucks had entered the 
Kazakh market (Shaw Media 2016). Kentucky Fried Chicken, known as KFC, was the first to 
open a branch in Kyrgyzstan in 2017 (nov-ost.info 2017a), as well as the first global acting 
fast food chain that opened up a branch in Uzbekistan’s capital Tashkent in September 2018 
(The Tashkent Times 2018). Dodo Pizza and Papa John’s Pizza are other companies that 
entered the Kyrgyz market in the last two years (nov-ost.info 2017b; Ovchinnikov 2018). 
Howver, no American fast food chain had opened a branch in Tajikistan until July 2018, when 
research for this paper was conducted. 
In Khorog’s city centre an increasing number of gastronomic facilities advertise with images 
of fast food products, famous brands’ logos or creatively play with their names. Contrary to 
the increasing number of fast food franchise branches in the capitals of the Central Asian 
region, in Khorog, no franchises of McDonald’s or Kentucky Fried Chicken but MAC Doland’s 
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and Khorog Fried Chicken have opened recently. These enterprises are owned by local 
entrepreneurs, who started serving different dishes that are commonly connoted with the 
term fast food, including fries, burgers and fried chicken. 
The aim of this paper is to understand the contemporary development of fast food in Khorog, 
with a special interest in restaurants’ strategies to successfully implement their food 
concepts and rebranding of international chains in the local context. Robertson’s 
glocalization theory serves as the framework for analysis, which states – in a nutshell - that 
a universal concept has to be adpated in order to fit and function in a local context. Several 
studies have analyzed the role of glocalization for food enterprises in their strive to to adapt 
to local contexts (e.g. Kumar and Goel 2007; Prakash and Singh 2011; Simi and Matusitz 
2017). Yet, the geographical aspects of a remote, high altitude mountainous area, which is 
only marginally integrated into both national and regional economies, have not been 
evaluated so far. In doing so, glocalization theory serves as a helpful tool to better 
understand how the concept of fast food is transferred into such a place.  
Glocalization of fast food 
The glocalization approach emerged as a business concept in the 1980s, and subsequently 
became one of the marketing buzzwords during the early 1990s (Robertson 1995: 29). The 
term was employed as a critique about the ignorance of local conditions in contemporary 
globalization theory in sociology (ibid: 27). In line with the argument put forward by Cook 
and Crang (1996: 137) in their critical assessment of McDonaldisation theory proclaiming 
global homogenisation through standardisation, Robertson emphasies that globalisation in 
its attempt to override the local is nevertheless shaped to some degree by local ideas and 
frameworks, but also that the ‘local’ itself often represent an outside construction. 
(Robertson 1995: 27, 36). While local influences on global trends are comparatively rare, 
the interaction of the global and the local gives shape to what is called glocalization: local 
customs and values have significant influences on how global trends or products are 
articulated in a given local environment. Simi and Matusitz describe glocalization as creative 
use of of a worldwide concept through social actors who change it to fit their pre-existing 
homegrown values (Simi and Matusitz 2017: 574).  
Cook and Crang have pioneered research on the glocalization of food (Cook and Crang 1996). 
Glocalization of food has since become a popular research interest, with its biggest focus on 
globally acting restaurant chains. Here, research focussed especially on fast food chains, as 
they usually apply a universal concept in different settings.  
Various attempts exist to define fast food. Janssen et al. simply define fast food as the food 
served by the eight major fast food chains (Janssen et al. 2018). Winarno and Allain associate 
fast food with low cost in price, preparation after ordering, preparation time as well as its 
style of preparation (Winarno and Allain 1991). Watson stresses the importance of clear 
regimentation, standardisation and a predictable outcome for fast food preparation (quoted 
in Matejowsky 2007: 38). A more precise definition is given by Hogan and Maiberger, who 
define fast food as  
“[…] a genre of restaurant food items that are freshly prepared, packaged, and served either 
across a counter or through a drive-¬ through window. […] fast food is generally served in a 
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short period of time […]. Most fast food restaurants provide some customer seating, but usually 
not table ¬ service. Food types vary, including a wide range of meat offerings, ethnic styles, 
and preparation methods. Hamburgers are the mainstay of fast food fare, but chicken, fish, 
roast beef, hot dogs, pizza, and pasta are also quite common. Fast food items are commonly 
inexpensive, delivered quickly, and often wrapped for carry out.” (Hogan and Maiberger 2017: 
139)  
This definition also links fast food to restaurants and therefore distinguishes it clearly from 
street food, which is “ready-to-eat foods and beverages prepared and/or sold by vendors or 
hawkers especially in the streets and other similar places,” according to the United Nations 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO 2009: IV).  
Metin and Kizgin, as well as Simi and Matusitz have observed the modification of American 
fast food chains’ menus in Turkey and India (Metin and Kizgin 2015: 108; Simi and Matusitz 
2017: 576). Simi and Matusitz addressed that customers hybridise the local and the global 
and that restaurants therefore constantly revise their food items to suit different customer 
tastes (ibid.: 575). They observed, in the case of India, how the Subway-chain has opened 
vegetarian-only restaurants and developed menus aimed at catering to Jain customers, i.e. 
not offering any meat, animal product or root vegetables (ibid.: 579-580). Critical to the 
modification of menus are the origins of food (Cook and Crang 1996: 135; Cook 2004) and 
the respective system of food provision itself (Cook and Crang 1996: 132) as they have a 
direct influence on food availability. This is especially crucial for the remote high-
mountainous context of Khorog, where the supply situation is more difficult because of the 
fragile road connections and transport infrastructure.  
Against this backgrund, the flow of culinary knowledge about fast food to the ‘roof of the 
world’ was of special interest to us. Particularly Ceccarini and Cook and Crang have provided 
some interesting insights (Ceccarini 2010; Cook and Crang 1996). The latter frame the term 
of geographical knowledge, what they define as the knowledge about a food’s origin. In her 
work about pizza in Japan, Ceccarini focussed on how pizzaiolos (i.e. pizza cooks) found 
their way to the archipelagic state and concludes that they not only introduced a new food 
item but a new occupation too (Ceccarini 2010: 14), as more and more Japanese are 
becoming pizzaiolos nowadays. She also highlights the importance of solid staff training for 
restaurants’ success (ibid: 13). 
Simi and Matusitz find that there is a positive correlation between frequent fast food dining 
and obesity and that Indians are aware of that (Simi and Matusitz 2017: 575). Nevertheless, 
Subway introduced ‘healthy’ fast food, as customers were able to witness every step of its 
preparation through Subway’s open kitchen, which also influenced customers’ food 
purchasing behaviour (ibid: 576-577). Contributing to the restaurant’s ambience, the authors 
observed how Subway intentionally uses colours with certain cultural meanings to create a 
pleasant atmosphere (ibid: 578-579).  
Another popular strategy of fast food chains is the adjustment of advertising practices to 
attract customers (Metin and Kizgin 2015: 108, 114; Simi and Matusitz 2017: 580-581). This 
is supported by Robertson’s statement that glocalization is mainly a marketing strategy. 
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Additionally, Simi and Matusitz discussed how the use of social media is key to successful 
marketing in the 21st century (Simi and Matusitz 2017: 581-582). 
Methodological approach 
The empirical data presented in this paper was collected during fieldwork in Khorog in July 
2018. Initial explorations found that small shacks selling diverse kinds of street and fast food 
concentrated around the main bazaar play an important role in catering to the city’s 
inhabitants. Restaurants and cafes also cluster along the main street (Lenin Street), mostly 
near the bus terminal and around the park area. Acknowledging the importance of adjusting 
restaurant ambience to local conditions (Simi and Matusitz 2017), we focussed our approach 
on places that offer the possibility to consume food within the premises. There, we were 
able to examine the modification of menus, means of culinary knowledge, health concerns, 
food purchasing behaviours, restaurant ambience and the adjustment of advertising 
practices.  
After attaining a general overview of the city’s culinary landscape, our main interest was to 
better understand the recent development of restaurants opening in the city centre of 
Khorog and the strategies applied by proprietors in selected case studies. Interviews with 
department heads of the local municipality responsible for licencing restaurants and its 
affiliated hygiene institute helped to gain insights into licensing processes and training 
programmes. Semi-structured interviews with owners and managers of nine restaurants, as 
well as six employees and 38 customers form the basis of the main argument of this paper. 
Results 
The understanding of fast food employed here focuses on what could be best described as 
American-styled fast food. Nonetheless, several other dishes served in restaurants in the city 
of Khorog would meet the definition of fast food by Hogan and Maiberger (2017). Samosas, 
a type of savoury pastry frequently served in restaurants, are one example that can be 
classified as fast food. Yet, it was found that all types of interviewees not identify them as 
fast food. Rather, people perceive them as ‘traditional food’: 
‘I like the place [i.e. the restaurant] because of the atmosphere and the staff. Today, I had a 
cheeseburger, but sometimes, I also order traditional food, such as samosas.’ 
This perception of fast food corresponds with Padrão et al., who classified ‘sambusa’ (a 
synonym for samosa) as traditional Tajik fast food (Padrão et al. 2017: 2). However, 
classifying certain food items as ‘traditional’ is difficult. As Middleton stresses, potatoes 
were introduced by the Russians at the end of the 19th century, but are now one of the main 
food crops in the region, together with wheat, barley and rye (Middleton 2016). This 
understanding coincides with van Oudenhoven and Haider, who provide a description of the 
changing history of culinary culture and agriculture in the Pamirs susceptible to outside 
influences (van Oudenhoven and Haider 2015). Therefore, those dishes perceived as 
‘traditional’ by interviewees are classified here as regional food. The recent developments 
of the gastronomic scenery with an increasing number of fast food options thus can be 
referred to as an ‘American-style fast food trend.’ 
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The overall gastronomic scenery in Khorog is versatile, with changing offers of food and 
drinks and an often-limited lifespan of restaurants. An official list of registered restaurants 
in Khorog amount to 25 places, with many of those having closed in the meantime and others 
having emerged without being registered yet. Based on own observations there were 24 
restaurants in Khorog. In addition, about 20 food vendors offer their services round the main 
bazaar. 
Most restaurants were classified by the authorities as serving ‘traditional’ regional food, i.e. 
Tajik, Kyrgyz, Uighur, and Russian-influenced. The aim was to understand how fast food 
entrepreneurs build their businesses and adapt them to local market conditions. Fieldwork 
focused on three restaurants that serve fast food according to the definition used in this 
paper. 
Khorog Fried Chicken 
Khorog Fried Chicken (KFC) opened in September 2016. It is located on the main street west 
of the bazaar. The two-storey building hosts a ‘Play Station Lounge’ on the second floor and 
the actual restaurant on the ground floor. The size of the restaurant is approximately 30 m², 
ten of which are kitchen space. Six red tables, each with four seats, form the customers’ 
area. The open kitchen consists of new machinery and equipment made of stainless steel. 
The menu offers a variety of pizzas and chicken dishes. The bulk of customers, young adults 
or local workers, order pizza, french-fries and a soft drink. Chicken dishes are less 
frequented. Per shift there are two employees. A delivery service is offered throughout 
Khorog between 10 o’clock and 20 o’clock. 
Bamaza  
Bamaza translates as ‘tasty’ and opened in May 2017. It is located on Lenin Street on the 
east side of the bazaar opposite of Pamir Plaza, the city’s major shopping centre. The size 
of the restaurant is about 40 m² and offers seats to 24 customers at a time. The interior 
consists of wooden furniture, yellow and orange walls and a menu displayed on TVs above 
the counter. Showcases in the counter present the different food options, which include 
burgers, hot dogs, pizza and burritos. Especially during lunchtime, the restaurant is filled 
with adults. Five employees work in the restaurant during the day. 
MAC Doland´s  
MAC Doland´s is located on Lenin Street right opposite the main bazaar on the third floor of 
a three-storey building. It opened to customers in April 2018. The size of the one-room 
restaurant is about 70 m², providing space for approximately 20-25 customers on six tables. 
The open kitchen is located in one corner of the restaurant. The dominant colours of the 
furniture and walls are red, yellow, light green and orange. The menu is displayed above the 
counter and red food trays are served over the counter, sporting stickers with the McDonald’s 
logo pasted in each corner. Customers are mostly families, parents with smaller children, 
adolescents and young adults. Typical meals include burgers, hot-dogs, french-fries and soft 
drinks or coffee. 
Advertising fast food 
A common approach of all fast food restaurants in Khorog is the application of a ‘modern’ 
image, manifested in different ways. MAC Doland’s advertisement  arguably is best visible in  
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the city. Right opposite to the busy bus 
terminal where most regional transport arrives 
or departs, a four-by-one metre banner 
advertises the restaurant’s name next to the 
official McDonald’s logo and a ‘Free Wi-Fi’-sign 
(Fig. 1). Many among MAC Doland’s’ customers 
chose to have their lunch there because of its 
centrality and short distance to the terminal. 
Other customers referred particularly to the 
free Wi-Fi service in a city where the overall 
internet access is poor. 
The bus terminal and neighbouring bazaar as 
the commercial and transport hub of the 
whole region form the busiest part of the city. 
Several food shacks use advertising pictures of 
fast food (Fig. 2) in order to attract customers, 
albeit without offering it: “Fast food is good to 
attract customers. That’s why our 














Fig. 1: The banner advertising the MAC 
Doland’s fast food restaurant. 
Photograph taken by Hasse, July 2018 
MAC Doland’s’ name itself serves as 
advertisement. It intentionally plays with the 
name of one of the world’s biggest fast food 
franchise chains. However, this wordplay has 
an additional meaning as the acronym of the 
first name of its three owners. The other 
restaurant that creatively plays with a famous 
international fast food chain is Khorog Fried 
Chicken. KFC’s manager stressed that the 
name was chosen because of a foreign 
investor, insisting on the name to create 
attention. Because of his decision the initial 
plan to only offer pizza was modified and 
chicken items were also included on the menu. 
KFC was observed to be the only restaurant in 
Khorog with a diverse advertisement strategy, 
including placing flyers in hotels, a branded 
car for delivery and an internet presence     
(Fig. 3). The latter focussed on TripAdvisor and 














Fig. 2: One off the shacks, which use 
food pictures and global brands for 
advertisement.                                       

















Fig. 3: KFC’s delivery car.                                                                                                
Photograph taken by Hasse, July 2018 
 
‘Roland MAC Doland’ – a modern image 
KFC’s delivery service was the first to be introduced in Khorog. Between four to ten times 
per day, the car with a large logo and the restaurant’s name printed on both of its sides 
delivers mainly pizza and drinks to customers around the city. This service leads to high 
visibility of the restaurant in the city, especially during afternoons when most orders are 
placed. The convenience of a delivery service was well appreciated by all interviewed 
customers and contributed to its overall positive image of a ‘modern’ restaurant. Two young 
female customers at KFC described the restaurants’ atmosphere even as a ‘[…] feeling of 
holidays. It’s bright, it’s comfortable and one feels free. It somehow feels like home.’ 
However, other fast food restaurants aimed to copy the modern image of KFC. MAC Doland’s 
and Bamaza achieved this through the way their menus are presented. While KFC used 
leaflets, the other displayed their menus above the counter. MAC Doland’s copied the 
approach from its name-giving franchise chain, and Bamaza uses big TV flat screens for 
display. Combined with the dominant colours red, yellow, orange and light green, customers 
are intended to find themselves in a similar atmosphere like the one created by McDonald’s, 
as its founders stressed. This is reinforced by the way that food is received over the counter: 
packaged burgers, boxed fries and soft drinks in plastic-topped paper cups with straws are 
served on red trays. 
Fast food is seen to be a customer-magnet and especially attractive for the younger 
generation. Therefore, all fast-food-serving restaurants try to create an atmosphere 
perceived to be pleasant for that age group. The use of music is crucial for that. US-
American, English, Russian and Persian Hip Hop and Pop music is played in every restaurant; 
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some even broadcast music videos on TV-screens. Other multimedia devices were also visible 
in restaurants. KFC’s staff uses a tablet to place orders and facilitate the payment process. 
On the counter of MAC Doland’s a laptop replaced the calculator commonly used in most 
restaurants and was also used to display the menu to staff members. 
Wall decoration supported the 
accomplishment of the desired 
atmosphere. The best example is given by 
MAC Doland’s and its attempt at 
‘glocalising’ McDonald’s clown mascot (Fig. 
4). In the picture, Ronald McDonald wears 
the traditional Pamiri hat and socks, apart 
from his typical clown suit. A button on his 
chest contains the McDonald’s logo 
together with the name of MAC Doland’s. 
Hung up right opposite the entrance, it is 
the major eye-catcher when customers 










Fig. 4: ‘Roland MAC Doland’.                                    
Photograph taken by Rupp, July 2018 
Another picture of 19,5 carrots equalling a burger is placed on the wall to dubiously point at 
the health benefits of consuming a burger. Comically photoshopped pictures show celebrities 
eating burgers, such as the football player Cristiano Ronaldo or the President of the United 
States, Donald Trump. Such pictures shall convince customers that their food is meant for 
everyone and not only for children, who, together with their parents, from the biggest 
customer group. 
While fast food is often associated with low prices (Winarno and Allain 1991), this is not the 
case in Khorog. Bamaza’s manager reported that his food “[…] should be something special, 
that people save up for”. Altogether, the reception of fast food in Khorog is diverse. Some 
interviewess expressed outright antipathy, while others were not bothered. However, most 
interviewees, including managers of other restaurants and government officials, appreciated 
fast food as an addition to the culinary scenery in the city: “It’s the 21st century, so we need 
to be modern.” Fast food is thus seen as a step towards a positive development in the city. 
Modernity and development were catchwords often mentioned by interviewees, and such 
positive connotation was perceived as more important than the price. 
Health concerns 
Interestingly, there were only very few negative statements about fast food and its impact 
on health. Most customers did not share any health concerns, in contrast to the manager of 
KFC admitted that “fast food messes up your health”. However, the frequency of 
consumption remains the responsibility of the customer, while the KFC-management see 
itself responsible for providing good quality and fresh food out of local produce. 
Health issues were however mentioned by customers regarding cleanliness and hygiene 
within fast food restaurants. Heat, smell and the presence of too many flies were criticised 
by many interviewees. However, this perception was not shared by the hygiene institute. 
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Officials praised the high hygienic standards in fast-food restaurants to be ‘the cleanest in 
Khorog and laboratory checks of fast food were all satisfying’. This claim seems justified in 
light of recent openings and the use of modern kitchen appliances. Additionally, it was 
stressed that all employees are instructed and trained to follow hygienic standards set by 
the institute.  
Microwave-burgers 
In addition to Government training in hygienic standards, all interviewed managers of fast-
food-serving restaurants provide in-house training. Some employees already had gastronomy 
experience from previous work in Moscow. Nevertheless, all staff received additional 
training at their workplace because the standardised processes of fast food preparation were 
often new to restaurant workers. KFC’s delivery man also reported being trained for behavior 
in traffic jams and customer service. 
The availability of well-trained staff is an issue for managers of fast food restaurants in 
Khorog. Bamaza’s owner explained that he would like to expand his menu and include more 
Mexican-styled food options but that he does not find kitchen personnel with the adequate 
skill-set to prepare such novel food items. He himself taught how to prepare Burritos, a skill 
he acquired while working in Dushanbe, but other Mexican food items so far remain beyond 
the scope of Tajik chefs whose skills are bound to localized geographical and culinary 
knowledges. Even though most interviewees associated fast food with the USA, the first 
contact with such food was often made in Russia while on labour migration. This included 
all the current restaurant’s managers and owners. The only exception was KFC’s manager, 
who studied in the USA. 
The owners of MAC Doland’s, KFC and Bamaza all stated problems regarding the preparation 
of fast food. Primarily, the availability of food ingredients and kitchen appliances are 
problematic. There are no specialised businesses for kitchen appliances or restaurant 
equipment in the Tajik Pamirs, and the existing trade infrastructure allows restaurants to 
purchase kitchen appliances only for higher pricing. This challenge of limited capacity for 
kitchen appliances leads to different food preparation strategies largely relying on the use 
of microwave heaters as an alternative to expensive chip pans in the case of MAC Dolands. 
On the contrary, the owner of KFC invested in new machinery for the restaurant’s opening 
in 2016. She managed to buy state of the art kitchen appliances from China. The pizza oven, 
fryer, burger fryer and showcases are all made of stainless steel. 
The style of preparation is crucial to fast food, and all fast food managers indicated that 
their preparation processes were standardised. For example, the restaurant Bamaza uses a 
patty form to ensure the same sizes of burger patties. The same happens at KFC for pizza, 
where patterns of four different sizes are used to ensure a predictable outcome. To 
accelerate the preparation of pizzas, KFC’s staff prepares the dough before the restaurant’s 
opening hours and prepacks it ready for order. In contrast to KFC, MAC Doland’s was not able 






Restaurants developed a variety of food preparation strategies when confronted with a 
changing availability of food ingredients. As a rule, ingredients are almost exclusively of 
local produce and bought from the bazaar, with only dairy products usually being shipped 
from the Sughd region in northwest Tajikistan. A common problem is the shortage of 
vegetables in Khorog during the winter season. The manager of Bamaza came up with a 
simple coping-strategy: “During winter time some products are not available, so I change 
the menu and create the food without them – just adjust.”  
Additionally, restaurants changed fast food items to fit the local taste. Because consumers 
expressed their preference for bigger chicken pieces and less spicy coating, KFC’s 
management acted accordingly. It probably helped that the original recipe for Kentucky 
fried chicken included 15 spices to be used in the marinade but only eight out of those were 
available in Tajikistan.  
In order to meet local tastes, MAC Doland´s adjusted the size of burgers towards a lower but 
broader shape when compared to the original. “In the beginning, we wanted to serve beef 
and chicken burgers, but very few people ordered beef. Owing to customers’ preferences, 
we only have chicken now.” The concept of the burger was successfully adapted at the Choy 
Khona (‘Tea House’) restaurant. The restaurant created a ‘Kulcha Burger,’ combining the 
local wheat flour bread with the ingredients of an American-style burger. 
Customer preferences also led to the combination of regional Pamiri and fast food as was 
observed in several restaurants. A typical lunch meal at one of the four restaurants consisted 
of items from one of the region’s most common dishes, plov (a meal made mainly from rice 
and meat), sided by french-fries and accompanied by tea. Customer interviews indicated 
that the availability of both types of food is preferred. More generally, it appears that fast 
food is consumed by the younger generation, whereas older people almost exclusively order 
regional food perceived as ‘traditional.’  
Discussion 
In the case of Khorog, the concept of glocalization helps to explain how the universal concept 
of fast food has been adapted for the local market, constrained by a limited availability of 
ingredients, trained employees and kitchen appliances. The remote location of Khorog 
makes importing new kitchen appliances and equipment more expensive, and in fact only 
KFC was able to import all the required appliances, being the only restaurant with a foreign 
investor.  
Global food companies have thus far not attempted to enter the market of Khorog, but their 
branding strategies were introduced by local food businesses. As such, the global flows of 
culinary knowledge are of special interest (Cook and Crang 1996, Ceccarini 2010). For most 
food entrepreneurs in Khorog their first encounter with fast food took place in Moscow, but 
the image of their restaurants is ‘American-style fast food’. About half of employees in the 
studied places were already experienced restaurant workers in Moscow. The other half 
required extra training, coinciding with findings from other contexts that solid staff training 
is of high importance for the success of a restaurant, and that new food concepts often 
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create new occupations altogether (Ceccarini 2010: 13-14). It might be argued that all fast-
food restaurants created new occupational fields, but the delivery service introduced by KFC 
can be seen as the greatest innovation in the gastronomic scenery of the city.  
The modification of restaurant’s menus is observed as a strategy to fit local tastes (Metin 
and Kizgin 2015: 108, Simi and Matusitz 2017: 576). In Khorog, both MAC Doland’s and KFC 
have changed their menus and other restaurants included regional food options in their 
menus to be more attractive to customers who prefer a variety of options. This 
‘hybridisation’ (Simi and Matusitz 2017: 575) was observed in all restaurants offering fast 
food and regional cuisine.  
The correlation between regular fast food dining and gaining weight (ibid) was not drawn by 
customers in Khorog. In fact, the opposite was observed as most repsondents had positive 
impressions regarding health and the consumption of fast food. As cconfirmed by statements 
from the local governmental health institute, fast food restaurants in Khorog are those with 
the highest hygiene standards and levels of cleanliness in the city. However, cleanliness was 
only one aspect contributing to a modern image of fast-food restaurants. The use of music 
(videos) broadcasting inside all fast-food serving restaurants contributes to the creation of 
a special atmosphere, as does the use of certain colours as used in the original American 
brands (Ceccarini 2010: 13, Simi and Matusitz 2017: 578-579).  
It can be concluded that glocalization of fast food is happening in Khorog. In terms of 
advertisements and the creation of restaurant atmospheres, glocalization is intentionally 
used as a marketing strategy. The most remarkable (and visualised) example is the transfer 
of McDonald’s mascot Ronald McDonald to ‘Roland MAC Doland’ (wearing traditional Pamiri 
hat and socks).  
However, it was found that customers at Bamaza had to wait about 15 to 20 minutes after 
their order was placed and even up to 90 minutes at KFC, especially when using the delivery 
service. This leads to the question, whether their foods can still be identified as fast food 
(Winarno and Allain 1991, Hogan and Maiberger 2017). Standardisation and predictability of 
food were understood as the main aspect of fast food preparation (Watson quoted in 
Matejowsky 2007: 38), both of which can not be attributed to restaurants in Khorog because 
of a lack of appropriate kitchen appliances and the seasonally varying availability of 
ingredients.  
Conclusion 
This paper has discussed the contemporary development of a growing culinary scenery in 
Khorog, Tajikistan, with a focus on fast food restaurant’s strategies to  successfully 
implement their food concepts in the local context. Following Robertson’s glocalization 
theory, we have examined different criteria of these strategies. We can conclude that the 
concept of fast food has been glocalised in Khorog and transferred from experiences gained 
in Russia rather than from the USA. Two important issues further arise from increased fast 
food consumption in Khorog that need addressing in further work on the subject. First, the 
packaging of fast food leads to an increasing production of urban waste, and second health 
aspects of hybridized fast food consumption would need further scrutiny. This is especially 
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A poster of the “Migration Service of the Government of the Republic Tajikistan”, hung in the 
ticket office of the airport of Khorog, explains the documents and legal requirements for Tajik 
















View of the Khorog Campus of the University of Central Asia from Upper Dasht Village. 
Photograph taken by Dörre, July 2018   
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Muybalikhon Jumakhonov, Lennart Kessler & Janina Laube  
Effects of Labour Migration on Household Roles in Khorog  
Abstract 
The majority of research on labour migration focuses on strategies of migration. Comparatively few 
researches focus on the consequences of labour migration on households in the labour migrants’ place 
of residence. This research emphasises the changes that occur by the labour migrants experience and 
contact with a relatively unknown culture and its subsequent impacts on his/her’s perception of 
his/her’s own cultural values and on traditional family roles. 
As labour migration presents a lucrative way to generate income in Tajikistan, especially in Khorog, 
most families in town have an absent member who is in labour migration. Therefore, we point out 
the importance of this topic and the wide range of issues in a household that can be affected by 
labour migration. With the concept of social remittances, we analyse what and how labour migration 
effects household roles in Tajikistan and its meaning especially for the females in Khorog. 
Introduction 
Labour migration plays a significant role in Tajikistan’s national economy. In recent years 
financial remittances by labour migrants have accounted for up to 50 percent of Tajikistan’s 
GDP and are, according to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), much 
needed to finance the country’s foreign trade deficit (UNDP 2015: 12). Thus, labour 
migration is a widely spread household survival strategy in the face of prevalent 
unemployment and low wages. A survey of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) found 
that for an enormous share of 62 percent of households in Tajikistan remittances account 
for more than half of their financial incomes (ILO 2010: 25).  
This is also true for Khorog, the capital of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) 
largely populated by the Ismaili minority of Tajikistan. The city is situated at about 2100 
meters above sea level and only connected to the capital Dushanbe towards  the northwest 
and Kyrgyzstan and China towards the northeast via the so-called Pamir Highway, which is 
in poor condition in large parts. The number of inhabitants is about 30,000 (Bliss 2006: 2). 
During the civil war (1992-1997), the GBAO suffered heavily as opposition forces used the 
difficultly accessible area as base to continue the war after losing the fight for the capital 
Dushanbe (Bliss 2006: 2). This is why the GBAO was, and to a certain degree still is, heavily 
supported by international humanitarian aid and development assistance, above all through 
the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) (Bliss 2006: 328–29; Middleton 2016: 262). 
However, the region still remains one of the poorest in Central Asia (Middleton 2016: 246). 
Official statistics for Khorog demonstrate that in 2017 more than 5,700 people left the town 
to find themselves a job elsewhere, most of them heading to Russia. This form of migration 
is highly gendered as male persons accounted for 83 percent of this figure (OVIR 2017). 
Given the great scale, with almost every fifth inhabitant of Khorog on labor migration, there 
is a clear need for more knowledge about the implications of this process. The focus of this 
paper is on what Victoria Lawson calls one of ‘the classic migration questions’ (Lawson 1998: 
49): How are household dynamics affected and transformed by labour migration? Research 
has been carried out on this topic in other contexts (e.g. by Schafer (2000) for Zimbabwe, 
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Kaspar (2006) for Nepal, Desai and Banerji (2008) for India and Boehm (2008) for Mexico, 
Archambault (2010) for Tanzania, Zhang and Fussell (2017) for China). Results of these 
studies vary, as the cultural production and transformation of household divisions of labour 
are highly context dependent (Lawson 1998: 50). However, not much, if any, work has been 
done on this topic in the context of Gorno-Badakhshan, which makes it an important topic 
of research.  
Materials and Methods 
The argument presented here is based on fieldwork carried out in Khorog over the cause of 
two weeks during July 2018. Material has been collected through qualitative empirical 
research based on semi-structured and in-depth qualitative interviews with members of 
seven households: five women, two men, and one couple. These persons were interviewed 
two times, which allowed us, as interviewers, to go into more detail on important issues 
raised in the first round of interviews. The interviews took place at the respondents’ 
workplace, at their personal residences, and in some instances in public spaces. Interviews 
were translated and transcribed from Shughni and Tajik into English by Muybalikhon 
Jumakhonov, our research partner from the UCA. The interview transcripts served as the 
basis for analysis. 
Interviewed households practiced different and dynamic types of labour migration strategies 
to Russia, in turn leading to varying and also dynamic resident household strucures and 
compositions: 
• sole male migration (Households A, B, C, E, H);  
• sole female migration (unmarried) (Households B, G, H);  
• family migration (Households D, E, G, H). 
Household and residency situations of our respondents are the following: 
• nuclear family households with an absent husband (Households B, C);  
• extended family households living in the same house with an absent husband 
(Household A);  
• extended family households living in the same house without anyone absent 
(Households D, E, G, H).  
Only three interviewed persons were single female migrants. These women went on labour 
migration before they got married, often being followed by their later husband. In our 
interview sample these are interviewes B, G and H. Four respondents (D, E, G and H) went 
to Russia with their nuclear families. However, the majority of our interviewees were 
formerly or are currently affected by the migration of their husbands (A, B, C, E and H). The 
different strategies led to different household compositions and residence situations during 
the time of the interviews, which are important for the coherence of the analysis. Two 
interviewees, both females, lived with their nuclear family but an absent husband in Khorog 
(B and C). One person, a female spouse, lived in an extended family household with her 
parents in law while her husband was in Russia for work (A). Half of the interviewees, both 
female and male, lived in an extended family household without a current absent member, 
but have been engaged formerly in labour migration to Russia (D, E, G and H). 
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The analysis of interviews showed that the two concepts of social remittances and 
empowerment were prominent aspects of migration strategies and consequently form the 
focus and analysis of this paper.  
Anthropological approaches to household 
Households can be defined as “the actual domestic arrangements […] form[ed] to pool and 
manage labour, allocate food, money, and other resources, to manage child care, and to 
transmit property” (Peterson 1994: 90). Households are not static, but rather flexible units 
that are dynamic and responsive to change, and can always “[re]arrange roles within the 
household to suit their needs” (ibid.: 91). It is common for households to have one or even 
more members staying abroad to be able to contribute to the household incomes. These 
migrants, however, remain part of the household despite not living under the same roof, as 
they actively and regularly engage in decision making or child upbringing via phone and 
social media. In fact, migrants are often the most important part of the household as 
economic unit. This is the case also when long term labour migrants have formed a second 
household in Russia, even though such exemaples were not encountered in the interview 
sample. 
With the household as a research unit one has to keep in mind that household boundaries 
are of analytical nature. Obviously, households are integrated in families, neighbourhoods 
and broader social, political and economic systems. Thus, a reification of households should 
not promote the image of households as isolated, clearly distinct entities (ibid.: 93). For the 
purpose of analysing changes in household roles it is, however, important to arrive at a 
sensible definition. 
Empirical social science methods such as interviews are able to identify details and dynamics 
within urban households and a means to arrive at a better understanding of womens’ roles 
within these structures (ibid.: 87). The rationale is to identify how, and what variations 
occur in household roles and responsibilities when various labour migration strategies are 
put into place. Attention is directed to the social relations within a household, its dynamics 
under condition of labour migration, and especially to womens’ roles and contributions. 
Social remittances 
Interviews conveyed what has been described by Peggy Levitt as social remittances, i.e. 
“ideas, behaviours, identities, and social capital that flow from receiving- to sending-
country communities,” constituting a “local-level, migration-driven form of cultural 
diffusion” (Levitt 1998: 926). The flow of social remittances is, however, varying with the 
degree of the migrants’ exposure to the host society (ibid.: 930). To show how these 
different levels of contact affect social remittances, Levitt suggests distinguish ing between 
three broad patterns of interaction with the host society: A) recipient observers, who are 
almost exclusively in contact with other migrants, both at work and during their free time; 
B) Instrumental adapters whose exposure to the host society is limited to pragmatic reasons; 
C) Purposeful innovators actively search for and absorb new things, who “creatively add and 
combine what they take in with their existing ideas and practices and thereby extending 
their cultural repertoire” (ibid.: 931). This tyopology is used to show how social remittances 
influence household roles in Khorog. 
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Empowerment 
The idea of womens’ empowerment through their own migration  or by staying at home while 
their husbands leave has been a prominent feature in debates on labour migration. It has 
been claimed that male out-migration “empowers women by increasing their role in the 
family” (Malyuchenko 2015: 10; see also Archambault 2010), while others note how the 
absence of men actually strengthens the traditional gender ideology and leads to an increase 
in social control by households, families and communities (de Haan 2006; Desai and Banerji 
2008). This ambiguity in the literature can be focused on the situation in Tajikistan. Many 
interviewees stressed that the Pamiri customs facilitate more egalitarian gender roles that 
are different and more liberal than those in other parts of Tajikistan. These are described 
as being extremely conservative and suppressive in the private sphere, despite the 
promotion of gender equality in the public sphere during the Soviet era (Harris 2004; Kikuta 
2016). In contrast, the anthropologist Frank Bliss remarks that “women must be seen as the 
main losers in the radical changes that took place after 1991. This is, however, not readily 
admitted in [the] GBAO, as the Pamiris are proud of the equality enjoyed by their women” 
(Bliss 2006: 327; see also Ishkanian 2003). Empowerment is context specific, and in this 
research we follow an understanding of the concept that is not only about “the ability to 
make strategic life choices in a context where this ability was previously denied” (Kabeer 
2001: 19), but that also involves the ability to influence what choices are on offer (Reeves 
and Baden 2000: 35). 
Results 
Against this background the remainder of this paper closely follows a qualitative content 
analysis of interview texts that established four major categories derived from a combination 









Fig. 1: Coding categories and number of codings.                                                                          
Source: Jumakhonov, Kessler & Laube 2018 (draft)  
 
Division of labour patterns in different households  
In urban households of Khorog there is a strict gendered division of labour. This means that 
there is a widespread conception of what work tasks are the responsibility of male and 
female household members respectively: “The heavy work is for men and the light work is 
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the responsibility of women” (Household D: Interview 2), or: “Females do not do heavy work” 
(Household B: Interview 2). Household chores such as preparing food, child caring and child 
upbringing, doing laundry, cleaning and caring for the parents in law are considered female 
tasks. Tasks for men included looking after the kitchen garden, chopping firewood and 
lighting fires, carrying heavy groceries or any kind of construction work. This gendered 
division of labour is very clear as conceded by a female respondent: “[i]n our culture it is 
embarrassing to see men washing their clothes” (Household B: Interview 1), and “the kitchen 
is the place of women” (Household B: Interview 1). Another respondent stated that she is 
obliged to perform these tasks as her husband “cannot cook and cannot do laundry” 
(Household H: Interview 2). 
Interview partners who live in a nuclear family household and deal with an absent husband 
made it clear that it is up to the remaining females to do all the male work: “Since I do not 
have a man at my home right now, I try to do all the work by myself” (Household B: Interview 
2). This pattern, however, only appeared in nuclear family households. 
There are only very rare variations from this point of view. Just one respondent stated that 
“[m]y husband helps me with the preparations of meals” (Household D: Interview 1), but 
“the rest is done by myself” (Household D: Interview 1). Another woman said that in her 
family “there is no particular division of tasks, […] we help each other” (Household A: 
Interview 1). While it remains her responsibility to perform all other emerging house chores 
there does not appear to be any discontent with this division of labour. 
One interviewee however declared not to be satisfied with the prevailing division of labour. 
In her opinion, “he [her husband] should help, but he does not want to” and adds that 
“sometimes conflicts” occur about this topic. Ideally “there should be reciprocal help 
between couples”. She is the only respondent who receives help from her son when it comes 
to female tasks: “[h]e washes dishes, cleans and does laundry”. Still “he does not like 
kitchen work, but I force him to do it” (Household G: Interview 1). 
The shape of household structures and compositions appears to be a defining factor for 
labour migration strategies. Women who have themselves migrated prior to being married 
did not engage in migration again after the birth of their children. They returned to Khorog 
to raise their children and/or to take care of their parents in law, as this is also seen as a 
female obligation, further underlining the wide range of gendered divisions of labour. Only 
one interviewee with teenage children expressed her wish to go to Russia for work, but her 
husband would not allow her to come and join him as he thinks she should make sure her 
children pursue their education properly. 
Decision-Making processes 
The oldest male member of a household in Khorog holds the position as head of household. 
Responsibilities in this respect refer to the management of the household’s finances, 
educating children about social norms and safeguarding the continuation of house 
construction.  
All interviewees who live with adult men in a household state that it is either their husband 
or their father (in law) who serve as the head of household: “The head of the family are my 
parents in law, especially my father in law” (Household A: Interview 1); “My husband is the 
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head of the household” (Household D: Interview 2); “He is the oldest of his brothers, so he 
is the boss” (Household H: Interview 2). Interview partners who live in nuclear households 
without an adult male all state that they themselves are now the head of the household: 
“My husband used to be the head of the household, but in his absence, I am the head of the 
household” (Household B: Interview 1). In these cases, labour migration induces a clear shift 
of responsibilities, indicated in turning male-headed to female-headed households. Only one 
interviewee mentions that there is a discrepancy from the outside to the inside view: “I can 
say that my husband, […] is head of households for the people, but, in fact, inside the house 
it is me” (Household H: Interview 2). Interesting findings emerge when the position of the 
head of household is contrasted with the process of decision-making. Holding the position of 
the head of the household does not necessarily come along with having the last word when 
it comes to decision-making: “In his absence, I am the head of the household. Nevertheless, 
my husband decides upon the most important issues also when he is not here” (Household 
B: Interview 2). “He does not allow me to go to Moscow for labour migration. […] Still, it is 
me who currently is head of the household” (Household C: Interview 1). “Because my 
husband is away, whatever he [her father in law] says, we always do it. He gives us different 
advice on many topics” (Household G: Interview 1).  
Three interviewees explained that decision-making processes are handled jointly in their 
households: “It was mutually decided that my husband engages in labour migration” 
(Household B: Interview 1). “Whatever we decide, we negotiate and come to one consensus” 
(Household C: Interview 1). “Everyone says their opinion and we choose the best option” 
(Household D: Interview 2). These statements make clear that being the head of the 
household does not always mean to be in charge of the decision-making processes, especially 
when the person is not the oldest male. 
Workload 
In cases of husbands being on labour migration interviewed women were confronted with 
the need to shoulder additional tasks. This was especially challenging, as at the same time 
all women were employed in a full-time job to make ends meet. 
When living in a nuclear household, this puts a lot of pressure on the women in Khorog. Work 
activities such as irrigation of their kitchen garden, including the need to fetch water as 
there is not necessarily a pump or irrigation channel on site, carrying heavy groceries, such 
as the common 50 kg packs of flour, or collecting firewood were left in the responsibility of 
the women. A strategy to cope with this additional workload was to utilise kinship networks, 
neighbours and friends to reduce the workload. In one case, the value of communal work in 
the process of completing the house construction was stressed. Building materials were 
bought and food was prepared with the financial remittances sent by the husband, and the 
labour force was recruited via reciprocal communal help. Relatives also played an essential 
role in child caring during women’s work shifts. In exchange for taking care of her children 
while at work, one respondent regularly bought food supplies for the related neighbouring 
household. 
In cases where women lived in an extended household, these additional burdens were partly 
mitigated by other household members: “the work in the kitchen garden and other heavy 
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work is completed by my father in law […] and my mother in law supports me by preparing 
the meals when I come home from work exhausted” (Household A: Interview 1). 
Nevertheless, a state of hierarchical household relations that inhibit women remained: “I 
feel shy and uncomfortable to ask my father in law to do something, so that is why sometimes 
I do the work by myself” (Household A: Interview 1). Emotional well-being is further affected 
in nuclear households as “at night my children and I feel lonely sometimes” (Household C: 
Interview 1). 
Independent of household compositions, all interviewees reported of similar constrains due 
to an increase in their workload. Time to visit own relatives was scarce: “Since I am alone, 
I cannot visit my mother very often” (Household B: Interview 2); “If my husband would be 
here, I could visit my mother more often” (Household A: Interview 1). Additionally, women 
often are forced to miss some important social events: “Sometimes I can not go to a wedding. 
Even though I get invited, I can not make it there” (Household A: Interview 1). The time 
they have to spend with their children is less than they would like it to be: “I am not even 
able to go for a walk with my sons. I cannot spend much of my time with them, which is sad” 
(Household A: Interview 1). 
Social Remittances 
When asking our interviewees on how their own or their husbands’ experience of migration 
to Russia has changed their perspectives on household roles, we were often told that such a 
change would not occur. The only change people recognised for themselves were reports of 
different forms of social capital gained, skills that migrants acquired through their jobs 
which then helped them to either find a job in Khorog, or another, better paying job in 
Russia. This, however, did not challenge or transform the household roles in any way. 
Wondering how multiple years of migration would not challenge perceptions of household 
roles and the division of labour in one or the other way, it soon became clear that most 
migrants did not come in close contact with Russians whatsoever. One woman reported how 
her husband is, together with other migrant workers, living in the same construction site he 
is working at. Another woman said about her time in Russia: “I worked with Tajiks and 
Uzbeks, […] I do not think I changed a lot because we worked for more than 10 hours a day, 
so there was no place for too much thinking […] and we did not have time to have a chat 
with anyone” (Household B: Interview 2). 
We argue that this narrow window of actual exposure to the Russian society, embedded in a 
subculture consisting of other migrant workers with comparatively similar cultural 
backgrounds and almost no free time is limiting the potential for social remittances to 
change household roles. This pattern arose for two-thirds of the migrants in the households 
of the interviewees. The other one-third had a higher level of interaction with the receiving 
society. These migrants were in contact with other Russians on a day to day basis, both at 
their workplace, as well as in their neighborhoods and talked about their overall migration 
experience in a more positive manner. One family even took on the Russian citizenship. From 
members of these households we then received reports of partly changing household roles. 
This became most obvious in their perception of what roles and tasks their children should 
fulfill when helping with household chores. The households with the more culturally exposed 
migrants were the only ones in which male children were supposed to help with chores who 
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are traditionally received as ‘female jo100bs’. As one interviewee puts it: “I want my sons 
to help me with cooking, laundry, dishwashing and the like and also they should be able to 
help their wives one day. It is important” (Household H: Interview 2). However, such changes 
could also create potential for conflict, especially when the migrants returning with such 
new ideas are female household members. In both cases the women seem to be the driving 
force in giving their sons an understanding of such ‘female tasks’ whilst their husbands were 
dismissive: “My husband for example did not live in Russia and did not stay with Russians 
before, so when it comes to do some work, laundry, baking bread, cooking or washing the 
dishes, he says that in our culture men do not do these chores and he simply does not do 
them.” (Household G: Interview 2) 
Another domain in which one migrant who gained social remittances showed a discrepancy 
in perceptions to the other interviewees concerned help among neighbours. She highlighted 
how “here in Badakhshan, in Khorog, we care about our neighbours; you need to be a good 
person for them,” which is contrasted with her experience in Russia: “Russian people, how 
to say, they do not care for their neighbours” (Household H: Interview 2). Referring to this 
difference she explains how it made her and her husband reject some request of their 
neighbours in case they did not suit them: “Sometimes you have to say no to your 
neighbours” (Household H: Interview 2), thereby breaking up normative structures of 
neighbourliness and community participation in Khorog. 
Discussion 
Before interpreting our analysis in regard to social remittances and empowerment, we like 
to contextualise our findings with relevant literature on Tajikistan and labour migration in 
Central Asia.  
The work of Kikuta showed that the women in the Fergana Valley took over the entire tasks 
and the division of labour formerly handled by their husbands, now absent in labour 
migration (Kikuta 2016: 102). In contrast, Khusenova stressed that labour migration leads to 
a decrease of women in their ascribed fields of work such as the organisation of the 
household (Khusenova 2013: 370). Our results suggest that all the women who could not 
count on the help of another male household member take over the responsibilities formerly 
handled by the absent migrant, leading to an increased workload for them in addition to 
their reproductive chores. Additionally, there were almost no long-term alterations in 
perceptions of established divisions of labour, neither in the Fergana Valley nor in our 
research sample (Kikuta 2016: 102). The only exceptions are provided by the two households 
with female migrants who engaged in strong exchange with Russian mainstream society at 
the time of their stay abroad. This experience and the transfer of social remittances led in 
these cases to a loosening of established gender roles in their respective housholds.  
However, the wider literature on Tajikistan asserts that the majority of labour migration 
strategies lead to increasing workloads for women as well as the strengthening of traditional 
gender hierarchies (Hegland 2010: 16). This is supported by our findings, even though no 
relevant examples that also led to a strengthening of generational hierarchies were 
encountered (ibid: 20-23). 
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Most interviewees reported that it is their social network and their wider family who are 
supportive in mitigating the increasing workload, as is the case elsewhere in Tajikistan 
(Khusenova 2013: 370). Labour Migration thus leads to a gap in nuclear families to be filled 
by womens’ work, and it may also lead to insecurities for those left behind, especially for 
children who have to deal with missing role models (Hegland 2010: 27). Another effect is the 
rising number of extended family households in Tajikistan (Khusenova 2013: 370). Such a 
pattern however does not appear in our sample. Quite in contrast, those respondents who 
at the time of fieldwork formed part of an extended family household strived to separate 
and become a nuclear household. 
An interesting observation made by Hegland is that women regularly take over the position 
as head of household, but only as long as there is no other male family member present  
(Hegland 2013: 20). Nonetheless, she argues that the power of female household heads, 
when it comes to resource controlling, is minor to the power of a male household head in 
the same position (ibid.: 21). This is also true for Khorog: those female interviewees who 
acted as household head claimed to not have full power over decision making processes in 
their households. 
A factor that has been stressed in multiple studies conducted in Central Asia is the high 
number of women in low-paid jobs (Akiner 1997: 272; Kanji 2002: 140; Khusenova 2013: 
358). The majority of women who participate in the labour market are underpaid and work 
jobs that do not fit their qualifications. Among respondents for this study, most had a 
medium- to higher-level education, being trained as nurses, teachers, meteorologists or 
psychologists. None of them, however, was working in a job close to their original profession, 
leaving this potential in human capital underutilised. Bliss adds that educated people may 
even lose their skills and can not keep up with new technical developments when only 
carrying out unskilled labour (Bliss 2006: 333).  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the concepts of social remittances and empowerment are used to assess 
interview findings and results from the wider literature.  
The aspects discussed above suggest that for migration to have an influence on household 
gender relations, migrants need to acquire social remittances, i.e. have a certain level of 
exposure and interaction with their receiving society. Th is observation is line with Levitt’s 
findings on labour migrants from the Dominican Republic who fall in two major categories: 
so-called purposeful innovators with a high degree of exposure to the host society and 
recipient observers with very limited contact to mainstream cultural practices (Levitt 1998: 
930–31). Using this distinction, in the Khorog-study two households (G and H) can be seen as 
purposeful innovators. In both cases, the spouses have been in labour migration together but 
when returning to Khorog, it was the women whose social remittances changed the cultural 
pattern of certain procedures in child upbringing. Interestingly, we found that in order to 
avoid conflict these women did not challenge their ascribed roles and associated tasks in 
direct disussions with their husbands, but nevertheless they were reflecting about 
established gender roles and aimed to pass a new understanding about gender relations on 
to their children. In contrast, women in households without access to social remittances 
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supported the established assignment of tasks for their children: “I teach my daughters only 
female skills like cooking, washing, laundry and cleaning the house. Men’s jobs should be 
done by men” (Household B: Interview 2). As recipient observers, their norms and practises 
were not challenged due to their limited social engagement with the host society. Their 
established cultural repertoire worked among other Central Asian migrants, while in cultural 
terms they were living a live very similar to the one back home. Clearly, in our study only 
two women who became purpose innovators challenge social ascriptions of gender, while 
the majority are recipient observers and avoid doing so.  
In terms of empowerment for women, it has become clear that male labour migration has 
very limited effects. It has been argued, that when women become heads of nucelar 
households they gain more decision-making power (Desai and Banerji 2008). However, in 
Khorog it is more often the case that absent migrants still make all important decisions via 
socia media or phone, thereby hindering women’s “ability to make strategic life choices in 
a context where this ability was previously denied” (Kabeer 2001: 19). Maybe even more 
importantly, becoming head of household was not a voluntary choice but aquired by sheer 
necessity. Empowerment as a means to widen opportunities about life choices is not 
happening in households affected by male labour migration in Khorog. 
Likewise, the idea that taking over male household tasks by women would constitute an 
empowering effect (Hadi 2001) is not the ase in Khorog. Rather, the additional workload is 
perceived as a burden, and there was no ‘power to’ involved in gaining responsibility in 
these domains. Again, there was no choice for women. These additional tasks limit womens’ 
ability to take part in important social events such as weddings. Time for child caring and 
rearing also was reduced. As such, rather than leading to means for empowerment, labour 
migration and the affiliated increase in workloads for women constrains the spatial and 
social mobility of women in Khorog. In other contexts, these constraints were interpreted as 
a moral evaluation of female mobility when remaining without a husband (Reeves 2011), but 
in Khorog it has clearly to do with the additional burden imposed on women. 
It is evident that the experiences of our interview partners point to a variety of ways in 
which labour migration affects household roles in Khorog. In the wake of the increased 
workload, social networks, families and neighbours become more important to mitigate the 
effects. Labour migration thus is a double-edged sword. In economic terms, the remittances 
send by migrants represent an increasingly important livelihood ingredient, but managing 
household affairs in Khorog often leads to difficult situations for women. By no means should 
the fact that women become nominal heads of household be seen as empowerment. At the 
same time, the transfer of social remittances leading to progressive changes in gender 
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The UCA as a Catalyst for Regional Development  
Abstract  
The concept of universities solely being a centre of research and education has changed throughout 
the last 70 years. Especially the influence of higher education institutions in structurally weak regions 
is taking a centre stage in the scientific debate about regional development in the present day. We 
examine the social and economic impact of the University of Central Asia through its current social 
and economic connections and as a provider of professional higher education in the mountainous 
region of Gorno-Badakhshan. Additionally, we seek to draw attention on the impacts the actual 
construction of such a large-scale project can have on local society and economy. This paper argues 
that higher education institutions can be a driving factor for social and economic growth and an 
anchor for knowledge structures in a region that is usually connected to the phenomenon of brain 
drain. 
Introduction and theoretical framework  
Concerning their classical duties of research and education, universities have a self-
conception of being primarily supra-regional institutions. Nevertheless, most of them have 
a wide range of connections to the region. Especially since the expansion of higher education 
in the industrialised countries of the 1960s and 1970s, new universities were established as 
economic and social pacemakers, specifically in structurally weak regions. In the view of 
politics and regional planning, these relatively isolated educational institutions were 
obligated to become institutions with strong social interconnections. The expectations and 
focus of that time was usually directed on the economic effects. That applies for the 
scientific debate as well. While Bauer describes how employment and income effects 
(indirect and direct demand effects) were seen as most relevant (Bauer 1997: 2), Böhret 
classified eight university-related effects on a region (Böhret 1985: 12). As most important 
he considered the cultural effect (expansion of cultural activities and socio -cultural 
climate), the labour market related effect (employment effect), the economic effect 
(impact on regional income and economic structure) and the infrastructure-related effect 
(housing market, transportation, etc.). In any case, the economic impact of a university can 
be striking. It is not only an important employee for academic and technical-administrative 
staff and a producer of human capital, but also causes direct income effects and indirect 
employment effects by reason of its demand for goods and services. However, long-term 
effects, network effects, structural effects, and image effects of universities on the region 
were neglected in the discussion (Zajontz 2010: 34). 
This changed in recent discussions about the role of universities, rooting in the significance 
that is attributed to knowledge as a source for the wealth of regions and nations in the 
process of globalisation. Revitalised by the idea of the ‘global knowledge society’ (Forstorp 
and Mellström 2018: 8-9) and concepts of knowledge-based development, higher education 
institutions are again in the centre of consideration (Zajontz 2010: 41). Universities are seen 
as reservoirs of creativity and innovation whose accomplishments should be targeted to the 
regional economy and development. In this perspective, a university has three main 
functions: 1. As research centre it facilitates the production of knowledge, especially in 
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interaction with regional and external research institutes and companies. 2. As knowledge 
reservoir it channels the absorption, collection and allocation of existing knowledge, not 
least for the production of human capital. 3. As institution of regional-development it 
promotes the exchange of knowledge to trigger regional learning processes (Fritsch et al. 
2007: 20). 
As such, not the mere existence of institutions and organisations (actors) is decisive for their 
regional development potential, but rather their ability of knowledge transfer, their degree 
of interactions by network building and their awareness of being an economic entity. In the 
words of Boucher, Conway and van der Meer it is “the existence, creation and strengthening 
of informal and formal linkages, as a set of functioning structures and streams, interactive 
networks and forums for collaboration […]” (Boucher, Conway and van der Meer 2003: 887) 
that promotes the economic development of a region. On that account an increasing 
importance of interactions on the regional level has been observed (Zajontz 2010: 36). New 
ways of management and organisational structures are crucial to initiate knowledge-based 
development processes. Krücken and Meier summarise this process as turning the university 
into an organisational actor (Krücken and Meier 2006). “By the term ‘organizational actor’ 
we try to evoke the image of an integrated, goal-oriented entity that is deliberately choosing 
its own actions and that can thus be held responsible for what it does” (ibid.: 241). Like 
most new concepts of modern universities, the ‘organizational actor’ approach can be traced 
back to trends in the American higher education sector. Furthermore, the USA deemed to 
be the reference-system for what is understood as the modern university (ibid.: 242). In 
addition, the role of universities as source for innovation activities is mainly discussed in the 
context of North-America, Europe and parts of Asia. They may not be easily transferable to 
peripheral world regions characterised by a history of long-lasting foreign rule and serious 
socio-economic problems aas is the case in Central Asia. However, innovations are not about 
genuine world innovations. Dahlmann describes an innovation in the context of less 
developed countries as “[...] the first use of existing global technology in the domestic 
setting” (Dahlmann 2006: 2). Innovations also will be defined broadly to include products, 
processes and new business or organisational models. In this way universities in peripheral 
global regions have to be seen as potential catalysts for change processes, especially for the 
economic sector. They can help the local population to develop their skills and their 
awareness to absorb new ideas and concepts (Schiller 2006: 68). 
Against this background of the wider roles of universities and the manifold connections 
between higher education institutions and development processes, the focus of the present 
study is inspired by Goldstein, Maier, and Luger (1995). They have identified eight different 
functions, or outputs, of modern universities that potentially lead to economic development 
and that we use to analyse our findings: 1. Creation of knowledge; 2. Human-capital 
creation;3. Transfer of existing know-how; 4. Technological innovation; 5. Capital 
investment; 6. Regional leadership; 7. Infrastructure production and 8. Influence on regional 
milieu. 
In focusing on regional development, the concept of ‘region’ needs to be clarified. The 
status of regions changed in the globalisation discourse. Regions are declared to be the 
increasingly relevant space for political, scientific and economic activities, with the 
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objective to positioning themselves (as sublevel of the national state) in the global 
(capitalist) world system and to initiate local development processes (Zajontz 2010: 38). 
Various concepts were developed in this context and many of them focus on knowledge and 
learning processes to improve the global competitiveness of a region. But what exactly is a 
region? There is nothing like a single theoretical concept that is generally accepted. In the 
very different concepts of Blotevogel and Werlen for example, regions are defined as socio-
spatial unities formed on the basis of interactions (Blotevogel 1999; Werlen 2007: 197). In 
the understanding of Koschatzky, regions can be differentiated by the criteria of 
homogeneity (similar structure), functionality (interregional interdependence) and 
institutional character (administratively, politically, by planning aspects), whereby hybrid  
forms are also possible (Koschatzky 2001: 15). We have defined the term region here as 
functional system, with the city of Khorog being the administrative and political centre and 
the surrounding rural area and villages as its periphery.  
Methodology  
This paper is based on empirical fieldwork conducted in Khorog, a city of nearly 30,000 
inhabitants and the administrative centre of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast 
(GBAO) (AKF 2002: 18). During the fieldwork, we opted for a qualitative approach pursuing 
intensive structured and semi-structured interviews in English and Shughni as well as non-
participatory observations. We made a short survey on how the local population views the 
University of Central Asia and the university’s facilities in Khorog.  
Following this approach, we conducted nearly 40 interviews in English and Shughni with 
university staff members as well as students, professors, the auditor and the civil engineer 
of the UCA, and with inhabitants of Dasht – the district of Khorog City located adjacent to 
the UCA campus that was relocated in the construction process of the university. We also 
talked to a local member of the office of the Aga Khan Foundation and to an official of the 
Khorog State University (KSU). To have an insight on the network of higher education 
institutions we interviewed a spokesperson of the KSU as well. Furthermore, we interviewed 
contractors and companies that worked with the university in one or another way during and 
before the construction in 2015. To expand our knowledge on how the UCA as a part of the 
Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) impacts on regional development, we also 
approached the Aga Khan Lycee (AKL) and the School of Professional and Continuing 
Education (SPCE). Altogetherm we collected approximately 750 minutes of qualitative 
interview data and conducted two non-participatory observations as well as a short 
quantitative survey.  
The UCA as a catalyst for development in Gorno-Badakhshan  
Findings generated through this methodological approach are presented with reference to 
the process of physically developing and constructing the UCA, and its manifold material, 
educational and social functions. This will take into consideration the effects of the 
construction process and its physical and measurable development factors as well as 
immaterial aspects such as knowledge generation and transfer in a specific cultural setting.  
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University of Central Asia – one university, three schools 
The AKDN is a network of private development agencies founded by the Aga Khan IV to fulfil 
his hereditary responsibilities as the leader of the Shia Imami Ismaeli Muslims (AKF 2018a). 
The network comprises three main development sectors, focusing on economic, social and 
cultural development. The AKDN employs approximately 80,000 people and works in over 30 
countries, mainly in Central Asia, Africa and the Middle East. The annual budget for non-
profit development activities is approximately US$ 950 Mio (AKF 2018b). While the 
foundation of the network is deeply rooted in a religious system, many branches of the AKDN 
promote a secular view. This is the case for the UCA project that is part of the social 
development sector. The UCA consists of the Schools of Arts and Sciences (SAS) located in 




















Fig. 1: Institutional structure of the AKDN and the UCA.                                                             
Source: Azum & Belling 2019 (draft based on AKF 2019b and UCA 2019c)  
 
It also contains other research institutes and the so called ‘Schools of Professional and 
Continuing Education’ (SPCE). The SPCE’s agenda is “to strengthen academic inquiry in the 
region and provide the foundation of knowledge, human resources, research products, and 
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curricula to support UCA’s undergraduate and graduate programming” (AKF 2018c). It strives 
to improve employment through short term education programmes focussing on professional 
and vocational qualifications in various fields (AKF 2018c). These efforts are materially 
represented in Khorog’s townscape itself, as the SAS at the campus of the UCA, the SPCE, 
the AKL, the Jamaat Khana as Ismaeli Centre, a community park, a botanical garden and a 
hospital, all being fully or partly funded by the AKDN. 
Relocation and resettlement of the former village of Dasht  
The UCA campus site of Khorog opened to the broader public and took its first admissions of 
students in 2016. However, the planning process already started as early as the year 2000, 
when the President of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon and Kharim Aga Khan IV signed and 
ratified a treaty for the development of a construction site for the UCA (Interview 1). 
Subsequently, an assembled team of engineers and other experts evaluated possible campus 
sites. After three years of planning and evaluation, the 86 hectares large area of the former 
village of Dasht in the vicinity of Khorog was selected by the Aga Khan IV himself, leading to 
the preparation of the actual construction of the UCA campus. The following land acquisition 
led to the relocation and/or removal of 126 private houses, 60 subsidiary constructions and 
20 government institutions, among them a prison that was rebuild elsewhere with advanced 
sanitary installations (Interview 1). The governmental ‘Technical Inventory Company’ (TIC) 
evaluated and assessed the value of the inhabitant’s property such as buildings, subsidiary 
constructions, but also material and agricultural lands and properties, e.g. trees and crops. 
Then, by direct command of Aga Khan IV, an additional payment of 45 percent to the already 
calculated value of the property was given to each individual household that was affected 
by the relocation process, summing up to US$ 30,000 in compensational payments for each 
dweller. As stated by an engineer who had overviewed the construction works from the very 
beginning, these payments alone represented a major economic windfall and also social 
turning point for some households in Dasht, leading to the creation of new businesses such 
as hotels and restaurants. In some cases, the payments were used to start a new life since 
former Dasht inhabitants used the compensations to migrate to Dushanbe or elsewhere. 
While some dwellers used these compensational payments for longer term investments, 
others used them to satisfy individual needs with no sustainable effect (Interview 1).  
The UCA respected the wish of the majority of Dasht households to relocate to a nearby site 
that initially was uninhabitable. In the process the UCA created new infrastructure such as 
an asphalted road, waterpoints, an electricity grid and street lights to facilitate the 
relocation process for the affected. In addition to these material compensations, the 
relocated dwellers of Dasht also complied with the relocation plans out of their religious 
belief in the Aga Khan as devout Ismailis (Interviews 24 – 32). Also, most respondents from 
Dasht recognised that the UCA will be a major turning point for the development of the 
region in some way or the other, and they were hopeful of acccessing new opportunities for 
their children (Interview 27, 30). There were also grievances, however, relating to a 
perceived unjust distribution of payments between neighbours holding the same size of land, 
and unfulfilled promises of being recruited at the construction site (Interview 20). One 
respondent complained that the street provided by the UCA is not usable during winter and 
that the water supply is not on par with the one they had before (Interview 25), and another 
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felt disadvantaged because his landholdings were significantly diminished after relocation 
(Interview 20).  
Altogether, the Aga Khan spent approximately US$ 1.5 Million in form of compensation or 
rebuilding measures for private households and governmental institutions. Economically, the 
relocation process of the Dasht community alone had a fairly large impact on the region. 
Compensational payment for individual households were substantial when compared to the 
average monthly wage in Khorog of around US$ 300.  
Construction of the UCA Campus 
The resettlement process and clearing of the building site was finished in 2003, but the 
actual construction of the UCA only started in 2015. After resettling the inhabitants of Dasht, 
the site had to be levelled. In this process, 160,000 m² had to be cleared from rocks which 
then were used as “base material for roads, buildings, manufacturing of concrete and 
general use in the construction of the campus” (UCA 2016a). The UCA formally secured a 
loan in 2015 that was necessary to advance the construction of the UCA campus. While the 
AKDN committed US$ 64.4 Million, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and 
the United States Development Finance Institution contributed US$ 30 Million to complete 
the first construction phase. The first construction phase was completed in 2017 and 
included an academic block, a laboratory building, a student-life building, residences, a 
library, a computer lab as well as athletic facilities, all built according to the highest 
international standards (AKF 2018d). The lead engineer of the construction asserts that the 
investment of approximately US$ 95 Million is actually fairly low when compared to the 
average costs for such large ventures. This was reportedly only achievable by opting for the 
agency-construction-management-method (ACM) instead of a general contracting method 
(GCM). In doing so, the whole construction of the campus was split up into 30 ifferent work 
packages. This enabled local companies and entrepreneurs to participate in the bidding 
process and compete with international companies for individual contracts, rather then 
putting one large international company at the helm, which would have made the 
construction significantly more expensive (Interview 1). Such price efficiency was not the 
only reason favouring the ACM, as the entire construction approach was oriented on the 
facilitation of regional development and the inclusion of a local workforce, thereby 
“maximising the University’s local economic impact while offering greater control over cash 
flow and design changes throughout the construction” (UCA 2016b). The inclusion of local 
industry and workforce did not stop with the ACM, and several measures were taken to 
ensure that the local sector would profit from the construction. The management of the UCA 
actively supported local companies in the bidding and construction process through the 
following procedures:  
Ensuring realistic bids from local companies for the work packages 
Local companies were mostly unfamiliar with the concept of bidding for contracts, leading 
to rather low bids from local entrepreneurs that were economically not sustainable. Through 
consultation, the UCA made sure that companies made realistic biddings so they could 
actually profit from the construction process. In at least one case, the management team 
even wrote the bidding document itself for the local company (Interview 1). 
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Purchase of technical equipment and training of local contractors 
The UCA management team led several workshops in woodworking techniques for local 
contractors before the actual construction began. Some local companies also did not have 
the proper technical equipment necessary to ensure a trouble-free construction. At this 
point the UCA provided loans to local contractors for purchasing needed technical equipment 
such as a batching plant, a crusher, a scaffold, tipper trucks, concrete trucks, cranes and 
excavators. Local companies used these loans for technical upgrades and higher 
competetiveness (Interview 1). 
Special arrangements with international firms 
International companies were only allowed to bid when signing contracts guaranteeing that 
at least 80 percent of employees were recruited from a local labour force. This resulted in 
850 local peopel being employed by international companies. These were professionally 
trained and provided with certificates, so that the local employees could use their new 
capabilities to access future employment and long-term security. For example, a German 
Company namd ‘STO’ that focuses on façade work and engineering trained 70 workers of a 
local company. The company ‘Turas’ trained local workers in slate fixing. Other professional 
trainings concentrated on roofing, mechanical and electrical plumbing, asphalting, stone 
and wood working and concrete framing. The forced cooperation led to the emergence of 
an internationally trained workforce in Khorog itself (Interview 1). The international firms 
also had to pay local taxes in Khorog to boost incomes for the region. 
Business opportunities for non-construction/building companies 
The construction process also had downstream effects for the local food sector. The caterer 
for the canteen at the building site prepared about 1,000 meals per day for the entire time 
of construction. He used mostly locally produced ingredients for cooking and indirectly 
benefitted the farming sector in the region (Interview 1, 33). 
Labour conditions and contracts 
Conditions for construction labour were regulated according to social standards. Working 
day were eight hours, life and health insurance was provided to each worker, as well as 
clean work clothes and protection equipment, a welfare facility with showers, WC and a 
canteen which served lunch and dinner (Interview 1). 
The locally retained share of the net construction costs were calculated as 31.78 percent 
for the Central Asian market, and 22.68 percent in the GBAO. As such, the university 
construction was a driving factor for socio-economic development in the region because the 
planning process laid special emphasis on the inclusion and development of local companies 
and a local workforce (Interview 1). Local companies such as ‘Khudoyorbek’ or ‘Pamirstone’ 
increased their total annual turnover tenfold and are now able tp compete with international 
contractors in their respective fields. ‘Pamir Energy Service’ is now considered as the best 
mechanical and electrical plumbing contractor in the whole GBAO region. Most of the local 
companies that worked at the UCA Campus grew in size and advanced economically 
(Interview 1). The transfer of existing know-how from international companies to local 
entrepreneus was one of the driving factors that made this development possible. 
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Empowerment through employment 
Today, the UCA provides a substantial number of diverse job opportunities. The campus is 
workplace for 126 regular members of staff, out of which 120 are local residents. The 
operational staff of 90 people is entirely from Khorog and surroundings. In addition, there 
are 50 temporary positions filled by local employees, and also a significant number of 
seasonal employment relationships in the gardening section and for regularly needed 
craftsmen and mechanics (Interview 6). The UCA’s working contracts for newly employed 
regular staff are initially on temporary basis, limited to one year and including a probation 
period of three month. However, after one year renewed contracts become permanent 
(Interview 6). 
Most current employees were hired in the period between March and December 2017. The 
staffing followed the rules of ‘open recruitments’, and all job offers were publicly advertised 
(Interview 6). Only two respondents holding specialised positions emphasised that this 
procedure resembled a formal act with a forseeable outcome (Interview 14, 17). Most 
interviewed staff members, however, reported about a multilevel application processes of 
various tests and interviews, including laying open a personal history and current living 
conditions (Interview 7). It was not easy to find qualified persons for some highly specialised 
positions, but in general the Human Resource Department had to deal with a large number 
of applications for advertised positions. It was not uncommon to have a three-digit number 
of applicants for a single post, all of them invited for the first round of tests. The tests were 
designed in ‘simple English’ (Interview 6), as it was decided that a good command of English 
was an important first criterion for recruitment. The actual working experience in the 
specific position and a job qualification were other selection criteria. 
This procedure of open recruitment and the multilevel selection process pursues the target 
of transparency to avoid charges of nepotism. Decision-makers were thus enabled to resist 
social pressures of their kinship networks (Interview 6). Nevertheless, some minor allegations 
were communicated to the research team in light of the administrative decision to soften 
employment criteria for some specific departments. This was the case for gardeners and 
some security men who were employed by the UCA since commencing the construction 
phase. These groups had to pass the multilevel application process but were not able to 
speak English properly. However, since the persons concerned were the only breadwinner of 
their households’, exemptions were agreed upon (Interview 6).  
It is striking that a high number of labourers who are doing manual and often unskilled work 
have an academic background (Interview 6, 7, 15). This fact points to the lack of adequate 
work opportunities in the region (Interview 13), resulting in labour migration as a dominant 
phenomenon in the GBAO (Hohmann 2013: 158; Kessler et al. in this volume). A high number 
of interview partners were at some point in their life, sometimes for more than a decade, 
labour migrants, mostly in Russia (Interview 15). 
Many interview partners underlined the advantage to be close to their families and friends 
(Interview 5, 15), but the most important fact encouraging highly educated persons to 
engage in menial jobs are the comparatibely high salaries provided by the UCA also for 
unskilled labour. While a common school teacher in Khorog earns less than US$ 100 per 
month, not even enough to cover the minimum living expenses (Interview 4), a cleaner at 
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the UCA earns nearly three times more (Interview 6). Additional benefits of working for the 
UCA are social security measures sucha as insurance payments, sick-leave payments, pension 
payments and shift bonuses and holiday payments – by no means a self-evident fact in the 
region (Interview 6, 15). Equally important, employment at the UCA is bringing along an 
increased social status as it is “most prestigious place to work in Tajikistan” (Interview 8). 
This is because the UCA is an AKDN project, and the UCA’s chancellor is the Aga Khan himself. 
Working for such an institution in an Ismaili dominated region like the GBAO (Hohmann 2013: 
158; Olimova and Olimov 2014: 181) provides also religious and emotional value (Interview 
7). 
The beneficial terms of employment led to increased household security for all sections of 
the workforce, and led to individual investments in different domains, e.g. financing the 
education of siblings, marriage decisions, family planning and house construction (Interview 
4, 16, 17, 18). 
Education as a chance for development 
This chapter aims to provide a better understanding of the relation between education and 
development in the UCA context, and the kind of knowledge production and transfer that 
takes places on the UCA Campus in Khorog. 
Different perspectives on development were expressed during interviews: a general 
betterment of life (Interview 9); stable socio-economic living conditions (Interview 18); 
economic growth and the ability to access more opportunities (Interview 19). Aspects of 
hope and better future perspective were emphasized when talking about the development 
role of the UCA (Interview 5). Development and education were considered as deeply 
interconnected, and particularly so in relation to the regional development in Khorog and 
other Central Asian mountain regions (Interview 19). Education in general is understood as 
the key for positive change in the region. However, such broad concepts of education go 
beyond the academic education as provided by the UCA. 
It is pertinent to underline that the UCA Campus is only part of a bigger idea, rooted as it is 
in the various endeavours undertaken by the AKDN. For example, all local students we talked 
to were graduates of the AKL (Interview 18 - 23), which even provided a special, UCA-
supported upgrade programme to prepare students for both the UCA application and studies 
(Interview 19). Several present staff members were taking up the opportunities provided by 
the UCA-SPCE for vocational trainings (Interview 3, 11). Instructors were profiting from ‘The 
Central Asian Faculty Development Program’ and its scholarships, through which the UCA 
supported potential local educational staff (Interview 3; 4; 5). The approximate goal is after 
all to have a ratio of 50 percent local, 25 percent regional (Central-Asian) and 25 percent 
non-regional professors (Interview 3). 
An important aspect is the offering of language education by the AKDN educational services 
(AKS 2019; Interview 3). The UCA and SAS are focused on knowledge transfer in English, 
understood as the ‘main language’ of both the academic world and global knowledge 
production. The curricula at UCA are developed in cooperation with Western universities 
mostly from North-America and Europe, with the University of British Columbia taking on a 
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leading role (AKF 2019a). Nevertheless, contextualization of curricula according to the 
regional circumstances also takes place (Interview 5). 
A member of the teaching staff described the special concept of the UCA (Interview 5): 
“UCA’s key is the multi-campus […] each campus is almost fully functional and at the same 
time they are closely integrated. There is student’s mobility back and force, there is faculty 
mobility and there is staff mobility […] It’s just starting but as it is fully functional, you’ll 
have that”. Six five-year major programmes are provided by the UCA, assigned to the three 
campuses: ‘Computer Science’ and ‘Communications and Media’ in Naryn, Kyrgyzstan, 
‘Engineering Sciences’ and ‘Business and Management’ in Tekeli, Kazakhstan (scheduled 
opening in 2021), ‘Earth and Environmental Sciences’ and ‘Economics’ in Khorog, Tajikistan, 
(UCA 2019a). The two majors that can be studied in Khorog have been selected in 
expectation that they convey the most important knowledge for regional development, but 
also because the Naryn and Tekeli campuses are providing better circumstances for the other 
majors. In contrast to Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan has a relatively liberal state and Kazakhstan a 
booming economy.  
The integration of the UCA in the community and institutional structures of Khorog also has 
just begun. The community service is already a firm part for each UCA faculty, the students 
are expected to do volunteer community work, and some staff members have to spend some 
working hours for the community. For example, the English and Mathematics faculty gave 
lectures at the AKL and the KSU, students went outside the town and taught primary students 
English and the campus chef gave lessons for hygienic preparation and cooking (Interview 4, 
14, 22). Moreover, there are guided tours for visitors almost every day, regular sporting 
events, celebrations to which UCA members can invite friends and family and there is almost 
always the option to invite guests over during day-time (Interview 5, 20). 
However, the UCA Campus area is not generally open for the public. It is surrounded by a 
fence, supervised by security personel and its location physically remote in relation to the 
residential districts of Khorog. Either way, all common people we randomly talked to in 
Khorog City gave at least neutral, but in most cases a very positive opinion on the UCA. Even 
our interlocutor at the KSU provided an unexceptional positive estimation of the UCA. 
Opened in 1992, the chronically underfunded KSU is located in the centre of Khorog, has a 
much higher number of students than the UCA will ever achieve, and the teaching language 
is Tajik (Interview 4). KSU officials perceive that great opportunities lie in fruitful 
cooperation with the UCA (Interview 32). 
However, there are some hurdles for increased collaboration. Until autumn 2018, the UCA 
was waiting for the official affirmation as educational institution by the Tajik government 
authorities. Although a verbal agreement was given that enabled the university to start its 
teaching activities, official collaborations with other educational institutions in Khorog were 
severely limited. After formal authorisation, collaborations will likely start to intensify 
(Interview 22; 19), possibly resulting in common research and field work about local and 
regional development opportunities (Interview 5). 
The UCA provides modern facilities and conducive surroundings to facilitate study and 
research. One respondent stated: “Local people say, ‘when we enter the UCA we are like in 
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a different part of the world’, which is a really really great feeling” (Interview 3). The library 
is high standard and the equipment comparable to world class Western universities 
(Interview 4, 5). However, student fees are moderate and the UCA proclaims: “Once a 
student is admitted, financial assistance is guaranteed” (UCA 2019b). Annual fees amount 
to US$ 8,000 per year, but the UCA provides support by providing grants, interest-free loans 
and/or scholarships at different levels, considering individual financial backgrounds and 
academic performances. In light of these different support schemes, students we talked to 
had to pay annual amounts between US$ 700 and 1,500. While some mentioned economic 
strains for their families, all of them emphasised the moderate fees, especially in light of 
the increased opportunities likely to be gained by graduating at UCA. Almost every 
interviewed student plans to go abroad for master studies, also because there will be no 
UCA master programme for these future graduates. Nonetheless, a majority shares the 
perspective to come back to work in the GBAO or Central Asia (Interview 18; 19; 21). 
Even when students go, there will be still multiform connections to the region. And even if 
not, they would be a shining example for younger students (Interview 5). Concepts of “brain 
circulation/exchange” (Eich-Krohm 2013: 162) become relevant here, rather than brain 
drains. The UCA is seen as a symbol of hope and inspiration for local people. Without such 
inspirations, people would have only the perspective to leave the country or to come to 
terms with a lack of opportunities (Interview 5). 
Future graduates, even when they leave the region, are also seen as potential future 
financiers of the UCA. At this time, the university is fully dependent on the financial support 
by the AKF. Such high dependency on external financing is quite normal for most universities. 
This was also the case for the SPCE in the beginning, which today is nearly self-sufficient by 
means of course fees and further support provided by graduates and members. One hope is 
that successful future graduates will support the university by giving endowments. 
Philanthropists among the Ismaili Community could be potential donors too (Interview 5). 
While these aspects are difficult to predict, high external support enables the UCA already 
today to provide scholarships for students not belonging to the socio-economic elite.  
A rising number of young people apply for admission to the UCA. In the first year alone, 
there were 2,500 applicants for 80 student places (Interview 3). As a result, only few local 
students are going to get the chance to study at the UCA. In spite of the scholarship scheme, 
access to education remains a question of class affiliation, also in Central Asia (Bulbulov and 
Niyozov 2013: 155). Arguably, this is true for the UCA in Khorog too, and none of the students 
we talked to has a poor family background. Universities worldwide are elitist institutions, 
and the UCA is no exception. 
Discussion and conclusion  
The study has shown that the UCA may indeed be seen as a driver of economic and social 
development in the region. Using the eight-tiered framework developed by Goldstein, Maier 
and Luger (1995), this final chapter elaborates on the different functions the UCA as a 
modern university may provide for the region.  
The UCA is very young and no graduates yet exist. However, the creation of knowledge in 
both study programmes on the Khorog Campus, ‘Economics’ and ‘Earth and Environmental 
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Science’ is aimed to be practice oriented. With enough financial resources, the UCA has a 
high number of students and academic personnel rooted in the local community. The 
possibility of fruitful research activities exists and the UCA can serve as ideal partner for 
research projects conducted by international scientists. 
The creation of human capital and the transfer of existing know-how is most evident through 
the direct employment that is necessary to run a university, referring to the teaching and 
admin staff, food providers, gardeners, cleaning staff, security personel and more. The 
transfer of existing know-how too k place on a greater scale between international and local 
companies during the construction process, and the forced certification enabled local 
companies to upgrade their businesses not only in size but also in form of producing power 
and development of hard skills. These companies are now standing on their own ground and 
benefitted from knowledge transfer and the creation of human capital. 
Knowledge transfer and creation of human capital aso comes along with teaching activities. 
Enrolled students are satisfied by the high standard of education which they receive and are 
very optimistic about their future life. The idea to offer world-standard education seems 
not exaggerated, and in doing so the UCA follows a model of westernised education. Such 
orientation towards the modern western universities has been criticized as rooted in 
modernisation theories (Benz 2014: 17). Still, by respecting regional culture and by aiming 
to serve the needs and interests of the local population, the UCA strives to absorb and utilise 
a successful concept for higher education. Admission policies are relatively neutral when it 
comes to the socio-economic background of the students, but also contributes to 
reproducing current socio-economic conditions by charging student fees. The UCA is also 
engaged in wider community services that involves knowledge transfer to community 
members.  
The UCA is a filled with modern technological equipment for both teaching and research 
that is unparalleled in the region. By providing the newest equipment, research and teaching 
paves the way for innovations which will likely benefit the region. As such, the UCA is a 
driver for facilitating technological innovation. The UCA also channeled large capital 
investments for the purpose of furthering business objectives (Kenton 2018). The 
construction process alone retained millions of US$ in the region. 
The UCA also assumes the role of regional leadership in education, and its reputation in 
Tajikistan and whole Central Asia is very positicw. Being a part of the enormous engagement 
of the AKDN in the education sector as a whole, the UCA is seen as the peak of a mountain 
built on a strong fundament. Already now it is perceived as a prestigious place to study and 
work, and it enhances Khorogs supra-regional reputation. 
Built on high investments, backed by the AKDN and accepted by the community and the Tajik 
State, the UCA has a high local and regional importance and the ability to be a leading 
institution. At the same time, with its high financial dependency on the AKF the UCA is not 
a completely independent player.  
The production of infrastructure through the UCA is self-evident – building of the campus 
itself, the construction of a new village and prison site, its associated streets and 
waterpoints. The AKDN as umbrella organiation has been involved in the production of 
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infrastructure in Khorog also before the emergence of the UCA. Many streets in an out of 
Khorog are being maintained by the AKDN, providing a stable road network that plays a 
crucial role in the supply system of the region. 
Institutions of higher education in economically weak countries are often suspected to 
intensify processes of brain drain (Freytag, Jahnke and Kramer 2015: 88). The example of 
the UCA is different. Its activities rather facilitate a brain gain, in providing opportunities 
for local academics to study, teach and do research in Khorog, instead of having to leave 
the region. The same effect holds true for a majority of local companies. 
The campus will be further growing in the future, and planned new construction phases will 
have further positive employment effects, stimulating local demand for goods and produce.  
Although it is too early to make decisive statements about the potential impact the UCA will 
have in the following years, important pillars for success are already built. Through its 
affiliation with the AKDN and the Aga Khan it is already deeply incorporated within the 
social, cultural, economic and infrastructural networks of the region and enjoys an 
extremely good reputation in the regional context. The UCA itself is aware of its role as a 
social and economic pacemaker of the region.  
The entire approach of the AKDN itself is a model approach for interconnecting local players 
with international know-how and expertise. We highly recommend a follow up study in the 
coming years about the impact of the UCA a a higher education institution for furthering 
development processes in the GBAO. 
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View of the upper part of Khorog City and the University of Central Asia Campus located above 
















The office of the Pamirs Eco-Cultural Tourism Association (PECTA) in the City Park of Khorog. 
This non-commercial organisation was established in 2008 with the support of the Mountain 
Societies Development Support Programme in order to develop the tourism industry in Gorno-
Badakhshan. Photograph taken by Dörre, August 2016   
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Katharina Bredigkeit, Khudonazar Imomyorbekov & Sonja Vipavc  
Microcosm of Development Organisations in Gorno-Badakhshan:            
Actors, Areas and the Tajik State 
Abstract 
The research paper introduces the actors who work in the field of development processes in the 
Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) while trying to explain an omnipresence of 
organisations in the Pamir Region. By using the ‘state fragility’ framework of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development we assume that the Tajik state lacks to fulfil its 
responsibilities towards the people in the GBAO. We examine if government tasks in Tajikistan are 
adopted by development organisations and present the thematic areas in which the organisations 
work predominantly. To substantiate the thesis, interviews were conducted with development actors 
based in the capital of the GBAO, Khorog. An additional literature review analysed the relationship 
between the fragility of the state and the development processes of the study region. 
Introduction 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Tajikistan obtained its independence. The 
accompanying transformation processes had a major impact on the country, and especially 
in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO). As part of the Soviet Union, the GBAO 
received subsidies from Moscow in a system of exchange between Soviet republics that were 
directed towards “medical and social services, subsidise housing and electricity, support 
large families, and look the other way at certain kinds of black-market trade” (Kalinovsky 
2018: 249). These subsidies were discontinued after the independence of Tajikistan and the 
resulting scarcity of goods and services heavily affected the livelihoods of the population.  
The impact on the GBAO was reinforced by a five year long civil war between 1992 to 1997, 
in which various religious and regional factions fought for political power in Tajikistan. 
“Right from the start, the conflict in Tajikistan was mostly a confrontation amongst sub-
ethnic groups, which developed in a progression from regional mobilisation to regional 
domination” (Nourzhanov and Bleuer 2013: 329).1 Meanwhile, “the real issue was the rising 
power of the excluded regionalist groups (Gharmis and Pamiris) against the communist 
establishment” (Roy 2007: 140). The independence and following civil war led to various 
challenges in all areas of people’s lives. In a short time, the Soviet supply system collapsed 
completely along with the economy of the country, resulting in an economic deprivation of 
a large part of the population. Only through the support of external development actors an 
impending famine could be averted. Even today, the GBAO is characterised by widespread 
poverty, structural deficiencies and inadequate infrastructure. The historical conflict 
between the Tajik central government and the GBAO and the fragility of the state means 
that sustainable development is a mulitifaceted challenge: political, economic, social, 
environmental and in relation to security questions (Breu etal.: 2005: 139). 
 
1
 For a detailed overview see for example Nourzhanov and Bleuer 2013: 277-323 and Steinberg 2011: 
126-133. 
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As a result, in the GBAO the density of development organisations is very high, especially 
when compared to the size of the population of 2.5 percent of Tajikistan’s inhabitants living 
on 44 percent of the country’s surface (ASPRT 2018: 9, 30). 
The civil war period made external intervention necessary in order to secure the bare 
survival of the people of the GBAO. Ever since, deficient measures of national support for 
the region resulted in a continuation of activities by development organisations.  
Against this background, this paper aims to analyse the development actors and activities in 
the GBAO in its broader historical and institutional context by using the conceptual 
framework of ‘state fragility’ developed by Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD). The OECD-framework serves as a tool to diagnose and measure 
economic, environmental, political, security-related and societal fragilities in a given 
context, which in turn can be translated into risk management and coping strategies for 
affected populations. A central assumption is that the Tajik Government lacks accountability 
and is defective in fulfilling its responsibilities towards the people in the GBAO. It is this lack 
of state-led development initiatives in Gorno-Badakhshan that led to the high number of 
non-governmental development organisations aimed at addressing fragile contexts.  
The major development organistion in the region is the Aga Khan Development Network 
(AKDN) and its affiliated organisations and institutions. Its widespread act ivities have 
manifested itself in the form of local institutions, programmes and actions. The fragility 
framework when applied in light of the contentious history of the GBAO is helpful to address 
the shape and functioning of the development microcosm in Khorog, and to explain how the 
AKDN was able to establish what might be termed a semi-state like structure, something 
akin to a state within a state.  
‘Development’ and ‘Fragile States’  
Within Development Geography, ‘development’ is a contentious term since it “has long been 
critiqued as a form of neo-colonial intervention, based on Eurocentric concepts and, despite 
the rhetoric of partnership and participation, driven by vested interests in Europe and North 
America” (Willis 2014: 584). Over time, the understanding of what ‘development’ actually 
is has changed along with transformations of development theories - from the grand theories 
to post-development and postcolonial approaches. By using the term ‘development’, it is 
thus necessary to acknowledge that the term is inherently a normative paradigm, loaded 
with different concepts and meanings. The term is neither universally definable nor neutral, 
but dependent on space and time as well as on individual and collective values (Nohlen 2002: 
227). A definition is therefore needed that accounts for Tajikistan’s Soviet history, and the 
idea of ‘development’ that arrived with the collapse of the Soviet Union.2  
The understanding of ‘development’ in the context of Tajikistan and Gorno-
Badakhshan  
The idea of development and socialist modernisation was essential to the Soviet regime and 
its plan to achieve social and economic progress in Central Asia. The GBAO represented one 
 
2
 For an overview about the Soviet Union’s experiment in developing a socialist economy in Central 
Asia and the socialist ideas about the meaning of ‘development’ in the Soviet Union see Peterson 2011 
and Kalinovsky 2018: 67-90. 
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of the most remote parts of the former USSR and was consequently targeted by development 
endeavours. The whole region was considered as backward and in need of fundamental While 
the Eastern part of the GBAO represents a high, arid and sparsely inhabited plateau 
predominantly useable for animal husbandry, the Western part is characterised by high 
mountain ranges separated by deep and denser populated river valleys where small-scale 
agriculture is practiced on small irrigated land plots (Fig. 1). transformations directed by 
the centralised government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in Moscow. 
Basic infrastructure such as schools, 
hospitals and communication lines 
were introduced, which increased the 
standard of life dramatically. Supplies 
for the province, such as food, 
pharmaceuticals, fuel and fertilisers 
were directly imported from the 
economic centres of the USSR (Sievers 
2003: 6). Accordingly, the GBAO 
performed extremely well under 
Soviet rule compared with its 
neighbouring countries (Bliss 2006: 
243). These interventions aiming for 
modernisation and development led 
to much higher living standards, a 
fact that helped the USSR to achieve 












Fig. 1: Typical river valley landscape in the Western 
part of Gorno-Badakhshan.                                   
Photograph taken by Bredigkeit, July 2018 
Over the period of Soviet rule, the practice of the USSR providing its population with 
essential resoures turned into a general expectation towards the state as the provider of 
welfare: “People’s belief that the state could and should do things to make life better 
(provide decent healthcare, education, reliable and cheap electricity) shaped not only what 
they expected from officials today, but also how they viewed the Soviet legacy and 
contemporary aid donors” (Kalinovsky 2018: 250). Despite abandoning the communist 
ideology in 1991, the Tajik population remains deeply influenced by Soviet modernisation 
efforts and welfare activities.  
Many consider the inhabitants of the Pamir region to be ‘outsiders’, neither real ‘Tajiks’ nor 
real Muslims (Kanji 2002: 147). This fits to some degree with local self-awareness, when 
people in the Pamirs describe themselves as being Ismailis and Pamiris in the first place. 
“They tend to express antipathy toward Tajiks and make a considerable effort to set 
themselves apart from that ethnicity” (Steinberg 2011: 139). During the civil war, many 
Pamiris were involved in the Islamic Democratic Alliance (IRP) that sought to bring political 
change to Tajikistan.  
During the civil war, the state was far away and not able to provide enough goods, especially 
food, fuel and spare parts. Therefore, “80-90% of the nutritional needs of the region were 
met through food assistance during the early period of the conflict” (Kevlihan 2016: 423), 
mostly provided by the AKDN. In 1993, the national government allotted less than ten 
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percent of the required amounts of food, and only three percent of the needed wheat flour 
as staple food of the region. “This resulted in a shortfall of more than 75 percent, which put 
the survival of all people living in GBAO at stake and could only be compensated by external 
aid” (Bliss 2006: 297). 
After the end of the civil war in 1997, Tajikistan adopted social welfare and economic growth 
as political goals and invited international institutions to help achieving them. “After the 
“system alternative” offered by the Soviet bloc has faded away, the challenge to the 
“traditional Western approach” now appears to come from increasing activities of state and 
non-state actors outside of the largely intergovernmental aid system centred on OECD 
donors” (Grimm et al. 2009: 7). 
In 1997, the upper-limit for self-sufficiency in the GBAO reached 40 percent. According to 
the Aga Khan Foundation (AKF), the staple food sufficiency has reached nearly 70 percent 
by 2000 (AKDN 2002: 3). However, in years of unstable weather or drought this level might 
drop. “This means that [the] GBAO will continue to rely on external aid if it fails in 
developing any other sectors apart from agriculture” (Bliss, 2006: 297).  
According to Bliss, the level of national support in the early 21st century was almost as low 
as it was in the first few years after the civil war. “The government in Dushanbe has certainly 
not begun to consider that [the] GBAO should be given priority in the distribution of national 
resources” (ibid.: 297). A cause for the unjust treatment of the GBAO is the perseverance 
of mutually hostile attitudes and distrust between the government in Dushanbe and the 
autonomous region. “In the 1980s, the official line of the Tajik leadership denied the Pamiris 
their cultural uniqueness: “the Pamiris are Tajiks by descent and their languages are nothing 
more than dialects of Tajik”” (Nourzhanov and Bleuer 2013: 102). 
The Concept of ‘Fragile States’ and the Multidimensional OECD-Model 
There is no legal concept that defines ‘fragile states’, and the use of the term in social and 
political science is contested, addressing a wide spectrum of questions related with the 
legitimacy of state institutions in the sense of the Weberian understanding of the state and 
its authority (Nay 2013: 329). Hence, what is meant by labelling a state as ‘fragile’ varies 
strongly from author to author. That the term is used as an equivalent to words like ‘weak’, 
‘unstable’ or ‘failed’ confuses the understanding further.  
As part of the social contract, the state is expected to deliver certain public goods “ranging 
from welfare, education, and health to infrastructure, housing, and electricity” (Miller 2013: 
63). In return, citizens are expected to follow the rules and laws set by the state. The goods 
and servies delivered by the state can vary, depending on context. In this view, a ‘fragile 
state’ lacks the possibility or willingness to provide its citizens with some or all services and 
goods, and hence can be described as incapable of taking care of the population or some 
group within the population. The reasons for the lack of service provision can vary, ranging 
from unwillingness, penalty measures for certain population groups to the chaos of civil war. 
At the same time, the government as well as the population do not have the capacities to 
cope with or compensate for associated risks. This is reflected in the OECD model of fragility, 
a multidimensional approach that is oriented on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).  
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The organisation describes the framework as an improvement compared to the harmonised 
lists that merely divides states into ‘fragile’ or ‘non-fragile’ and thereby neglects different 
shades and nuances of fragility (OECD 2016: 70). The “new OECD framework links fragility 
with a combination of risks and coping capacities rather than focusing primarily on weak 
governance” (ibid: 72) in 58 countries classified as ‘fragile’. It is a multidimensional 
appproach measured along five dimensions: economic, environmental, political, security, 
and societal. Fragility is defined 
“as the combination of exposure to risk and insufficient coping capacity of the state, system 
and/or communities to manage, absorb or mitigate those risks. Fragility can lead to negative 
outcomes including violence, the breakdown of institutions, displacement, humanitarian crises 
or other emergencies [...] The calculations reflect a systems-based conceptualisation of 
fragility. [...] In addition, capacities are measured at state level, as well as incorporating the 
various formal and informal mechanisms societies can draw upon to cope with negative events 
and shocks” (ibid.: 22).  
The OECD methodology suggests that fragility is (a) multidimensional, (b) measurable in its 
level of intensity and (c) expressed in different ways, depending on the respective dimension 
which is considered (OECD 2018a: 265ff). The methodology is based on a two-stage process, 
using both quantitative and qualitative methods to (first step) examine contexts in each of 
five dimensions and classify those contexts into groups within each dimension (OECD 2016: 
265). For that purpose, the principal component analysis (PCA) is used, “a statistical 
procedure with the aim to reduce the number of variables in the study to a few (say two or 
three) that express most of the variation within a sample” with minimal loss of information 
(Butterfield and Ekembe Ngondi 2016).3 Accordingly, for all five dimension the PCA is applied 
to combine the two components ‘risk’ and ‘coping capacity’ into two components per 
dimension (five dimensions = ten components).4 ‘Risks’ are defined as hazards, threats and 
vulnerabilities that are either generated inside the society as well as coming from the 
outside (other countries or environmental events) (OECD 2016: 149). ‘Coping’ on the other 










 For an introduction into the selection of a subset of variables by using PCA see: Dunteman 1989: 51–
55. 
4
 The complete data and methodology for the 2018 OECD fragility framework can be found on github: 
https://github.com/githubIEP/oecd-sfr-2018. For an exact listing with the contribution and correlation of 
each variable see: 
https://github.com/githubIEP/oecd-sfr-2018/blob/master/data_out/dimensional%20pca%20 contributions.csv 
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Table 1: Examples for risks and coping capacities  
Dimension Description Examples for                 
risks 
Examples for              
coping capacities 
Economic Fragility in the economic 
sector can be ascribed to 
a weakness in the 
economic foundations of a 
state as well as the human 
capital that leads to 
vulnerability. 
➔ strong aid 
dependency 
➔ strong dependence 
on resource rent 
➔ high number of 
unemployed youths 
➔ good education 
➔ high number of 
citizens in labour 
force 
➔ strong regulatory 
ability of 
government 
Environmental Fragility in the 
environmental sector is 
the vulnerability to 
environmental, health and 
climatic risks that have an 
effect on the lives and 
livelihood of the citizens.  
➔ strong exposure to 
natural disaster 
➔ poor quality of the 
air 
➔ lack of sanitation 
➔ strong civil society 
➔ food security 
➔ effective 
government that 
provides a high 
quality of public 
services 
Political Political fragility is 
vulnerability to risks 
related to the political 





➔ high degree of 
corruption 
➔ long regime 
persistence 







Security Fragility in the security 
sector can be ascribed to 
both political and social 
violence. 
➔ high risk of violent 
conflict ➔ high homicide rate 
➔ strong impact of 
terrorism 
➔ effective control by 
the state over the 
whole territory 
➔ high number of 
police officers and 
armed security 
➔ presence of alliance 
with other states 
Societal Societal fragility is the 
vulnerability to risks 
resulting from inequalities 
- vertical and horizontal. 
➔ strong gender 
inequality 
➔ high urban 
population growth 
➔ high number of 
refugees 
➔ strong civil society 
➔ secure and effective 
access to justice 
➔ state-society 
accountability 
Table based on OECD 2016: 73; OECD 2018a: 268-277. The information provided in this table 
represents a compilation of examples for risks and coping strategies presented in the reports. 
 
Subequently, the acquired information is aggregated to arrive at an overall picture of fragility 
(OECD 2018a: 265). In the ‘States of Fragility Framework 2018’ each dimension of a respective 






Out of 172 analysed 
countries, only the 85 that 
are classified as ‘fragile’ 
were included in the report 
(Hammond 2018).  
As an analytical tool, the 
OECD framework 
understands ‘fragility’ as a 
manifestation of an exposure 
to risk by insufficient coping 
capacities. The goal is to 
outline the degree of 
fragility in each context 
depending on the dimension 
(Fig. 2) instead of numerical 
listing the countries since it 
“has become increasingly 
incongruent with the growing 
recognition that fragility is a 
multidimensional issue” 
















Fig. 2: States of Fragility Framework 2018.                               
Source: OECD 2018b  
The relation between the GBAO and the central government 
Many people in the GBAO still harbour a widespread insecurity and mistrust towards the 
central government. Violent conflicts occurred in Khorog in 2012 when up to 60 people got 
killed in fightings between supporters of local strongmen and Tajik security forces (EIU 
2014). Although the civil war is over, the aftermath “continues to damage a state’s security 
environment even after organised political violence has stopped” (Miller 2013: 58).  
The lack of effective governmental development programmes is especially visible in the 
GBAO where many people heavily depend on external aid and resources. This is reflected in 
national poverty statistics, claiming that 39 percent of the population in the GBAO live in 
conditions of poverty (The World Bank 2018a: 14)5. This makes the region one of the poorest 
in Tajikistan (Fig. 3).  
The contentious relationship with the Tajik state also became apparent during fieldwork. 
Most interview partners were not willing to judge the work of the central government in the 
GBAO, some even outrightly refusing to talk about the state at all, conceding only there is 
always a degree of cooperation and negotiation involved between any development actor 
and Tajik government authorities. The state and its intelligence agencies seek to control 
 
5
 The World Bank defines people who subsist on less than US$ 3.10 as living in poverty. If individuals 
have less than US$ 1.90 a day they suffer from extreme poverty (The World Bank 2018a: xi, 13).  
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everything and everywhere. According to respondents, authorities have already shut down 














Fig. 3: Poverty distribution map of Tajikistan (in percent of the population).                              
Source: Bredigkeit & Vipavc 2018 (draft based on The World Bank 2016) 
 
The effect of insufficient state-led development initiatives is an institutional vacuum in the 
region. This vacuum has been partly filled by national and international organisations that 
took over spaces of governance and assumed capacities that would nominally be in the 
responsibility of the government. While this could potentially lead to a destabilising 
situation, Kevlihan claims that “contradictory to other analysis of aid and conflict, where it 
is stated that the engagement of international aid actors deepens the conflict in situations 
of civil war, the amount of organisations taking over the responsibilities of the government 
strengthened the peace and stability between Dushanbe and GBAO” (Kevlihan 2016: 423-
424).  
Methodology 
For our project we focused on development organisations based in Khorog, distinguished as 
national and international, as well as governmental and non-governmental institutions. 
Altogether 20 open interviews with representatives of the various organisations were 
conducted. Subjects addressed in these interviews were the means, strategies and 
problematic issues of project implementation, and how the organisations cope with risks 
perceived and associated with the OECD assessment of Tajikistan and the GBAO as  fragile 
contexts. We have divided the existing development projects carried out by these 
organisations in the GBAO into different thematic areas of activity (Tables 2 and 3).  
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Table 2: Overview: organisations present in Khorog and thematic areas of activity  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Accelerate Prosperity (AP)    x x    x    
Aga Khan Foundation (AKF) x  x x  x x  x   
Aga Khan Early Childhood Development 
(ECD) 
   x  x   x   
Aga Khan Habitat (AKH) (AKH)  x   x       
Aga Khan Education Service (ES)    x     x   
Aga Khan Health Service (HS)     x  x     x 
American Space (AS)    x        
Camp Tabiat (CT)  x x  x       
Center Nur (CN)    x  x      
Gesellschaft fuer Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH (GIZ) 
x  x    x     
International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) 
     x   x   
International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) 
x  x x     x x x 
Madina Microfinance (MM)         x    
Madina Public Organisation (MPO)   x x  x      
Mountain Societies Development Support 
Programme (MSDSP) 
x  x  x  x x x  x 
Microfinance Bank (MB)   x    x x    
Operation Mercy (OM) x  x x  x     x 
Pamir Eco-Cultural Tourism Association 
(PECTA) 
  x x x    x x  
United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) 
x   x       x 
World Food Programme (WFP)  x    x x     
Fields of activity: 1 Agriculture; 2 Disaster Relief; 3 Economic Activity; 4 Education; 5 Environment; 6 
Health; 7 Infrastructure; 8 (Micro)Finance; 9 Security/Peace/Democracy/Participation; 10 Tourism; 11: 
Women. This classification is based on information from the interviews with representatives of the 
development organisations active in Gorno-Badakhshan. 
 
The interviews were mainly conducted with the representatives or executive directors of 
the respective company, organisation or bank. Furthermore, we visited a peri-urban village 
to get direct insights into projet implementation and the inclusion of the population. The 
resulting case study of participatory and community-based joint local development planning 
in the village of Khidorjev seeks to demonstrate how a community-based approach can 
strengthen coping mechanisms in order to deal with multidimensional risks in a fragile 







Table 3: Overview of the projects in Gorno-Badakhshan identified by the authors  
Area of activity  Specific topic 
Agriculture - Food processing 
- Wood processing  
- Beekeeping 
- Fruit drying 
- Juice production 
- Building greenhouses 
- Tree management 
- Yak wool processing  
- Mushroom growing  
- Providing of food in remote areas 
- Providing school meals 
- Agricultural management  
- Innovative technologies  
- Extension services (alternative energy, sustainable land management, training 
in modern technologies) 
- Improvement of resilience through terrace construction, planting (erosion), 
riverbank stabilisation  
Disaster Relief  - Food supply 
- Repair of houses, waterpipes and roads in case of hazard  
Economic Activity - Offer (further) training/education  
- Milk processing/Cheese production 
- Support local businesses 
- Expansion of economic activities 
- Improve Conditions for business creation 
- Production small carpets for Tourists, souvenirs 
- Food processing 
- Wood processing 
- Beekeeping 
- Training: Homestay 
- Dry fruit production 
- Juice production 
- Building greenhouses 
- Pasture management  
- Tourism development (brings jobs) 
- Support local businesses with microcredits 
- Support small-medium businesses (SMI) 
- Marketing 
- Cross border trade 
- Training in modern technologies 
- Helping returning migrants open their own business 
- Support start-ups 
- Business training 
Education - Train people in health sector 
- Supporting young people in learning English (with book, DVD’s, Clubs) 
- Provide children with internet access 
- Outreach programme (inform the rural population about the offer) 
- Invite journalists to inform others about GBAO 
- Intercultural tourism training 
- Training teachers and parents to work with disabled people/children 
- First aid training 
- Quality education  
- Training Teachers and school managers 
- Training people for early childhood development 
- Training in the rights of children 
- Support the role of the youth in leading 
- Business trainings  
- Day School (Aga Khan Lycee) with high standard education 
- Live skills programme 
- Early Childhood Development  







Environment - Climate change adaptation  
- Soil conservation  
- Sustainable natural resource management 
- Pasture management 
- Joint forest management 
- Sustainable tourism 
- Resource management  
- Sustainable, reliable energies 
- Terrace building 
- Planting (erosion) 
- Riverbank 
Health  - Community health programme (secure the access to medicine and treatment) 
- Training: Hygiene (e.g. hand washing for kids) 
- Construction Hospital and dental clinic 
- Community based financing programme (health financing) 
- Afghan Soldier Treatment 
- Training: Nurses 
- Psychology (e.g. Families of missing persons) 
- Medical support 
- Technical support for disabled people 
- Training: First Aid 
- Training: health promoter 
- Improving health service in rural areas 
- Rehabilitation centre 
- Training: Teachers and parents to work with disabled children 
Infrastructure - Irrigation Channel 
- (Drinking) water supply 
- Building bridges, routes 
- Stabilisation of infrastructure (in case of hazard) 
(Micro)finance - Health credit for vulnerable people 
- Infrastructure Credit 
- Fast Credits (within 30 minutes): up to 3,000 Somoni (25 percent or 36 percent) 
- Agricultural Credits: up to 80,000 Somoni (10 percent) 
- Seed/Fertiliser Credit: 10 percent 
- Start-up Credit: up to 50,000 Somoni  
- Consumer Needs Credit: up to 10,000 Somoni (25 percent or 36 percent) 
- Reduce Poverty 
- Developing local business 
- Provide bank service (in remote areas) 




- Cross border programme  
- Treatment of Afghan Soldiers 
- Border management (support cross border business; markets) 
- Capacity building for military staff (e.g. communication) 
- Prevent resource conflicts 
- Whole community will benefit (bottom-up) 
- Support cross border relations for tourists 
- Reestablishment of family links between detainees and their relatives 
- Participatory governance – community-based planning, village organisation 
system (Mahalla) 
- Training: Children Rights 
- Breaking up stereotypes throughout team building (University students) 
Tourism  - Training: Homestay Skills 
- Invite journalists to attract more tourists 
- Souvenir Production 
- Training: What do Tourists like? 
- Promote Regions as tourist destinations 
- Promote cultural understanding 
- Support cross border relations for tourists 
- Establishment of general standards (e.g. hygiene of hot springs) 
Women  - Empowerment in Agriculture and Tourism (e.g. drive tractor, use 
machines/technologies) 
- Increase health service for women 
- Training: Health Education to help families and neighbours 
- Women resource centre (domestic violence; legal & psychology help) 
This classification is based on information from the interviews with representatives of the development 
organisations active in Gorno-Badakhshan.  
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Limitations of this paper 
China is described as the most important donor for Tajikistan. However, there “is no vision 
of inclusion or social transformation. Chinese aid is about Beijing’s economic interests and 
its desire for stability in the region” (Kalinovsky 2018: 254). Before and during our stay in 
Khorog, we could not establish any contact or even find out if there are Chinese development 
actors situated in the city. As such, we mainly focused on western donors and agencies, as 
well as organisations and programmes affiliated with the AKDN. We followed a three-step 
approach by first identifying development actors, then exploring their areas of activity and 
their cooperation and interactions with other actors. The paper can not claim to account for 
a complete overview of actors but is focused on the microcosm of the AKDN and other actors 
located in western discourse. Another limiting factor is that our research was conducted in 
Khorog and its immediate surroundings only. Hence the analysis just includes actors with a 
representation in Khorog and precludes those without an office in Khorog (e.g. the Agency 
for Technical Cooperation and Development ACTED6). However, all interviewed 
organisations have projects in different districts in Gorno-Badakhshan.  
Development Actors in Khorog 
We held interviews with representatives of 
twenty national and international organisations 
including governmental and non-governmental 
institutions. The AKDN forms the umbrella 
structure for several organisations present in 
Khorog and is the most visible international 
development institution in the region targeting 
different spheres ranging from economic and 
social development to education, emergency 
relief and environmental protection, amongst 
others.    Table    4    shows    the    number    of  
Table 4: Number of organisations active in 
the seven districts of Gorno-Badakhshan  
Name of district Number of organisations 
active in the district 
Darvoz 13 
Vanj  14 
Rushon  13 
Shughnon 20 
Roshtqal’a  14 
Ishkoshim 13 
Murghab  16 
 
development organisations active in the seven districts of Gorno-Badakhshan. The most 
important development actor in the region is the AKDN (Fig. 4). The network is formed by a 
group of private development agencies established by the Aga Khan IV, 49th spiritual leader 
of the world’s 15 million Ismaili Muslims. Seen as living proof of god’s existence (hujjat), 
the Aga Khan inhabits a special role that combines religious authority with  political 
legitimacy. However, this should not be confused with legitimate political power 
(Mohammad Poor 2014: 7ff). While the Ismaili belief is mentioned in the public material 
about the work of the AKDN, it is as clearly expressed that the programmes carried out by 
the multiple branches of the network are faith-inspired rather than faith-based. Ismaili 
religious orientation and a culture of volunteerism advertising the obligation to help socially 
and economically disadvantaged people is paired with the emphasis on development and 
made the network one of the world’s largest private development agencies (Ruthven 2011: 
189ff). The cluster of AKDN institutions is active in more than 30 countries in the world, with 
an annual budget of US $ 950 million (2018). The network has built a good reputation over 
the last decades through highly effective programmes (Karim 2014: 153).  
 
6
 For more information check: https://www.acted.org/en/countries/tajikistan/  
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The short growing season in the Pamirs represented a bottleneck for achieving higher rates 
of self-sufficiency for food security, and because of the lack of adequate storage and 
processing facilities, significant shares of the yield were in danger of getting lost. Today, 
however, even a temporary oversupply with certain agricultural products can be sometimes 
observed. The major problem today is seemingly not one of agricultural production 
capacities but of detrimental market conditions characterized by low local demand and very 
limited export opportunities. This is why development agencies started projects aimed at 
increasing processing technologies such as fruit drying and juice production, and promoted 
agricultural innovations such as the construction of greenhouses. Against the background of 
the global sustainability narrative, projects in sustainable land management and agricultural 
extension services were implemented. Additionally, agrotechnological measures for both the 
prevention and mitigation of disasters like debri flows and soil erosion were applied, 
including the construction of terraces and the planting of trees for both slope and riverbank 
stabilisation.  
Disaster Relief Help 
Tajikistan and especially the GBAO are regularly affected by natural disasters and extreme 
weather events. “Due to the knowledge gap on climate-glacier interactions […], it is difficult 
to predict hazards triggered by extreme weather events, like flash-floods, landslides, and 
glacial lake outburst floods (GLOF)” (Xenarios et al. 2018: 9). The most frequent hazards are 
Areas of development intervention 
The main areas of development as compiled 
in Table 4 form the structure for the 
following brief synopsis of activities in the 
region. The five dimensions of the OECD 
‘fragile statehood framework’ are addressed 
throughout. 
Agriculture 
During the Soviet times, about 90 percent of 
consumer goods were imported from other 
republics and local self-sufficiency in 
agricultural production was reduced to a 
minimum. In 1993, the Pamir Relief and 
Development Programme (precursor of the 
MSDSP) initiated negotiations with the 
government with the aim to privatise and 
distribute landholdings that were not used by 
state farms. Eventually, the government 
privatised land rights for certain areas in the 
GBAO and farmers started working with the 
MSDSP, leading to an increase in agricultural 
production in different municipalities 

















Fig. 4: AKDN organisational chart.                       
Source: Vipavc 2018 (draft based on AKFT 
2018: 27)  
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floods and mudslides, with 85 percent of Tajikistan’s surface threatened by mudflows 
(Barbone et al. 2010: 6). These disasters commonly occur in mountainous regions, sometimes 
destroying whole villages, important infrastructure and damaging the local economy. This 
disrupts everyday life in a manner “where local resources cannot handle the demands of the 
situation” (Ireni Saban 2014: 15 in accord with Quarantelli 2001: 332ff). Less frequent but 
devastating are droughts, rainstorms, snowstorms, windstorms and avalanches (Xenarios et 
al. 2018: 9). As a result of the unpredictability of such events, one of the main development 
activities is the preparation of the local population for emergency cases. 
Economic Activities 
Supporting local economies is the most prominent development activity, with more than half 
of organisations in Khorog running at least one project in this broad domain. Interviews 
findings conform to the OECD assessment of Tajikistan experiencing severe fragility in the 
economic dimension. At the same time, economic development was described as the sphere 
with the most development potential in the GBAO. Development professionals explained the 
reasons for this fragility in different ways. 
The Soviet era was seen as an explanation for the persistent economic weakness of the 
GBAO. Because there was a continuous external supply during the Soviet time, the 
population of Gorno-Badakhshan had little experience in establishing their own businesses. 
One interview partner stated: “Thinking economically and plan in accordance was unlearned 
by the Pamiris during the Soviet era”. Hence, the promotion of local businesses through 
different measures ranging from skill training to start-up consultation and providing financial 
assistance is seen as an important driver for the sustainable development of the area. 
Furthermore, the importance of creating new job opportunities and strengthen economic 
activity in the GBAO was repeatedly emphasised.  
Gorno-Badakhshan has the highest official unemployment rate in Tajikistan with 6.8 percent, 
compared to 2.3 percent in the whole of Tajikistan (The World Bank 2018b: 7). The rate of 
unregistered unemployment is however substantially higher. Along with a general lack of 
financial resources this results in an extremely high number of people emigrating to work 
abroad, mainly to Russia. Tajikistan is the most remittance-dependent economy worldwide 
(BS 2018: 35), with remittances taking a share of 40 percent of Tajikistan’s GDP (The World 
Bank 2018a: x). 
Much development work is directed towards the facilitation of cross-border trade with 
Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and China. Interview partners emphasised the reestablishment of 
close economic relations with the border region of Afghanistan. This includes the 
construction of cross-border bridges, the expansion of the road networks, the development 
of localised markets and trading places as well as the export of hydroelectric energy across 
the border. These programmes led to an increasing exchange of goods and knowledge. 
Education  
Another main area of interest for development agencies is education. There are AKDN-
founded educational institutions such as the Aga Khan Lycee (AKL), the University of Central 
Asia (UCA) and the School of Professional and Continuing Education (SPCE). The focus is on 
educational training for people of every age. Activities include early childhood programmes, 
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school education as well as skill training for adults engaged in manual work, health or social 
sectors. However, there are also educational projects that are not promoted by the AKDN-
related agencies and organisations that pursue the similar goals. In either case, the idea to 
facilitate education for development is that the local population should be enabled to drive 
the development of the country without having to rely on external donors or expertise. 
Environment 
The idea of sustainable development today serves as a comprehensive model of development 
cooperation, with the aim to enable ecological management, environmental protection, 
resource conservation, social justice and economic efficiency. The agencies in Khorog that 
engage in the fields of environmental protection and sustainable development initiate 
projects dealing with climate change adaptation, soil conservation, sustainable natural 
resource management or sustainable tourism. 
Health 
New health facilities such as a dentist clinic, a new hospital and a diagnostic centre are 
currently constructed along with training programmes for medical staff. The latter aspect 
addresses one of the main problems in the health sector that is suffering from a lack of 
educated and skilled employees. Limited adequate health services in remote areas are 
addressed through rural community health trainings. Target group are women in particular, 
who are trained to provide basic health service to family and neighbours, complemented by 
hygiene courses for children and educational programmes for pregnant women. 
Infrastructure 
Infrastructure projects aim at the construction of bridges, the repair of irrigation channels 
and the maintenance of drinking water supply systems. These activities are essential for 
integrated development as they are closely linked to food security, health and economic 
development that all depend on functioning infrastructures.  
(Micro)Finance 
Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs) make financial services available to small private 
enterprises and households. Small businesses as well as private persons can borrow small 
amounts of money, albeit with high interest rates. Until recently no microfinance 
programme existed in the GBAO. In cooperation with the AKDN the First MicroFinance Bank 
– Tajikistan (FMFB-T) was established in 2003 and started operating in 2004. The programme 
facilitates access to and use of formal financial services. However, all credits – except 
agricultural credits with ten percent interest rate – have high interest between 24 and 35 
percent, and under these profit-oriented procedures its effets as a method to facilitate 
economic development seems doubtful. Background checks shall safeguard that “loans are 
only granted to people with sustainable income or a business, so nobody ends up in debt”, 
as an interview partner said. A more accessible approach to cash money is provided through 
the work of community-based saving groups that have been established by the MSDSP in 2010 
and that today function independently of external intervention. Its most popular form is the 





In development policy discussions and practical development cooperation there is a debate 
about the connection between participative processes and the democratic rule of law. 
Projects that focus on the issues of security, crisis prevention, peace building and the 
promotion of democracy refer to cross border and border management programmes, 
establishing participatory governance through community-based planning, establishing 
village councils to facilitate local governance systems and the prevention of resource 
conflicts.  
Tourism 
Tourism is seen as one of the most promising sectors for the economic development of the 
GBAO. The main task is to develop a tourist friendly environment without losing authenticity, 
and some organisations are active in promoting the local tourism industry through 
consultations, providing maps and other materials and selling local handicraft items to 
foreign tourists. The community-based tourism programme that is highly successful in 
neighbouring Kyrgyzstan has also started in the GBAO, but there remains room for 
improvement. 
Women  
It can be observed that in Gorno-Badakhshan the share of women in labour force is higher 
than in the rest of Tajikistan (Middleton 2016: 20).  
This is supported by development initiatives, underlined by the belief that such initiatives 
are conducive to empowering women in the GBAO. Projects focus on women in low-income 
households, and women receive cash transfers needed to take advantage of prenatal care, 
trainings on nutrition and hygiene, as well supporting their children’s school attendance and 
health checks. 
This very general overview gives an idea of the wide range of development efforts taking 
place in the GBAO. The fact that the AKDN is the only development actor that has a presence 
in all these thematic areas serves as an indicator for its role in substituting of governmental 
responsibilities since the civil war. “In the mountains of Tajikistan [...], the Ismaili global 
assemblage constitutes an administrative and symbolic entity in many ways more significant 
than the state itself. The implications for sovereignty and citizenship are significant” 
(Steinberg 2011: 131). 
Tajikistan as a fragile state  
Tajikistan has achieved huge improvements since the end of the civil war in 1997. According 
to the World Bank, the country achieved a rapid poverty reduction over the last two decades, 
with ‘extreme poverty’ falling from 54 percent in 1999 to five perent in 2015 (‘poverty’ as 
defined by the Tajik state fell from 73 percent in 2003 to 31 percent in 2015), although the 
process has slowed down over the last years (The World Bank 2018: xi) - with strong seasonal 
fluctuations as well as severe differences between rural and urban areas. Even though 
poverty declines and per capita incomes rise, the whole country is highly dependent on the 
economy of Russia, being “the most remittance-dependent economy in the world” (BS 2018: 
4). Another problematic factor is widespread bribery, as perceived by a programme manager 
of an NGO in Khorog: “[it] is everywhere, at every level in every institution.”  
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According to the OECD, Tajikistan worsened 
in four out of five fragility dimensions 
between 2016 and 2018 (Fig. 5). “However, 
deterioration was particularly apparent in 
the security [...] dimensions. The decline in 
the security dimension was the most obvious, 
with risks associated with terrorism and 
violent conflicts having increased” (OECD 
2018a: 89). In 2018, the economic dimension 
represented most critical aspect of 
Tajikistans state fragility, followed by high 
degrees of ‘environmental’ and ‘societal’ 
fragility. It would be important to explore in 
further work if a correlation exists between 
the number of development projects as 
explored in this paper (Fig. 6) and different 
dimensions of state fragility. The OECD-
evaluation, however, contradicts a report 
from the International Fund for Peace, 
stating that Tajikistan “strongly improved’ 
between 2016 when the country was 
classified with a ‘high warning’” (Messner et 
al. 2016: 7) and 2018 when the classification 
dropped to “elevate warning” (ibid.: 7). 
However, the general picture is the same - 
both reports locate Tajikistan on the 











Fig. 5: Fragility level in Tajikistan in the 
years 2016 and 2018.                                          
Source: Vipavc 2019 (draft based on OECD 












Fig. 6: Number of development projects in 
Gorno-Badakhshan.                                              
Source: Bredigkeit 2018 (draft) 
The AKDN in Gorno-Badakhshan - a state within a state?  
Mohammad Poor reaches the conclusion that the AKDN network can be described as 
“authority without territory” an “embodiment of a “hybrid leadership” which is not eroded 
by modernity, but it has even become more powerful through it” (Mohammad Poor 2014: 
21). An important addition can be found in Bolander’s work, who summarises that the idea 
of a united Ismaili community is largely achieved by the “widespread use of nation-state 
symbols and structures, including a constitution and a flag, a cohesive “development 
bureaucracy”, a “highly centralised”, “institutional infrastructure”, and a shared official 
language – English” (Bolander 2016: 584). In some countries, representatives of the AKDN 
enjoy diplomatic status, and the “national “resident representative” has legal ambassadorial 
status” (Steinberg 2011: 11), which is the case in Tajikistan as well (Mohammad Poor 2014: 
196).  
Development actors and citizens of Khorog alike asserted that people identify themselves as 
Ismailis and Pamiris first rather than Tajiks, corresponding to Steinberg who writes that in 
(often isolated) spaces, where the state persecutes and marginalises its own citizen, 
“individuals [...] become more closely affiliated with a transnational, nonterritorial 
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organisation than with the territorial nation-state of which they are citizens” (Steinberg 
2011: 19). Even though there was no significant military action in the GBAO during th civil 
war, the consequences for the region were overwhelming and the “exclusion of Isma’ili’s in 
Tajikistan must be framed at least in part in the context of the Tajik civil war” (ibid.: 126) 
Marginalisation of the Ismailis meant that “over 60,000 Ismailis living in the central parts of 
Tajikistan took refuge in Badakhshan” (Elnazarov and Aksakolov 2011: 57). It is crucial to 
keep in mind that until the period of Gorbatschow’s perestroika and glasnost’ policies, any 
religious beliefs were actively suppressed by the central Soviet government. Hence, only 
after 1991 the embedding of the Ismailis of Central Asia into their wider community became 
possible (Bolander 2016: 590). Together with the formation of the AKDN, this process could 
explain the cohesion of the Pamir-Ismaili community in and beyond the borders of the GBAO. 
The AKDN played a substantial role in the aftermath of the civil war by starting the first 
comprehensive relief programme (Pamir Relief and Development Programme). Since 1993, 
US$ 110 million from own resources were mobilised for Tajikistan (Abdullaev and Akbarzadeh 
2010: 51 f.). During this time, the network took over almost all responsibilities that a state 
must fulfil and contributed to “somewhat fragile, and uneasy peace” (Kevlihan 2016: 424). 
It can be safely stated that the “AKF virtually assumed the role of the government in 
Badakhshan during this period, while also establishing itself as the dominant broker between 
the international aid system and the population of the region” (ibid.: 524). 
Today, the website of the network states that the “AKDN works towards the vision of an 
economically dynamic, politically stable, intellectually vibrant and culturally tolerant 
Tajikistan” (AKDN n.d.). As an organisation with roots in a religious belief, AKDN programmes 
were not exclusively targeting Ismailis but directed at the whole population of Gorno-
Badakhshan. This intercommunal focus has been both interpreted as a holistic approach and 
a strategy to secure its own legitimacy by stabilising the country (De Cordier 2008: 176). 
For example, the Aga Khan Education Service (ES) has an outreach programme all over the 
GBAO to facilitate the education of government teachers through AK-teaching staff in order  
to assure quality education in public schools 
and to teach people to become responsible 
citizens: “We serve the country in a peaceful 
way. [...] governmental school children and 
teachers should have the same chances and 
education.” The omnipresence of the AKDN 
in Gorno-Badakhshan is obvious. Every other 
organisation we had interviews with 
collaborated with one or several institutions 
of the network and any project we saw 
carried their logo. Project signs are often on 
the side of the road and refer to specific 
measures applied at the respective place 









Fig. 7: Project sign in Buni Village.                      
Photograph taken by Vipavc, July 2018  
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The Establishment of Village Organisations by the MSDSP 
A concrete example about the way the AKDN branches work is provided through a case study 
about the implementation of a Village Organisation (VO) in Khidorjev Village by the MSDSP. 
The MSDSP has a strong presence in the region and according to their statistics works in 443 
out of the 700 villages in the GBAO. In these places, community institutions of ‘participatory 
governance’, i.e. VOs, were established. The goal of the programme is to establish civil 
society institutions skilled in political participation by increasing the competency, 
accountability and legitimacy of the VO as the governing body for local community based 
local development planning. Thus it “creates a form - neither entirely exogenous nor entirely 
indigenous - that is not simply specialised and oriented toward “development” but is also a 
generalised, new, and enduring element of local society” (Steinberg 2011: 166). The VO has 
several tasks: it serves as a village council that plans community projects, conducts 
monetary or no-cash help programmes for people in need through a common fund, requests 
development aid or money for certain projects, plans festivities and maintains common 
placecs in the village. In other contexts, these tasks are carried out by the state, but “since 
1991, there has been virtually no state-run administration at this level” (Bliss 2006: 318).  
We had the chance to visit one village where the concept of the VO was implemented and 
presented as highly effective, with the resident population seemingly convinced about its 
virtues. Steinberg (2001), however, states that the “feelings toward the VO structure are 
highly ambivalent and sometimes critical” (Steinberg 2001: 168). He ascribes this restrained 
commitment to a utopian memory of the Soviet era. To explore these different perceptions 
about the VOs, a case study was carried out based on interviews with the members of the 
VO and inhabitants of Khidorjev. Results indicate that there was a high degree of 
acceptance. This can be illustrated by introducing the proceedings of a participatory 
community-based joint local development planning in Khidorjev. 
Case Study: Participatory Community based 
joint local development planning  
Khidorjev has a population of 1,178 inhabitants 
residing in 143 households and is located close to 
Khorog. In 1999, a Mahalla committee was introduced 
by MSDSP where each resident can participate. The 
head of the committee is the Rais who gets elected 
for five years by the whole population of the village 
(Fig. 8). Every member of the committee must pay six 
Tajik Somoni per month. The main focuses of the 
development topics for the village are set by the 
committee. Efforts are made to facilitate the 
employment for young people, natural disaster 
management and the processing of agriculture 
activities. Once a month a meeting takes place in 











Fig. 8: Village Committee Structure.                   
Source: Bredigkeit 2019 (draft based on 
information provided by the head of the           
VO of Khidorjev 2018)  
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discussion on how the development of the village can be promoted. If the committee agrees 
on a problem solution, the committee will try to realise the development project either on 
its own or by appealing to the help of larger development organisations.  
By raising funds in the community people of Khidorjev built new irrigation channels, 
supported a poor family, and repaired bridges. Other projects are supported by different 
development organisations. For example, an Early Childhood Education Centre was built with 
the support of private donors from Canada and MSDSP as well as new village factories to 
ensure further processing of various products.  Eighty percent of the monthly contributions  
of community members are deposed into a 
bank account, enabling households to apply 
for a loan from this bank account in times of 
need. The borrower must pay two percent 
interest on the loan, a much more reasonable 
possibility when compared with the offers of 
micro financing institutes. In terms of coping 
with risk situations that affect residents of 
Khidorjev, they employ various coping 
strategies often initiated by the VO and 
partially financed by development agenies 









Fig. 9: Project sign Khidorjev Village. 
Photograph taken by Vipavc, July 2018  
 
Table 5: Risk and coping capacities in Khidorjev Village  
Risks Coping capacities 
Strong exposure to natural disasters Natural disaster management: Disaster 
information and early warning systems, 
deforestation, improved farming 
methods 
Lack of sanitation  expanding household infrastructure  
High number of unemployed youths e.g. loan from organisation with better 
conditions for business creation, 
creating jobs by building new factories 
Missing education, no school with 
standards 
Early Childhood Development Centre by 
MSDSP 
Strong dependence on resource rent 
and a lack of opportunities for 
producing fruits and vegetables 
Processing of agriculture activities, 








Conclusion - Microcosm of Development Organisations in Khorog  
This paper dealt with the fact that in the case of Gorno-Badakhshan many government 
responsibilities are outsourced to development organisations, and that the AKDN assumes a 
central role in carrying out and coordinating development efforts in the region. The work of 
development organisations led by the AKDN filled the institutional vacuum that emerged 
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and today addresses all dimensions identified by 
the OECD state fragility framework for Tajikistan. AKDN institutions promote bottom-up, 
community-based approaches, and its activities reach far beyond the region of the Tajik 
Pamirs, representing a transnational community of Ismailis all over the world. It is by far the 
most important organisation in the GBAO, and its outreach to a majority of villages through 
the VO-programme led to the establishment of accountable institutions of local governance 
that also cooperate with government authorities and NGOs. 
The approach of the AKDN in Gorno-Badakhshan is successful in serving a majority of the 
people and in strengthening peoples’ capacities, while at the same time relieving the central 
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